Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. StateRumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Colerain Township and its trustees appeal from a decision of the First District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court judgment denying Colerain’s motion to intervene in an action for declaratory judgment and injunc-tive relief filed by Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc., against the state of Ohio, denying the state’s motion to dismiss that action for failure to join Colerain, declaring the General Assembly’s amendments to
{¶ 2} The issue presented on this appeal is whether a township is a necessary party to a declaratory-judgment action challenging an enactment of the General Assembly as violating the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 3} Although Colerain Township may have a practical interest in the outcome of Rumpke’s declaratory-judgment action, a township has no legal interest in the General Assembly’s authority to enact laws and therefore is not a necessary party to a declaratory-judgment action challenging legislation as violating the one-subject rule. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 4} Rumpke and its subsidiaries own and operate a sanitary landfill located in Colerain Township, Hamilton County, Ohio. In 2006, Rumpke sought to expand its operation and filed an application to change township zoning, which Colerain denied. Thereafter, Rumpke sued Colerain in the common pleas court, asserting that because it is a public utility, it is not subject to the township’s zoning restrictions.
{¶ 5} During the pendency of that action, the 127th General Assembly passed, and the governor signed, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562, an appropriations bill establishing the biennial budget for the state of Ohio for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. In addition to making capital and other appropriations for the operation of state programs, the bill amended more than 300 sections of the Revised Code, including
{¶ 6} However, on September 2, 2008, before the amendments to those sections became effective, Rumpke filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunc-tive relief against the state, asserting that the amendments to
{¶ 7} On October 3, 2008, the common pleas court denied the motions filed by Colerain and the state and ordered that the amendments to
{¶ 8} On appeal by the state and Colerain, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Colerain’s motion to intervene, did not err in denying the state’s motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, and properly determined that the amendments to
{¶ 9} On Colerain’s appeal to this court, we accepted discretionary review of the following proposition of law: “A township is an interested and necessary party to a constitutional challenge brought by a property owner within the township’s jurisdiction to a law passed by the General Assembly that directly affects the township’s police powers over that owner’s property and pending litigation.” Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State,
{¶ 10} Colerain contends that it is an interested and necessary party required to be joined in Rumpke’s declaratory-judgment action pursuant to
{¶ 11} Alternatively, Colerain contends that even if it is not a necessary party pursuant to
{¶ 12} Rumpke, on the other hand, contends that Colerain is not a necessary party to its one-subject-rule challenge to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562, because it is not challenging Colerain’s zoning powers or any statute that the township is charged with enforcing, but rather is challenging the General Assembly’s power to enact the appropriations bill in violation of the one-subject rule. Accordingly, Rumpke asserts that Colerain had no legally protectable interest in defending the legisla
{¶ 13} Thus, we are called upon to decide whether a township is a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to an enactment of the General Assembly alleging a violation of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution if the outcome may affect township police powers over landowners and pending litigation.
Necessary Party Analysis
{¶ 14} R.C. Chapter 2721 provides a complete statutory scheme for obtaining declaratory relief. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (1989),
{¶ 15} Thus, whether a nonparty is a necessary party to a declaratory-judgment action depends upon whether that nonparty has a legally protectable interest in rights that are the subject matter of the action. We have considered whether the inclusion of a nonparty is necessary to the rendition of a declaratory judgment in several cases. In Driscoll, for example, we examined whether landowners adjacent to a parcel of property owned by a real estate development partnership were necessary parties to a declaratory-judgment action brought by the partnership challenging the constitutionality of township zoning as it applied to the parcel. We held that although the surrounding property owners may have had a practical interest in the outcome of the action — whether the partnership could construct apartment buildings on its property — they were not necessary parties to the partnership’s declaratory-judgment action, because they had no legal interest in a determination of the constitutionality of the township’s zoning resolution as applied to that property.
{¶ 17} Similarly, in Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron,
{¶ 18} And recently, in Natl. Solid Wastes Mgt. Assn. v. Stark-Tuscarawas-Wayne Joint Solid Waste Mgt. Dist.,
{¶ 19} Thus, our resolution of the present case depends upon whether Colerain has a legally protectable interest in rights that are the subject of Rumpke’s one-subject-rule challenge to the appropriations bill enacted by the General Assembly.
The One-Subject Rule
{¶ 20} In State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999),
{¶ 21} Because a township has no legally protectable interest in the authority of the General Assembly to enact a bill, a township is not a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to the bill premised on a violation of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. Accordingly, Colerain is not a necessary party to Rumpke’s declaratory-judgment action.
{¶ 22} Colerain’s remaining argument, that it should have been allowed to intervene in Rumpke’s action as of right pursuant to
{¶ 23}
Conclusion
{¶ 25} Admittedly, Colerain’s interest in its pending litigation with Rumpke may be practically affected by Rumpke’s declaratory-judgment action against the state, but Colerain has no legal interest in the authority of the General Assembly to enact amendments to
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 26} Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Colerain Township has no “legal interest” in this declaratory-judgment action and could not be joined as a party defendant in Rumpke’s action against the state, I must dissent. The township should have been joined as a party in this declaratory-judgment action under
{¶ 27} This case began when Rumpke sued to invalidate the General Assembly’s amendment to
{¶ 28} “Except as otherwise provided in division (B) or (C) or this section, sections 519.02 to 519.25 of the Revised Code confer no power on any board of township trustees or board of zoning appeals in respect to the location, erection, construction, reconstruction, change, alteration, maintenance, removal, use, or enlargement of any buildings or structures of any public utility or railroad, whether publicly or privately owned, or the use of land by any public utility or railroad, for the operation of its business.” Sub.S.B. No. 107, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 475.
{¶ 30} Just prior to the effective date of the amended version of
{¶ 31} The township does not seek to intervene in this matter merely because it claims an abstract interest in Rumpke’s constitutional challenge to amended
{¶ 33} The presence of the same issues in both the intervention and zoning cases, and the interdependence of those issues on the two cases, substantiates the township’s legal interest in this intervention case consistently with the joinder rule of
{¶ 34} The township has sufficiently demonstrated that its absence from the intervention case impairs its ability to protect its interest in maintaining its authority to regulate, control, and enforce land use within its boundaries. This is particularly true because it appears that Rumpke initiated the present case as a new and separate case from the already pending zoning action purposefully as a way to litigate the public-utility issue without the township’s opposing participation and as a way to gain a strategic advantage in the zoning ease. Despite the differing legal theories, these two cases involve related aspects of the same issues. Consequently, the township should be permitted to join as a party to assert its important legal interest in the present case ultimately challenging whether Rumpke is a public utility.
{¶ 35} Colerain Township’s interest in this case is clearly different from the interest of townships generally. The presence and interdependence of the same issues in both the preexisting zoning case and this intervention case give Colerain Township a specific, unique interest in the intervention case that is distinguishable from that of other township within the state. Permitting the township to intervene in this case would create no “unmanageable litigation,” as the majority asserts. Rather, it would simply permit an entity that has a legal interest that would be affected in the proceedings to protect that interest.
{¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Notes
. {¶ a} The amendment added a new sentence to the end of
{¶ b} “As used in this division, ‘public utility’ does not include a person that owns or operates a solid waste facility or a solid waste transfer facility, other than a publicly owned solid waste facility or a publicly owned solid waste transfer facility, that has been issued a permit under Chapter 3734. of the Revised Code or a construction and demolition debris facility that has been issued a permit under Chapter 3714. of the Revised Code.”
. The case is Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp., Hamilton C.P. No. A 0703073; 1st Dist. No. C-090223.