Ruge v. KovachRuge v. Kovach
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Pivarnik
This appeal comes directly to us pursuant to
Plaintiffs-Appellees each were arrested and charged in Porter County with driving while intoxicated. Specifically, David Ko-vach, a Pennsylvania resident and interstate truck driver, was arrested on September 12, 1988, after registering a .11% blood alcohol level during a breathalyzer test. Lloyd Ferguson, an Illinois resident, was arrested on September 8, 1988, after registering .15% on his breathalyzer test. Fred Paul of Porter County was arrested for violating
“[A ruling] declaring that portion of IC 9-11-1~1 dealing with the preconviction suspension of a persons (sic) drivers license is unconstitutional, a temporary restraining order prohibiting [Appellant] John Ruge from forwarding notice of an arrest to the Bureau of Motor vehicles, and for an injunction prohibiting [Appellant] Michael Pachard (sic) from suspending the drivers licences (sic) of any person before conviction of the crime of driving while intoxicated.”
On September 16, 19883, the first of over seventy-five Motions for Leave to Intervene as Intervenor Plaintiffs was filed with the Porter Superior Court which court subsequently ruled that all such motions filed by December 2, 1988, would be granted. The trial court also issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin Appellant Clerk of the Porter Superior Court from transmitting any licenses to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles pending the trial court‘s judgment. Two motions for change of venue from the judge were granted before the “all-inclusive hearing” on the merits finally was held on December 7, 1983. On December 28, 1988, the trial judge issued his judgment finding
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, CONSIDERED, RULED AND ADJUDGED that 1.C. 9-11-1-1 through 9~11-4-15, be and hereby is held unconstitutional on its face and as applied in Porter County, Indiana, and is hereby declared void (as to the Statutory provisions for suspension procedures and mandatory suspension of drivers licenses, and as said stat utes apply thereto, and that the other remaining parts and provisions of said Statutes remain in full force and effect). It is further Ordered that the restraining orders heretofore issued herein with reference to the Clerk of the Courts of Porter County, Indiana, and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of Indiana, be, and hereby are made permanent injunctions.”
Appellants now raise the following two consolidated issues: 1. whether the pretrial summary suspension protocol established by
Although Appellants appear to have expended considerable energy in briefing issue II, we decline to consider it. We so hold finding that the trial court in its amended judgment carefully declared only the summary suspension procedure established by
I
Appellants argue that the pretrial summary suspension protocol established by
It is a well-established rule that an act of the legislature must be afforded a presumption of constitutionality. This is because the Indiana Constitution explicitly vests in the General Assembly the exclusive power to legislate. Ind.Const.Art. 4, § 1. Accordingly, the burden to rebut this presumption is upon any challenger and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of an act‘s constitutionality. Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., (1982) Ind., 441 N.E.2d 8, appeal dismissed, (1983) 460 U.S. 1076, 103 S.Ct. 1761, 76 L.Ed.2d 338; Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., (1981) Ind., 418 N.E.2d 207, reh. denied. We therefore look to Appellees to provide us with a reason for finding Indiana‘s summary suspension procedure unconstitutional.
Appellees first challenge the constitutionality of
Although Chapter 2 of
In addition to erroneously suggest ing that
In Mackey, the United States Court considered “the constitutionality of a statutory scheme for administrative suspension of a driver‘s license for statutorily defined cause without a pre-suspension hearing.” Specifically, the Court faced the due process question presented by a Massachusetts “implied consent” statute mandating the pre-hearing, ninety day suspension of a drivers license for refusing to take a chemical test when arrested for driving while intoxicated. The system instituted by the Massachusetts law and approved by the Mackey Court is similar in most respects to the system established by
The first step in the Matthews balancing process is identification of the nature and weight of the private interest affected by the official action challenged. Here, as in Mackey, the affected private interest is the driver‘s license to operate a motor vehicle pending the outcome of the review hearing due him. To be sure, that interest is a substantial one since the State will not be able to make a driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of an erroneous suspension notwithstanding whatever public transportation may or may not be available. Mackey, supra; Dixon, supra. The Mackey Court indicated that the actual weight given to this private interest should
The second factor in the Matthews bal ancing process is the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved. The Mackey Court discussed this factor as follows:
“And, although this aspect of the [Matthews v.] Eldridge test further requires an assessment of the relative reliability of the procedures used and the substitute procedures sought, the Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error. The Due Process Clause simply does not mandate that all governmental decision making comply with standards that assure perfect, error-free determinations. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, [442 U.S. 1] at 7, [99 S.Ct. 2100, at2103, 60 L.Ed.2d, 668, at 675]. Thus, even though our legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error, the ‘ordinary principle’ established by our prior decisions is that ‘something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.’ Dixon v. Love, supra, [431 U.S. 105] at 113 [97 S.Ct. 1723, at 1728, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, at 180]. And, when prompt postdeprivation review is available for correction of administrative error, we have generally required no more than the predeprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official warrants them to be.”
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2618, 61 L.Ed.2d at 331 (emphasis added).
An Indiana drivers license is suspended pursuant to
“The officer whose report of refusal triggers a driver‘s suspension is a trained observer and investigator. He is, by reason of his training and experience, well suited for the role the statute accords him in the presuspension process. And, as he is personally subject to civil liability for an unlawful arrest and to criminal penalties for willful misrepresentation of the facts, he has every incentive to ascertain accurately and truthfully report the facts. The specific dictates of due process must be shaped by ‘the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases’ rather than the ‘rare exceptions. Matthews v. Eldridge, supra, [443 U.S.] at 344, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 LEd.2d 18. And, the risk of erroneous observation or deliberate misrepresentation of the facts by the reporting officer in the ordinary case seems insubstantial.”
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 14, 99 S.Ct. at 2619, 61 L.Ed.2d at 332. We note that the Indiana statute requires a pre-sus-pension judicial review of the police officer‘s probable cause determination which affords even greater protection to an affected driver than was involved in Mackey. See
The last factor for determining the constitutionality of a pre-hearing license suspension is the public interest at stake. The Supreme Court in Mackey considered the public interest in keeping roads safe while avoiding undue fiscal and administrative burdens and determined that both interests
“We have traditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety. States surely have at least as much interest in removing drunken drivers from their highways as in summarily seizing mislabeled drugs or destroying spoiled foodstuffs. E.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950); North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 55 L.Ed. 195 (1908).
The Commonwealth‘s interest in public safety is substantially served in several ways by the summary suspension of those who refuse to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest. First, the very existence of the summary sanction of the statute serves as a deterrent to drunk driving. Second, it provides strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test and thus effectuates the Commonwealth‘s interest in obtaining reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings. Third, in promptly removing such drivers from the road, the summary sanction of the statute contributes to the safety of public highways.
The summary and automatic character of the suspension sanction available under the statute is critical to attainment of these objectives. A presuspension hearing would substantially undermine the state interest in public safety by giving drivers significant incentive to refuse the breath-analysis test and demand a pre-suspension hearing as a dilatory tactic. Moreover, the incentive to delay arising from the availability of a presuspension hearing would generate a sharp increase in the number of hearings sought and therefore impose a substantial fiscal and administrative burden on the Commonwealth. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S., at 114, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172.”
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 17, 99 S.Ct. at 26, 61 LEd.2d at 334. We now find that Indiana‘s interest in keeping its highways safe by removing drunken drivers from its roads is every bit as great as that recognized by the Supreme Court in Mackey. Accordingly, we find that this most compelling interest in highway safety and public welfare justifies the State in making summary suspensions pending the outcome of the prompt post-suspension judicial hearing available by statute.
We reverse the trial court and hold that the summary suspension protocol established by