MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Carlos M. Ruiz (“plaintiff’), proceeding pro se, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) discriminated against him on the basis of his Hispanic national origin while he was employed as a Computer Assistant at the USDA’s International Institute of Tropical Forestry in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Presently before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint or, in *169 the alternative, for summary judgment, or for transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. In his motion, defendant argues that (1) plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to certain claims; (2) plaintiff failed to timely file his action within ninety (90) days of receiving his right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); and (3) venue is improper in the District of Columbia. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the 90-day statute of limitations imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
BACKGROUND
In May 2002, plaintiff began working as a Computer Assistant at the International Institute of Tropical Forestry (“IITF”) in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that from August 2002 until his departure from the IITF in August 2005, he was subjected to “constant harassment, hostile work conditions and discrimination.” Id. ¶ 2. 1 Specifically, he claims that his Caucasian supervisor, Lynda Lynch, “constantly interfered” with his attempts to complete his work, as she demanded that he perform his “website-manager duties” in a manner that was inconsistent with the regulations mandated by the Chief of the U.S. Forest Service. Id. According to plaintiff, Lynch accused him of “not knowing what [he] was doing,” id. ¶ 6, called him a “bureaucrat” in an insulting manner, and told him that “she did not have time for [his] games,” id. ¶ 11. Lynch subsequently removed plaintiffs website managerial duties' — allegedly “without justification,” see id. ¶ 6 — and hired a Caucasian woman to replace plaintiff as the IITF website manager, id. ¶ 13. Once he was no longer responsible for maintaining the IITF website, plaintiffs job included only “minimal computer support duties,” which caused his position to be at risk during the agency reorganization. See id. ¶¶ 14-15.
In November 2003, plaintiff complained to Ariel Lugo, Director of IITF, and Tito Santiago, IITF’s Human Resources Officer, about Lynch’s alleged “discriminatory actions and unfair practices.” Id. ¶ 14. On June 3, 2005, plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the USDA Office of Civil Rights, alleging that he had been discriminated against on account of his Hispanic national origin. See USDA Compl. at 1. Once he filed his complaint, plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against by Lugo and Santiago, who accused him of having “sabotag[ed]” the IITF website and told him that he had a “bad attitude.” See Compl. ¶¶ 16-17. Three days after filing his complaint, plaintiff was reassigned to another office. See USDA Compl. at 1. Then, on August 17, 2005 — shortly before plaintiffs official departure from IITF — plaintiff found a “counseling” memorandum on his desk-chair, allegedly drafted by Santiago, which criticized plaintiffs work performance and accused him of “manipulating [his] leave to milk the institute for their [sic] money.” Compl. ¶ 18; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2 (“Ruiz Letter”) at l. 2 Plaintiff *170 was so upset that the memorandum had been left in a public place where his colleagues could read it that he allegedly suffered an anxiety attack, which required emergency medical care. Compl. ¶ 18.
After this incident, plaintiff submitted an amended complaint to the USDA Office of Civil Rights. See USDA Am. Compl. at 1. The USDA consolidated plaintiffs two complaints on September 30, 2005, and explained that it would investigate (1) whether plaintiff was subject to discrimination based on his Hispanic national origin when he was reassigned on June 6, 2005; and (2) whether he was subject to discrimination based on his Hispanic national origin when he received the counseling memo on August 17, 2005. Id. The USDA subsequently issued a final decision denying plaintiffs request for relief, which plaintiff appealed to the EEOC in October 2008. See Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Docket Entry 5] (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 3. The EEOC affirmed the agency’s decision, and plaintiff requested reconsideration of the EEOC’s decision. See id. On June 19, 2009, the EEOC denied plaintiffs request for reconsideration, and notified plaintiff that he had 90 days from his receipt of the decision to file a civil action against the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. See Compl., Ex. 1 (“EEOC Decision”) at 1-2; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 4 (same) at 1-2. Plaintiffs complaint does not specify the date on which he received the EEOC decision denying his request for reconsideration (the “right-to-sue letter”). However, the certificate of mailing attached to the EEOC decision states that “the Commission will presume that this decision was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed.” See EEOC Decision at 3.
On September 16, 2009, plaintiff submitted an Application to Proceed Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (an application to proceed in forma pauperis or an “IFP application”) to this Court, and he attached his complaint to the application. See Pl.’s Opp. at 3-4; see also Compl., Ex. 2; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5 (same). On October 5, 2009, the Court denied plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis, and explained to plaintiff that “[a]s a result of the Judge’s ruling, your case has not been filed with our Court and is being returned to you at this time.” Compl., Ex. 2; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (same). More than four months later, plaintiff paid the requisite fifing fee and filed his complaint, which was docketed by the Clerk of the Court on February 24, 2010. Plaintiff claims that his delay in fifing after the Court’s denial of his IFP application was due to the fact that he was “saving the money to be able to pay the court fees.” See PL’s Opp. at 5. He further alleges that he consulted the local rules, but that he “could not find a reference to a time limit as to when or how to file the ease after a request to proceed in forma pauperis is denied.” Id. at 4.
DISCUSSION
Title VII requires that a plaintiff file a civil action within 90 days of receiving notice from the EEOC of his right to sue.
See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The 90-day statutory period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to fifing suit, but rather operates as a statute of limitations, and is thus an affirmative defense that can be raised in a pre-answer dispositive motion.
See Smith-Haynie v. Dist. of Columbia,
The Court will apply the more generous five-day presumption in this case, given that the certificate of mailing accompanying plaintiffs right-to-sue letter specified the presumptive date of receipt as five days after the decision was mailed.
See
EEOC Decision at 3;
see also Washington v. White,
Defendant argues that plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed because he did not file suit until February 24, 2010-245 days after receiving notice from the EEOC of his right to sue. See Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Defi’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 11. Plaintiff counters that he did, in fact, file suit within the statutory period, because he attached his complaint to his IFP application, which he submitted to the Clerk of the Coxxrt on September 16, 2009 — six days prior to the expiration of the 90-day statute of limitations. See Pl.’s Opp. at 3-4.
Several courts have addressed whether a complaint is “deemed ‘filed’ upon presentation to the court clerk when accompanied by an IFP motion, so that the formal filing ‘relates back’ ... to the ‘lodging’ of the complaint with the clerk.”
See Jarrett v. U.S. Sprint Comm’cns Co.,
Following the Tenth, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits, judges on this Court have also held that the filing of a complaint attached to an IFP application “is insufficient to commence the action and provide notice to the defendant for purposes of the 90-day requirement.”
Okereh v. Winter,
Here, plaintiff filed his IFP application on September 16, 2009, and the Court denied his request to proceed
in forma pauperis
on October 5, 2009.
See
Compl., Exs. 1-2; Def.’s Mot., Exs. 5-6 (same). Courts have not been entirely consistent as to whether the statute of limitations is equitably tolled only from the time that the IFP application is filed until the time that the Court rules on the application, or whether it remains tolled until the plaintiff receives notice of the Court’s decision.
See, e.g., Amiri,
This Court need not resolve this issue here, because plaintiffs complaint is untimely under either mode of analysis. Assuming that receipt is required, and applying the more generous five-day presumption, plaintiff is presumed to have received notice of the Court’s denial of his IFP application five days after its issuance, i.e., on October 10, 2009. Plaintiff filed his IFP application and initial complaint when only six days remained in the *173 90-day statutory period. Therefore, in light of the tolled statute of limitations, plaintiff — at the very latest — was bound to commence this action by October 16, 2009 (six days after his presumed receipt of the Court’s denial of his IFP application). But plaintiff did not file suit until February 24, 2010 — 131 days after the statute of limitations had expired, taking into account the 24-day period in which the statute of limitations was tolled (from September 16, 2009 to October 10, 2009).
Plaintiff has explained that he filed suit more than four months after the denial of his request to proceed
in forma pauperis
because he was “saving the money to be able to pay the court fees,” and that, as a
pro se
litigant, he did not understand the effect of the denial of his IFP application on the 90-day statute of limitations.
See
Pl.’s Opp. at 4-5. This Court is not unsympathetic to plaintiffs situation, but “[e]ven uncounseled litigants must act within the time provided by statutes and rules.”
Williams-Guice,
Plaintiff was clearly informed that he had 90 days to sue from the date that he received the final EEOC decision, and he decided to submit his IFP application with his complaint only six days prior to the 90-day filing deadline. When plaintiffs IFP application was denied on October 5, 2009, his complaint was returned to him, and he was instructed that his case had not yet been filed with the Court. See Compl., Ex. 2; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6 (same). Plaintiff then waited more than four months to pay the filing fee and initiate this action. Because plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter' — even taking equitable tolling into account — he failed to file his complaint within the time allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~5(f)(l). Accordingly, his complaint must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted. A separate order has been posted on this date.
Notes
. In his complaint, plaintiff does not specify the class-based impetus for the alleged discrimination that he suffered. For purposes of this motion, however, the Court will assume that plaintiff has alleged discrimination on the basis of his Hispanic national origin. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Docket Entry 3] ("Def.’s Mot.”), Ex. 1 ("USDA Compl.”) at 1 (accepting and referring for investigation plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of his Hispanic national origin).
. Although plaintiff’s complaint states that this event occurred on August 17, 2009, see Compl. ¶ 18, the record indicates that this *170 incident actually took place on August 17, 2005, see Def.’s Mot., Ex. 3 (“USDA Am. Compl.”) at 1; see also Ruiz Letter at 1.