178 Iowa 184 | Iowa | 1916
I. Mary L. Rule is the widow of Samuel Rule, deceased, and bases her claim upon three several promissory notes made to her by her husband in his. lifetime and after the date of their marriage. These notes are as follows: One for $2,500, bearing date March 1, 1910; one for $900.50, dated December 13, 1912; and one for $1,298, dated August 5, 1914. The maker of these notes died February 17, 1915. The resistance to the claim made on these notes is in writing, and may be stated briefly as follows: That deceased was- not in fact indebted to plaintiff; that he never in fact executed or delivered the notes; and that said notes were without consideration.
*187 ‘ ‘ He said he wanted to protect her in what he owed her. He said he owed her the amount stated in the note. After I had written it, he signed Ms name and handed it to' Mary L. Rule.”
The defendants offered no evidence of any Mnd upon any of the issues raised by their objections. At the close of the testimony, plaintiff moved for a directed verdict in her favor, on the ground that the undisputed evidence shows a valid indebtedness of the deceased to the amount of the promissory notes. Defendants also moved for a verdict in their favor because of lack of evidence to justify a recovery. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion and sustained the motion of plaintiff. Defendants then filed a motion in arrest, because of plaintiff’s failure to offer any evidence tending to show that the notes were made or given upon any valid consideration, or that such transactions had any relation to plaintiff’s separate estate, stating that, without such showing, she could 'not recover thereon. The motion in arrest was denied.
“Where, as in this case, the marital relation is dissolved by the death of the husband, we see no reason why the. widow may not maintain an action directly on the notes against the administrator without formally resorting to a bill in equity. ’ ’
This holding seems to recognize that the common-law rule which forbids litigation of this character between husband and wife had its origin in a purpose to prevent domestic discord, and that such reason ceases with severance of the marriage by death, leaving the surviving wife at liberty to assert legal rights which, out of regard to the marital relation, the law would not recognize while that relation existed. We have also held that, even where the common law ruled and the legal title to the wife’s money passed to the husband, yet she retained an equitable title thereto, and if the husband, recognizing the equitable obligation arising therefrom, gave her his promissory note, the consideration was sufficient and the
“It cannot be doubted that a transaction between husband and wife, which is in the nature of a gift, or a matter of contract between them, is, in the absence of fraud or like conditions which would vitiate it, an enforceable one. The rule of the common law that a gift of personal property from husband to wife was void was based upon the fact that the title to all such property held by either was vested in the husband. In these later days, when the right of each to hold and manage their separate estate is recognized by statute, that rule is without application.” Harman v. Estate of Harman, 167 Iowa 106, 108.
Contrary to the rule recognized in many jurisdictions, it is the law of this state that the husband and wife may become partners in business. Hoaglin v. Henderson, 119 Iowa 720. In disposing of that case, the court, while recognizing the disability of the wife at common law, made use of the following language, which may be very appropriately repeated here:
‘ ‘ The time for that argument is past. The right to contract with the husband is now so well established that it would be inexcusable to say that its existence is negatived by a holding that public policy forbids a suit by the wife against the husband on account thereof.”
Unless we are to overrule these, and numerous other decisions of like character, the adoption of the theory contended for by appellants would be to affirm the anomalous proposition that, while the husband may enter into valid
“All contracts in writing, signed by the party to be bound . . . shall import a'consideration.”
The statute, in so many words, speaks of “all contracts,” and nowhere in the chapter or in the context is there any exception or saving clause which withdraws from its operation contracts between husband and wife. Counsel do not go to the extent of insisting that all contracts between husband and wife are invalid, or that all promissory notes by husband to wife are unenforceable. If such a note may be supported by a sufficient consideration, is there any good reason for excluding it from the benefit of the statutory presumption? To hold otherwise would work a judicial repeal or amendment of a statute the meaning of which is too clear for construction. It has been held too often to permit of any doubt that the burden is upon the party defending against a written instrument to plead and prove a want of consideration (McCormick v. Jacobson, 77 Iowa 582), and that, in the absence of such proof, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. See also Code Supplement, 1913, Section 3060-a24. In apparent recognition of this rule of law, the defendants herein did plead affirmatively the lack of consideration for the note sued upon, but wholly failed to offer proof in support of the plea.
That a plea that the note or contract sued upon was made and delivered on Sunday states a good defense, may be conceded. This brings us directly to the inquiry whether any such plea was made. That the question must be answered in the negative, we have no doubt. The defense that the note was a Sunday contract was neither made nor considered on the trial. The system of fact pleading has long obtained in this state, as it has also in a majority of the United States. The pleading of a mere legal conclusion raises no issue, and puts upon the opposing party no necessity or burden of proof.
“The plaintiff can only allege facts, and in answer, the defendant must either deny the facts alleged in the complaint or allege new matter by way of defence or avoidance. And when the answer consists merely of a denial, it is quite clear that the plaintiff will only be required to prove and the defendant only permitted to controvert the facts alleged in the complaint. ’ ’
Again, the court says:
“But even if it was admitted that the defendant might by a mere denial raise an issue on a fact not specifically alleged, yet the legality of the sale is not a traversable fact, but a conclusion or inference of law. . . . The true object of pleading is and always has been to apprise the adverse party of the ground of action or defence, in order that he may be prepared to contest it, and may not be taken by surprise. . . . Facts only are to be stated in pleadings, and not arguments, inferences or matters of law.”
Decisions are to be found which go to the extent of holding that if, at any time during the progress of the case through the courts, it appears that the plaintiff’s right of recovery
“It is true it was her right at the outset to set up and prove, if she could, that the note was a Sunday contract; but such defense would be purely technical. . . . It is a clear case of a technical defense, provided by statute in the interest of what is deemed public policy, and barren of justice as between the parties.”
The amendment was therefore held not to be in furtherance of justice, and leave to file it was properly denied. In Kentucky, it has been held that a defense to an action on a contract that such contract was made on Sunday must not only be specifically pleaded, but the defense must be stated as fully and specifically as would be required in framing an indictment. Ray v. Catlett, 51 Ky. 532. The case of Roop v. Roop, 35 Pa. 59, is authority for the proposition that an objection raised after the trial is over that the contract sued upon bears a date which the almanac shows to have been Sunday, is too late. The same court held, in Fox v. Mensch, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 444, that a defense of this character cannot be sustained unless the facts be specially pleaded. To the same effect is Herndon v. Henderson, 41 Miss. 584. Upon the general proposition that a special defense to an action must be specially pleaded, the Massachusetts court uses this language:
“If, for instance, the ground of defence is that an article*197 was never delivered, or that it was sold contrary to law, or if any defence is intended which goes to show that the transaction was illegal or void in its inception, it must be specified in the answer, in the same manner as release, accord and satisfaction, infancy, or any other defence in its nature matter of discharge or avoidance. ’ ’ Granger v. Ilsley, 68 Mass. 521, 523.
The bald statement by defendants in their objections to plaintiff’s claim-that the note presented “is illegal,” states no defense, within the meaning of our statutes on the subject of pleading. By no liberality of construction can it be said to specially plead, either expressly or by near or remote inference, the facts upon which a conclusion of the note’s illegality can be drawn. An uncovering of the real nature of the defense for the first time in a motion in arrest or motion for new trial is entirely too late, and the trial court rightfully refused to give it recognition.
In the case at bar, the trial court submitted to the jury two special interrogations-: First, whether the name signed to the ixote was the genuine signature of Samuel Rule; and, second, whether there was a delivery of the note. Upon both questions, the finding was in favor of the plaintiff, axxd, under the undisputed record and the rules of law to which we have adverted, these findings are coxxclusive.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the finding that there was a sufficient delivery of the note must stand; and, as this constitutes the sole defense submitted to our consideration, the allowance of plaintiff’s claim must be, and it is, affirmed. The same entry will be made in each of the three cases, consolidated for the purposes of argument. — Affirmed.