Ruggles v. CannedyRuggles v. Cannedy
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Garoutte (en banc)
Chipman, C., and Cooper, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed.
Temple, J., Henshaw, J., Harrison, J., McFarland, J., Beatty, C. J.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE—NECESSITY OF RECORD—INVALIDITY AS TO CREDITORS.—The record of a chattel mortgage upon personal property pursuant to
ID.—PROMPT RECORD ESSENTIAL—INSOLVENCY OF MORTGAGOR—DELAYED RECORD—SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS—ACTION BY ASSIGNEE.—A prompt record of the chattel mortgage is essential in order to make it valid as against the creditors of the mortgagor; and where the record thereof was delayed for more than six months, and was made only two days prior to the adjudication in insolvency of the mortgagor, the mortgage is void, especially as to the subsequent creditors of the mortgagor, who, without notice of the mortgage, rendered credit to him; and the assignee in insolvency, representing such creditors, who have proved their claims, may maintain an action to have the mortgage adjudged null and void as to them. [Garoutte, J., Van Dyke, J., and Harrison, J., dissenting.]
ID.—GENERAL RIGHTS OF CREDITORS—SPECIFIC LIEN OR INTEREST.—In general, a creditor at large cannot set aside a chattel mortgage for want of record, or any transfer of personal property for want of an immediate delivery and change of possession, if he
ID.—PREVENTION OF SUIT BY INSOLVENCY—PROOF OF CLAIMS AGAINST INSOLVENT DEBTOR—REPRESENTATION OF INTEREST BY ASSIGNEE.—Where creditors of an insolvent mortgagor of personal property are prevented from suing by reason of the adjudication of his insolvency, and are limited to the proof of their claims against him, such proof is the equivalent of a judgment, and shows sufficient interest of the creditors in the mortgaged property to warrant the assailing of the chattel mortgage as a void act for want of prompt record, and the assignee in insolvency represents the interest of the creditors, and may recover the property for their benefit.
ID.—VOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY—EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION.—Where the debtor goes into voluntary insolvency, the adjudication in insolvency, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, is sufficient proof of the inadequacy of the property to pay the debts in full to justify a proceeding, on behalf of the creditors, to avoid a transfer or chattel mortgage which is void as to the creditors.
ID.—CODE PROVISIONS AS TO ASSIGNEE—GENERAL POWER UNDER INSOLVENT ACT.—The inclusion of the assignee in insolvency in
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County and from an order denying a new trial. W. H. Grant, Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Charles W. Thomas, for Appellants.
Philip Bruton, for Respondent.
The assignee in insolvency is not confined to powers given under section 55 of the Insolvent Act, but he represents the entire estate, under section 17 of that act, and he may set aside any transfer void as to the creditors, without reference to any question of fraud. (Merrill v. Hurlburt, 63 Cal. 494; Brown v. Bank of Napa, 77 Cal. 544.) The record in
THE COURT.—Upon further consideration we adhere to the following opinion and judgment heretofore rendered in Department:
HENSHAW, J.—This action is brought by the assignee in insolvency of one Wilgus, seeking a decree declaring void against creditors a chattel mortgage executed by Wilgus to defendant Cannedy. The appeal is from the judgment upon the judgment-roll alone. The findings of fact negative all claim of actual fraud and of a violation of the provisions of the insolvency act. The mortgage was made upon February 17, 1893, for a valuable consideration, and for a like consideration was assigned to the defendant bank, which took without knowledge of Wilgus’ contemplated insolvency. It was not recorded, however, until August 26, 1893, six months later, and two days before Wilgus, under his voluntary petition, was declared an insolvent. Intermediate the time of giving and the time of recording the mortgage Wilgus incurred debts, some of which were proved and allowed in the insolvency court. The creditors knew nothing of the mortgage until its recordation. The court, at the suit of the assignee, under the facts adjudged the mortgage to be null and void as to these creditors.
Two leading questions are thus presented: 1. Is a chattel mortgage, withheld from record beyond a time reasonably necessary for its prompt recordation, void against creditors whose claims have arisen between the date of its execution and the date of its recordation? 2. May such a mortgage be declared void at the instance of the assignee in insolvency on behalf of
Respondent, of course, maintains that both these interrogatories should be answered in the affirmative. Appellants oppose this, insisting that our recordation laws do not compel nor contemplate an immediate recordation of a chattel mortgage; that, if the mortgagee delays recordation, he merely takes the risk of losing his lien by a sale to an innocent purchaser, or of having it subordinated to that of creditors who have acquired superior rights by judgments, attachments, or executions; that whenever recorded the mortgage is valid against all creditors, saving those who have themselves acquired prior liens; and, finally, that in any event the mortgage recorded before insolvency, and not in violation of the insolvency law, may not be set aside at the instance of the assignee, who represents the insolvent, and who has no rights in the matter which the insolvent himself did not possess. As the unrecorded mortgage is valid between the mortgagee and the insolvent, as in its execution and delivery there was no fraud upon the insolvency law, and as no creditor has acquired a lien upon the mortgaged property before recordation, it is argued that the contract of mortgage is valid as to the assignee.
The determination of the first question must depend upon the language of our codes, and upon the policy of the law deducible therefrom.
In the early jurisprudence of the state, the law touching sales and mortgages of personal property was found in one and the same act concerning fraudulent conveyances and contracts. (Stats. 1850, p. 266.)
By section 15 of that act it was provided: Every sale made by a vendor of goods and chattels in his possession or under his control, and every assignment of goods and chattels, unless the same be accompanied by an immediate delivery and be followed by an actual and continued change in possession of things sold or assigned, shall be conclusive evidence of fraud as against the creditors of the vendor, or the creditors of the person making such assignment, or subsequent purchasers in good faith.
In section 17 it was declared: No mortgage of personal property hereafter shall be valid against any other persons than
Recordation at that time was unknown. Delivery and possession of the mortgaged chattel were required. But it is to be noted that, while as to sales the statute expressly demanded an immediate delivery, there was no such explicit exaction in the terms of the law governing mortgages. At a very early day this fact was called to the attention of the court, and upon it was attempted an argument of some substantial difference between the law governing sales and that governing mortgages. Thus, in Chenery v. Palmer, 6 Cal. 119, 65 Am. Dec. 493, we find the appellant complaining of an instruction by the lower court that to render a chattel mortgage valid against creditors there must be an immediate delivery. In Hackett v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 85, it is argued that such a mortgage is good against those who were not creditors, even after delayed possession taken. Finally, in Woods v. Bugbey, 29 Cal. 466, this court treated the question at length, and held that, as to delivery and change of possession, the same principle and rule applied whether the sale was absolute or conditional by way of mortgage. First quoting from Lay v. Neville, 25 Cal. 552, to the effect that the delivery must be immediate, it continued: The rule which our statute prescribes admits of no excuse dispensing with an actual and continued change of possession of the property sold, assigned, or mortgaged.
There is thus no room left for doubt but that the law of 1850 rendered void, at the instance of creditors, a chattel mortgage, unless it was accompanied by an immediate delivery and by an actual and continued change of possession of the property affected.
In time this statute of 1850 was repealed, and in place of the sections we have been considering were substituted the following code provisions:
Thus, in the case of the articles of personal property enumerated in
But here it is argued that, while the law makes recordation the substitute for an immediate delivery, it does not mean or require immediate recordation, but only provides that, when effected, recordation is the equivalent of immediate delivery and continued and actual change of possession. Considering that the law demands immediate delivery, and that recordation is but a substitute for it, it is not easy to see how an indefinitely delayed recordation may be said to take the place of an actual, immediate delivery. One being designed as a substitute for the other, what is the condition, in the one case, if the property be not immediately delivered? Indisputably, the mortgage is void as to creditors. What, then, is the condition in the other case for the indefinite period during which there has been no recordation? While recordation is lacking there is not only no equivalent for an immediate delivery, but there is no delivery at all. Recordation itself is the substitute for delivery.
A prompt recordation most obviously takes the place of an immediate delivery, and a delayed recordation of a tardy delivery. How, then, can a recordation effected one year
With this for the unquestioned policy of the law, how can it successfully be urged that an interpretation which fosters and encourages the very evil which the law was designed to check can be the true one? A mortgage without immediate delivery would create a secret lien, admittedly void against creditors. Is a mortgage without immediate recordation any less a secret lien, or any less an evil to be avoided? Prior to the amendment to
Fassett v. Wise, 115 Cal. 316, which appellants cite, is not in point upon the proposition we have been considering. This court was there called upon to construe the sections of the Civil Code (
We conclude upon this question that our law requires immediate recordation in lieu of immediate delivery, and that when such recordation is not effected the mortgage is void as against creditors of the mortgagor. The penalty for a failure to record promptly in the case of a mortgage is identical with the penalty under
But this, it is to be noted, does not mean that such a mortgage between the parties, and as to all the world, is absolutely void like an unrecorded builder‘s contract under the mechanic‘s lien law. It does mean, however, that it may be avoided at the instance of anyone in the enumerated classes—creditor, purchaser, or encumbrancer—whose right accrues during the time the recordation is withheld. Between the parties the unrecorded mortgage is, of course, valid. It is likewise valid against any creditor, purchaser, or encumbrancer whose claim arises after recordation. So, too, the mortgagee‘s interest in or title to the chattel affected by the unrecorded mortgage may be successfully asserted against a mere trespasser. Whether it is void against a creditor who extended credit before the making of the mortgage does not here call for decision. Suffice it to say that upon this, as well as upon many other questions concerning chattel mortgages, an irreconcilable conflict in the decisions of the courts upon statutes practically identical in language will be discovered. In illustration of this may be cited Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 476; Dempsey v. Pforzheimer, 86 Mich. 652.
But it is insisted that, even if an unrecorded mortgage is void at the instance of creditors, only those creditors may take advantage of the law who by judgment and execution levy, or at least by attachment levy, have acquired a lien upon the property before recordation. In this appellants place reliance upon section 237 of Jones on Chattel Mortgages, and upon the authorities which the learned author cites in support of his text. He speaks as follows: The only effect of delay in recording or filing a mortgage is to render it void as against intervening purchasers or mortgagees, or creditors obtaining liens by attachment, judgment, or execution. If the time within which a mortgage must be recorded or filed be not expressly prescribed by statute, it is sufficient that this be done at any time before possession is taken, or interest or liens are acquired by others, no matter how long this be after the execution of the mortgage. The record of a mortgage being only a substitute for the mortgagee‘s possession, it follows that, in the absence of any record, possession taken by the mortgagee before others have acquired any interest in the property makes his mortgage lien complete.
It is recognized that the authorities are in conflict upon this proposition, and that in some states it is held that a creditor must have acquired a lien before recordation of the mortgage, else it is valid against him. Such we have said is not the rule in this state. It is not the rule in Oregon, whose law provides: A mortgage of personal property is void as against creditors of the mortgagor .... unless it is recorded in the same manner as is required by law in conveyances of real property. (
Of course, it is true in general that a creditor at large of the mortgagor cannot set aside a mortgage for lack of recordation, any more than can such a creditor set aside a sale void for want of immediate delivery. He must come first with his judgment lien, execution levy, attachment, or some other process or right by which he has acquired a specific interest in or claim upon the particular property. But since, as has been discussed, he may acquire this lien or right after recordation, and since, when acquired, the mortgage is void as to him, it makes little difference whether it be stated as the rule that the law requires immediate recordation, or whether it be said that, while it does not require immediate recordation, the mortgage is void as to creditors who have become such during the time recordation has been delayed. It is but a change in the form of words,
In this case the creditors had not obtained judgments against the mortgagor, nor indeed had they instituted any proceedings against him at the time he was adjudged an insolvent. After that judgment, by force of the insolvency act itself, they were prevented from resorting to any proceeding in law or equity for such purpose. They were limited to the presentation of claims in the insolvency court. This they did, and when those claims were allowed and approved the questions involved in them became res judicata. The presentation, allowance, and approval of the claim, while not in strictness a judgment, had much of the force and effect of a judgment, and was the only thing in the nature of a judgment which creditors so situated could obtain. For the purpose of enforcing their rights against fraudulent or void acts of the insolvent, it is the equivalent of a judgment. (Roan v. Winn, 93 Mo. 503.)
We are not advised, nor do we understand it to be the rule in this state, that a judgment creditor must exhaust all other property before avoiding a sale, transfer, or mortgage by his debtor, which by the law is declared as to him void, or a fraud upon his rights. But, if it should be said that it is necessary for the creditor to show that he cannot otherwise make good his debt, we think a sufficient showing to that end is made in this case by the undenied averment of the debtor‘s voluntary insolvency. Insolvency in the law has two distinct and well-defined significations. Anderson, in his Law Dictionary, defines an insolvent as a person who is not pecuniarily able to pay his debts as they fall due; also a person whose property, if distributed among his creditors, would not be sufficient to pay their claims in full. Our insolvency act recognizes these distinct meanings. In proceedings for involuntary insolvency (Insolvent Act, sec. 8), aside from the acts of fraud therein enumerated,
2. We are come now to consider whether the assignee representing these creditors whose claims have been proved and allowed may institute on their behalf an equitable action to avoid the mortgage, an action which, but for the insolvency of the debtor, the creditors themselves unquestionably could have maintained after pressing their debts to judgment. The assignee‘s right so to do is combated upon two grounds: 1. Because, while
Merrill v. Hurlburt, 63 Cal. 496, and Brown v. Bank of Napa, 77 Cal. 544, were both by the assignee in insolvency to set aside a sale of personal property for legal fraud. In both the action was upheld. It is determined, therefore, in this state that the powers of the assignee in the premises are not limited to cases of fraud in fact.
But, independent of these reasons, there is still another consideration by which such an action as this upon the part of the assignee in insolvency is justified and upheld. By sections 18 and 21 of the Insolvent Act all of the estate of the insolvent passes to the assignee. As is said in Brown v. Bank of Napa, supra: The assignee has the right to sue for and recover everything due to the estate for the benefit of the creditors. While, as between the assignor and his vendee or mortgagee, the transaction is valid, as between him and his creditors it is void, and the title still remains in him. This title passes to the assignee in insolvency for the benefit of the creditors, and justifies him in maintaining an action in their behalf to reduce the property to possession. The statute provides for the assignment of property by insolvents to the end that it may be appropriated to the payment of debts. It authorizes proceedings to subject the property of debtors to the payment of their debts. As between the creditors and the debtor who fraudulently conveys property to defeat them, he is regarded as holding the title to or an interest in the property conveyed, and it may for that reason be made subject to his debts. If he holds no such interest, the law will not permit the creditors to appropriate the property, for it would not suffer the property of another to be taken for his debts. It thus appears that the debtor did hold as to the creditors an interest in the property, and that it passed to the assignee. It is said that the assignee takes the derivative title from the debtor and stands in his shoes. This is correct so far as persons other than creditors are concerned. As we have seen, as to creditors the assignee is regarded by law as holding an interest in and title to the land. (Schaller v. Wright, 70 Iowa, 667; Jones v. Yates, 9 Barn. & C. 532; Pillsbury v. Kingon, 33 N. J. Eq. 287.) By reason of the title which is thus vested in him we hold that the assignee may maintain this action.
It is said that the judgment should not be upheld because
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
GAROUTTE, J., dissenting.—I dissent from the conclusion declared in this case. I do not believe the bar of this state construe the law upon this question as it is here construed, and owing to the important principle involved I feel compelled to briefly indicate why this case should be decided the other way.
The true solution of the question raised upon this appeal is dependent upon the construction to be given
By virtue of the foregoing provision of the code it is now held that a chattel mortgage must be immediately recorded upon its execution, or, ipso facto, it is void as to creditors; and the fact that the mortgage may be recorded before any creditor takes a single step toward judicially enforcing his claims is a matter wholly immaterial. The inevitable result flowing from this decision will be to stamp many chattel mortgages as worthless property, when up to the present moment their genuineness has never been doubted. The serious results to follow from thus holding should lead the court to an opposite conclusion if a fair construction of the statute justifies it. For the simplest of reasons it is apparent that it would be work well done to de-
I am satisfied the provisions of the code only mean that unrecorded chattel mortgages are void as to creditors who assert their claims by attachment or otherwise before a recordation is had. This construction may be maintained without violating any principle of statutory interpretation, and for the reasons already suggested, if for no other, the court should so declare. I know of no reason based upon sound policy which may be urged in favor of a contrary construction. It is suggested in the majority opinion that such a construction of the statute cannot be declared because the policy of our law is opposed to secret liens. But my construction of the statute is directly in line with a policy opposed to secret liens. Until the chattel mortgage is recorded it is void as to third parties, and is only valid between the parties. A mortgage only valid between the parties is in no sense a secret lien as to third parties, and public policy is in no way concerned in such a mortgage. Men may pass their days and nights in mutually giving each other chattel mortgages upon their property, and it is no concern of the public. The public has no interest in that kind of a transaction, but is a totally indifferent party.
In a great many of the states the statute does fix the time when a chattel mortgage must be recorded. In Ohio, where the statute even declares that a chattel mortgage shall be recorded forthwith, under the penalty of being void as to creditors if not so recorded, the highest court of that state held such a mort-
Let us see into what deep water this reasoning by analogy leads us. If by analogy we are justified in inserting the word immediately in the chattel mortgage act, then, by the same analogy, it must be held that a chattel mortgage is void as to all
In a transfer of personal property there must be an immediate delivery; ergo, it is argued the chattel mortgage must have immediate recordation. Such a construction of the statute in numberless cases demands an impossibility. The statute says that a chattel mortgage must be recorded in the county where the mortgagor resides, and also where the property is situated. This express demand of the statute often requires weeks to carry out. It is impossible that the two recordations shall take place immediately, or even at the same time.
It is also insisted that a construction of the statute demanding an immediate recordation of a chattel mortgage is justified from general language found in Berson v. Nunan, supra, to the effect that the recordation of a chattel mortgage is an equivalent of the immediate delivery demanded by
In conclusion it may be suggested that
In this case there is no actual fraud. Neither is there any constructive fraud, for the law has not so declared. In the face of this provision of the statute it is impossible to see how the mortgagor‘s creditors have any rights as to the mortgaged property until they have first secured a lien upon it. In this case, before they took any steps to secure the lien the chattel mortgage was recorded.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent from the judgment.
Van Dyke, J., and Harrison, J., concurred in the dissenting opinion.