*1 517 of interest and maintain their conflicts confidentiality. They duty
clients’ have-no parties.
protect the interests of adverse Cohen, Whitfield, England,
Skarbrevik v. & 692, 627, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. public
(1991)(strong policy maintaining and
enforcing fidelity duty to- duty against imposing
ward client militates Pollack, nonclients); Fox v. 181 Cal. (1986).
App.3d Cal.Rptr. hand, On the other rule
insulating attorneys’ clients from their false statements, misleading made at the behest client,
or with the consent of a would allow
parties misrepresent impunity. Stat questions usually jury
ute limitations
questions. If Bank concealed the full setoff; Strassburg
extent of its had claim;
actual or constructive of a diligence
and whether he exercised to discov
er his cause of action are all issues of fact for jury. Summary judgment is reversed. MILLER, C.J., SABERS, GILBERTSON, JJ.,
AMUNDSON and
concur.
Eugene Rumpza, RUMPZA and Melinda Appellants,
Plaintiffs and ENTERPRISES, INC.,
DONALAR Appellant,
Defendant and
Stockholm Farm Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, Inc., Corpora- a South Dakota
tion, Appellee. Defendant and
No. 20133.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Argued Feb. 1998. May
Reassigned 1998. July
Decided *2 Shore], people
a house on
and the
[South
residing
were still
‘in there and would be
home,
moving
out of that
going
making
repairs
put
some
...
*3
up
possibly
it
for rent and also
for sale.”
1,
Rumpza
April
contacted Larsen on
[¶ 4.]
1993,
property.
par-
to insure this
After the
$50,000
proper
ties determined that
coverage,
amount of
Larsen added the South
existing policy
to an
Shore
issued
by Stockholm Farm Mutual Insurance Com-
(Stockholm).
Incorporated
pany,
Shortly af-
effect,
ter the
went into
certain im-
undertaken,
provements to the home were
Hieb of
Lee Schoenbeek
Jack
Schoen-
sale,
Rumpzas
listed the
for
Webster,
Office,
plaintiffs
for
beck Law
possession
a
secured
renter to take
Rumpzas.
appellants,
26,
home effective June
1993. The home on
Woods, Fuller,
property caught
E. Moore of
Shultz
James
South Shore
fire and
Falls,
Smith,
ap-
19,1993.
totally destroyed
for defendant and
&
Sioux
on June
Enterprises,
pellant, Donalar
Inc.
Rumpzas timely
[¶ 5.]
notified Stockholm
Ohnstad,
George
John V.
Jr. of
Boos and
replied by
of their loss. Stockholm
letter
Ohnstad, Milbank, for
Boos &
defendant and
14, 1993,
July
in
granted
dated
which it
appellee.
permission
vacancy
concluding
for the
after
poten-
that Larsen’s
of a
limited
(on
GILBERTSON,
reassignment).
Justice
vacancy
“permission”
tial
constituted
for the
vacancy
policy.
then
Stockholm
under
agent appeal from
Insureds and their
loss,
paid Rumpzas sixty percent of their
less
in favor
insur-
summary judgment entered
deductible,
$29,500.
total of
$500
er after the trial court concluded certain
informed Stockholm
were
vacancy
policy provisions relating to
$50,000.
seeking
policy,
face
value
unambiguous and insured's failed to demon-
Ohnstad,
attorney,
Jr.
Stockholm’s
John
strate insurer
breached insurance con-
had
(Ohnstad),
Rumpzas a letter dated Au-
sent
part,
part,
in
in
tract. We affirm
reverse
16, 1993, in
his
gust
stated
belief
proceedings
remand for
consistent with
Rumpzas’
home “was not vacant when
this opinion.
... and Mr. Lar-
was insured
Stockholm
believe that the house would
sen was led to
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
n
occupied by
continue to be
someone.”
recently detailed the facts under
[¶ 2.] We
5,
November
filed suit on
Rumpza
lying
fire insurance case in
1993,
claiming
against Larsen and Stockholm
Larsen,
810, (Rump-
ing to remove John Ohnstad 1. [¶ 10.] Whether circuit court erred as counsel for Stockholm. granting summary judgment in fa- In 8.] addition to the issues [¶ raised vor of Stockholm on the breach of Rumpzas, following Donalar raises the contract claim. issue: policy We reverse as the 5. Whether the endorsement at- provision relating ambiguous is as Rumpzas’ policy tached to the was in- applied to the facts of this An insur case. validated SDCL 58-10-10. policy ance must be examined as whole. Dakota, Minnesota, City Watertown v. & STANDARD OF REVIEW R.R., Eastern 1996 SD Our standard of review for sum (citation omitted). Rumpzas’ policy mary judgment is well established: In re following amendatory contained the endorse viewing grant summary or a denial of ment: 15-6-56(c), judgment under SDCL we deter moving party mine whether the has demon AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT
strated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and This endorsement BROADENS and in judgment showed entitlement coverages, some instances RESTRICTS merits as a matter of law. The evidence please carefully read favorably must be viewed most non- VACANT PROPERTY: moving party and reasonable doubts moving par- should be resolved Insured Premises are considered va- (cid:127) cant, is:1 claim that if the Stockholm’s “entire is not pages contained in; lived a. Not policy” its and that there was an “unwritten furnishing; or b. Void of necessarily term which must be included Furnished, full- c. not used as a but give meaning the contract - primary residence. time Rumpzas allege would assert.” this “unwrit- ten term” is how*Stockholm defines and de- add number 11 2. Under conditions rendering termines vacancies thus as follows: ambiguous. agree. We will not for loss while the We premises beyond is vacant insured (cid:127) Nowhere in the can be period days. permission If has of 30 found reference to how Stockholm deter granted vacancy, in lieu been of. mines is vacant in whether at the premium, the amount of increased ception coverage importantly or more how percent. will be reduced seeking coverage an insured know he would partial during In the event of a loss paying premiums property. for vacant period, payment vacant no will determining vacancy The method for is cru repairs complet- made until have been give provision any cial to meaning what *5 ed. Stengel soever. President of Stockholm tes agent tified that the determines of a written 12.] Construction [¶ procurement stage policy may the question contract of law which we review bind Stockholm with that determination. de novo. Bell v. East River Elec. Power may “An ... estopped insurer in refer Inc., 750, (S.D.1995); Coop., 535 N.W.2d 754 particular meaning ence to the of a term in Adkins, American Bank v. 458 N.W.2d State interpretation one of its contracts its own (S.D.1990); Valley Dirks v. Sioux of that term.” Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Ass’n, Inc., Empire Elec. 450 N.W.2d Segalla, (3d § Couch on Insurance 21:8 (S.D.1990). 427-28 ed.1996) cases). (collecting provisions poli- Where the of an insurance cy fairly of susceptible different inter- Stengel has that admitted the pretations, interpretation the most favor- way knowing prop insured has no of that his adopted. able to the insured should be erty policy is considered vacant under the This rule of of liberal construction favor approved by agent unless no the strictly against the insured and the insurer Moreover, in tified the insurer. the absence applies only language where the insured, agent telling of the the the insured ambiguous insurance contract is and sus- quoted does not know if he has been and is ceptible interpreta- of more than one premiums paying higher prop the for vacant tion_ mean, This rule does not howev- erty regular premiums occupied prop or for er, may that the court seek out a strained they erty. Rumpzas maintain never believed meaning or unusual benefit of the the paying premiums anything less insured. coverage. full that he than Larsen testified Fidelity property 1996 had been told the would be unoccu Olson U.S. Guar. (citation pied period up days for a of but did not SD omitted). apply quotations consider the exclusion would 1. Some exists the semi-colons and the word “or” in the confusion over whether above conditions disjunctive conditions are to be read in the conjunctive. or the set forth above is awkward at best. agreed The circuit court President, Stengel, Even Stockholm's was un- constituting Stockholm that the va- conditions meaning give sure how to the section property disjunctive cant are set forth in the so any asked whether each or one of the condi- applies that if one of them the is vacant. to be met for the to be tions have The circuit court held the clear and unam- considered vacant under the endorsement. He biguous as a matter of law because the "South in, interpret replied, guess “I I know how to don’t Shore was not lived nor was it used primary of that.” as full-time residence." The use premiums The circuit court request higher amend. reasoned
so he did Rumpzas’ Rumpzas possible of a basis the attention.2 “became aware bring the matter to for the willful and vexatious refusal to interpreting principle In accord with during deposition claim” of Stockholm’s insured, in liberally in favor of the expert subsequent which was held determining whether the use made Furthermore, stipulation use, to dismiss. contemplated premises constituted the during three-year existing court believed proper to consider the suit, span Rumpzas adequate an known to the had preexisting circumstances agent opportunity owner when the was is- to “consult number of insur- sued, as itself. experts well as ance in their search for a basis for the claim.” (footnotes Insurance, § omit- 94:43 Couch ted). motion based their pro- Larsen has testified that his 16.] [¶ discovery July of a amend procured opinion, thought he had fessional taped allegedly conversation which “indicated A question full from Stockholm. complete knowledge that Stockholm had material fact exists as to a breach of contract agent their [Larsen] knew such, As we reverse and Stockholm. premises unoccupied would be for as much as remand for trial. days coverage.” when he issued This prior conversation was to the Au- recorded the circuit court erred [¶ 17.] Whether 16,1993 gust letter from Stockholm’s counsel allowing in not Ohnstad which claimed Larsen “was led to amend their and reassert believe that the house would continue to be the claim for willful and vexatious occupied by someone.” pay. refusal to [¶ did become aware of 20.] On November *6 taped finally this conversation until was Rumpzas’ requested that the circuit court by in disclosed Stockholm March of complaint allow them to amend their and shortly summary judgment before the final reassert a claim for willful vexatious Rumpzas hearing. argue tape contained pay.3 Rumpzas previously refusal to had present information or evidence that was not stipulated to a dismissal of the willful and they voluntarily pay to dismissed the counts vexatious refusal and bad faith counts. 6, 1996, thus, they on The circuit court denied the motion under November should 15-6-60(b) determining complaint after have SDCL been allowed to amend their Rumpzas to did show sufficient cause reassert the claims. court, shall, consistently adamantly appellate 2. Larsen has the trial court and the claimed property judgment that the was not "vacant” within the an if or award is rendered for provisions policy. deposition plaintiff, plaintiff At his allow a reasonable sum attorney’s testified: as an fee[.] provides part: SDCL 58-12-3.1 in question vacancy [T]his is a —-this The determination of entitlement to an al- occupancy. unoccupied. It was was It lowance of fees as costs and the vacant. § amount thereof under 58-12-3 shall be So, therefore, my opinion since it was separate hearing made the court ... at a vacant, why was never I should subsequent entry judg- of record to the aof be concerned with the endorsement if person making ment or award in favor of the policy? there is such under the I never consid- and, against company, claim the insurance if according ered the vacant to the in- made, an allowance is the amount thereof Rumpzas. I received formation from the judgment shall be inserted in or added to the hearing or award. Such a shall be afforded provides part:
3. SDCL in 58-12-3 upon request of the claimant made with- proceedings days entry judgment In all actions or hereafter com- in ten after or against any company, menced ... insurance award. added). appears (Emphasis ... if it from the evidence that such The circuit court ruled on company pay though requires ... has refused to full issue even SDCL 58-12-3.1 loss, separate hearing entry amount of such and that such refusal is a court hold after ..., judgment. vexatious or a without reasonable cause maintains that the The circuit court 21.] [¶24.] should have con- [¶ dismissing allegation Rumpzas’ circuit court’s order sidered motion to their amend and, therefore, complaint SDCL 15- was a “final order” to claim willful and re- vexatious 6—60(b) apply. 15-6-15(a). pay the correct standard to fusal under SDCL disagree. previously The circuit court issued a dismissing We order the count with opinion prejudice on December letter was not a “final order” as contem- 15—6—60(b).4 plated by that the stated SDCL All Nation (S.D. Brown, Ins. Co. v. N.W.2d summary judgment November 1985). per We find there is sufficient basis Rumpzas negli- ... entered 15-6-15(a) upon complaint SDCL which the claim; gence this Court never reached the should have been amended. presented by issues the* ... willful and claim; vexatious refusal to the Novem- 3. Whether the circuit court erred judgment summary
ber 1995
has no bear-
allowing
in not
ing
current motion to amend.
amend their
and reassert
15—6—60(b)provides
part:
SDCL
the bad faith claim.
upon
On motion and
such terms as are
prior
[¶26.]
concede that
just,
may
party
the court
relieve
or his
deposition
Stengel
and the subse
legal representative
judg-
from final
quent
March, 1997,
tape
release of the
ment, order,
proceeding
follow-
indicating
did not have facts
that Stock
ing reasons:
holm
“an
had
absence of a reasonable basis
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
for a denial” of their claim. Julson v. Feder
neglect;
cusable
Mut.
ated
Ins.
1997 SD
(2) Newly
discovered evidence which
(citations omitted).
N.W.2d 117
After Stock
diligence
due
could not have been discover-
company
holm
admitted
relied
ined
time to move for a new trial under
agent’s
determination as to
and dis
15—6—59(b);
§
tape in
closed the
which Larsen stated that
(3)
(whether
Fraud
denom-
heretofore
vacant,
he did not
consider the
extrinsic), misrepre-
inated intrinsic or
question
taped
of fact was created. The
sentation, or other misconduct
an ad-
tangible
interview
Larsen
was the first
party;
verse
indicating
evidence
obtained
*7
Stockholm had
of Larsen’s initial
(6) Any
justifying
other reason
relief from determination that the house was not vacant.
operation
judgment^]
aware
Stockholm
added).
agent
determining vacancy
relied on the
in
(Emphasis
when the suit was initiated. The
Rumpzas contend the
dismiss
no
of
procedure.
makes
mention
this
This
of
al
the count was not a “final order” as
knowledge was obtained well after the suit
15-6-60(b),
required under SDCL
and there
brought
question
and creates a
of mate
was
15-6-15(a)
apply.
“par
fore
A
SDCL
should
rial fact
of
as to whether Stockholm’s denial
ty may
only by
pleading
amend his
leave of
claim,
through
August
1993 letter
by
court
of
written consent
the adverse
stating
counsel
that Larsen “be
to
party;
freely given
and leave shall be
to be occu
lieved
house would continue
15-6-15(a).
justice
requires.”
so
SDCL
Un
someone,”
pied
lacked a reasonable basis.
standard,
der either
we will disturb the lower
only upon
Supreme
finding
showing
court’s
a
that the
The
Court of North Dako-
an
decision was a “clear abuse of discretion.”
ta addressed a situation where
insured
(S.D.
information,
Kaarup,
presented
after receiv-
Hrachovec v.
evidence hereby upon making it incumbent [W]e are delegated its au- evidence that Stockholm judges of the circuit court this state thority to determine to Larsen who provision to enforce this [SDCL 19-1-3]. did not believe the would be vacant. Henceforth, attorney if an his testifies for so, pay Even refused to the entire matters, neither .client as contested claim. not this constitutes bad Whether or any nor member of his firm will be allowed merely faith is left to the trier of fact. We represent any pro- client at further ample hold there is evidence to amend the ceedings directly relating to that If case. complaint to include the claim. attorney some reason the does continue represent becoming the client after the circuit court erred [¶ 28.] Whether witness, testimony his will be considered failing attorney in to remove John incompetent and stricken from the record. as counsel for Ohnstad Stockholm. ¶ 28, Id. 1996 113 at SD N.W.2d As sufficient evidence exists for (citation omitted). to amend their to include Stockholm seeks to construe and willful and vexatious refusal to bad faith strictly, pro arguing SDCL 19-1-3 that the claims, we must examine the issue of hibition is limited to that of a “trial” and here the trial court should remove whether Ohns- jury argues no been It has seated. tad, attorney, Stockholm’s as counsel. The testify attorney Ohnstad could and still its trial court did not rule on the motion to discovery pre-trial proceedings at all remove to allow Ohnstad because refused disqualification present issue would grant- to reassert these claims and jury impaneled. itself until the While summary judg- ed motion for Stockholm’s vary definitions of a trial in the context unnecessary ment. It is for us to decide the used, such a definition as merits, disqualification issue of but we advocated Stockholm would make little provide relevant considerations for the circuit purposes sense when examined being court as this case remanded. place. in for the rule the first governs disposi- 19-1-3 [¶ 30.] SDCL prohibition A can in violation result provides part: tion of this issue consequences attorney serious for the attorney When an is a witness for his It his unfortunate client. can result except merely client trial as to disqualification from fur- *8 formal matters such as the attestation or participation ther in In the case. the al- like, custody anof instrument or the ternative, attorney’s testimony the con- is participate shall not further in trial. such incompetent sidered and is stricken from apply This section shall not when such Further, attorney may the record.... the attorney’s testimony in is offered answer inadvertently attack his own client’s credi- to evidence behalf of the received on other bility by testifying in a manner which con- party appear it shall satisfaction testimony.... flicts with the client’s attorney court that such had no the. Thus, it becomes a matter of evidence and anticipate necessity reason to the of his simply not a matter of ethics. As a viola- being a witness[.] attorney’s required tion of Rule 3.7 of the conduct, “Excluding testimony potential professional such avoids ethics is also involved Lange, may conflicts of interest.” v. 1996 and a in an Ward violation result unwanted ¶ 113, (citation appearance grievance SD 253 before the commit- omitted). removed, If not Ohnstad could not tee. .
525
Milled,
464
619 n. 4
the
Estes v.
N.W.2d
lieved
house would continue to
occu-
be
(S.D.1990) (citations omitted).
pied
holding
policy
Our
when the
was first issued.
in
of an
Ward that
roles
advocate and
“[t]he
It is clear
testimony
that Ohnstad’s
totally
a witness are
inconsistent and [the
sought
would be
on the contested issue of
attorney
assume both roles at the
cannot]
whether Stockholm’s basis’ for denial of the
time,”
logic
same
has the
force and
to
same
remand,
claim was
Upon
reasonable.
the
proceedings preparatory
jury
to the actual
trial court
hearing
should conduct a
to deter-
¶27,
trial.
information coun- fire, loss lightning tornado or sel; wholly and the insured is de- (2) sought the information is relevant and stroyed, part without criminal fault on the nonprivileged; and assigns, of the insured or his the amount of (3) prepa- information is crucial insurance written in the shall be ration of the ease. conclusively taken to be the true value of Harter v. Plains Ins. 1998 SD insured and the true amount 625, (citing v. N.W.2d Cascone Niles damages, of loss and measure of with the Children, F.Supp. Home following conditions: (W.D.Mo.1995) (relying upon Shelton (1) applies only This section if a total Corp., American Motors 805 F.2d ninety days fire loss occurs or more (8th Cir.1986))). after the was made or written or ninety days or more after amended should by twenty-five per- limits were increased allegations- be allowed to include of willful request. or more at the cent insured’s and vexatious refusal and bad faith. However, ninety days, within the first Stengel has admitted that Ohnstad was inti- payment to the insured shall in accor- mately process involved the claims with the terms dance and conditions provide the basis for these claims. witness, for valuation of the allege “may only that Ohnstad be the amount; absent stated explain available to Stockholm’s denial of (2) (1) given benefits his involvement with inter- Subdivision section does viewing prior apply unchanged policies, Larsen to Ohnstad’s letter on' renewal *9 Rumpzas.” policies adjustment of inflation lim- behalf Stockholm the The tape policies being recorded interview that Lar- its or to which are con- indicates coverage replacement sen did not believe the house would be vacant verted to cost appraised by Rumpzas upon form and was of the occu- from a lesser value Ohnstad, pancy agreement status of the home. howev- there is a written between er, 14, subsequent July company authored the the insured that the the policy a stating basis[.] letter to that Larsen be- will be written on valued MILLER, C.J., and [¶ 40.] The circuit court held that
[¶ 37.] 58-10-10, commonly KONENKAMP, J., as a referred to concur. SDCL statute, Rump- apply not policy did valued AMUNDSON, J„ and public furthered no policy zas’ because a,nd DOBBERPUHL, within Judge, the loss occurred Circuit dissent. purpose because coverage. of It days placement ninety of DOBBERPUHL, Judge, sit- Circuit prior to undisputed that the loss occurred is Justice, SABERS, ting disqualified. for ninety days inception expiration of coverage property. of the South Shore of for Donalar submits the addition (dissent- DOBBERPUHL, Judge Circuit property April on the South Shore - ing). existing policy of an a modification majority disagree I with the deci- a new contract for insurance did create 58-10-10(1). majority on one. The found the sion issue argu Donalar’s
under SDCL persuasive. April ambiguous insurance contract because it is not ment opportunity value the first for Stockholm to a term that failed to contain defines and property; a new risk. We the South Shore property. determines vacant The endorse- read statutes as a whole and effect must be clearly property ment vacant as “not defines provisions. Beitelspacher v. given to all its furnished, in; furnishing; lived void of or but (S.D.1989); Winther, primary not used as a full-time residence.” Hartpence Forestry Camp, Youth It further states that the insurance will not (S.D.1982); v. Heis N.W.2d State property beyond if cover a loss is vacant (S.D.1977). inger, 252 N.W.2d thirty days. clearly This states that begins by stating, 58-10-10 SDCL “When company property insurance determines that any policy of insurance is written or ever if occurs is vacant one three events for property[.]” renewed to insure real The thirty days. more than property for the South Shore was “written” Therefore, April first time on contending [¶ 44.] The are not statute, purposes of the valued a new that the endorsement can be inter- respect is formed with to the added preted ways, but the en- different believe property procures when the insured in first ambiguous dorsement is because the insured property real covered under a surance proper- does not know whether or not his/her previous policy between the insured and ty an in- requiring is deemed vacant thus company. insurance premium coverage. par- full creased No ty disputing agent is determines argues Donalar next policy insuring or the South Shore was whether not the is deemed va- policy “being replacement a converted to cost cant when underwrites the he/she coverage from a lesser value form” and according determination is made his/her 58-10-10(2) applies therefore SDCL as an to the in the Stock- definition endorsement. (1). exception exception of subsection president holm’s that the insured does stated argument easily disposed Id. This of as not know whether not his Donalar fails to demonstrate the existence of deemed vacant and or not he is whether agreement” a “written between the insured paying higher premiums to full receive cover- indicating and Stockholm was to age agent unless him. This cre- informs required be written on a value basis as under duty agent, ates and breach a 58-10-10(2). portion affirm SDCL We duty gives right the insured to recover refusing the circuit court’s order to invalidate negligence Rump- action which the under Rumpzas’ policy based the valued pursued separate zas have and which is policy statute. despite appeal. Rump- viable claim this Conclusion zas’ lack as to whether their property was deemed vacant or not and part, part, We affirm in reverse in
[f39.] pre- paying whether an increased proceedings and remand for consistent with opinion. ambiguous. mium does not make the contract *10 policy.5 the It undisputed Rumpzas The insurance contract and endorsement that the subject only-one interpretation, and pay premium, are did not an increased therefore, unambiguous. they only therefore were sixty entitled to percent of the premises value of the majority summary found that The [¶45.] they Finding received. the unambigu- judgment appropriate was not because a dispute, ous and no material facts in I can question of material fact as to the exists find no breach of contract the insurance the breach of contract because insurance Therefore, company. I would affirm the trial Larson, company’s agent, did not consider granting summary court’s of Stockholm’s poli- the vacant when he issued the judgment. cy procured full for and believed he Rumpzas. agent’s the The belief as to the I hereby am authorized state that status of the at the time he issued AMUNDSON, J., joins this dissent. controlling is not at the time of the dispute facts are not in that at
loss. The issued,
time the was own- former residing premises,
ers were at the and the
Rumpzas planning to make were some re-
pairs premises rent the out. After
fire, investigators determined that the house
thirty
had not been lived
for more than
whether the were deemed PARTNERSHIP, a District of Columbia alleged injury vacant when the occurred and partnership; Realty limited KP Hold- Therefore, not when the was issued. ings, Inc., corporation; a New York agent’s belief at the time he issued the Lloyd’s Component, Inc., a Minnesota policy not a material fact. corporation; general Altman, Norman dispute The facts are that the partner in KPKA Meadowlands Limited pay premium did not an increased Partnership; Management, Dimension permission and could not have received be- Inc., City corporation; a South Dakota agent premises cause never believed the Falls, S.D., municipality; Of Sioux amendatory were vacant. The endorsement Arnett, individually Frank and in his clearly explains premises that if the are va- capacity; official Does in John Jane beyond thirty days, cant Stockholm will not capacity, their individual and official loss, permission grant- for the if but Appellees. Defendants and vacancy, ed for the will insured receive Nos. 20227 and 20229. sixty percent property’s value. If the pays premium, they insured an increased will Supreme Court of South Dakota. receive the full value of their loss. Accord- April Argued 1998. ing to this Stockholm did not endorsement] However, have to cover the loss. July Decided gave the benefit of the doubt granted im- found had been permission plied agent’s due to the knowl-
edge possible vacancy issued the agent going sixty days. type agent
5. The knew that what was never told repairs remodeling going to make some to the home and it out to be or that the rent done thirty purchaser questioned, unoccupied until a was found. When home would be more than Therefore, agent depending type days. believed that do believe that this could I repairs, vacancy. unoccupied up home could be be considered