In the early evening of July 9, 1991, near the intersection of First and Kennedy Streets, N.W., appellant and four others — all armed — positioned the ear in which they were riding beside that of Mr. George Younger, with whom they had an ongoing dispute, and opened fire upon him. The ten to fifteen shots they fired wounded Younger, killed Ms. Marcia Williams who was driving in the vicinity of the shooting, and wounded one of her children who was riding in the front passenger seat of her car.
A jury convicted appellant in June 1992 of first-degree pre-meditated murder of Ms. Marcia Williams, D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -3202 (1989); assault with intent to kill while armed (“AWIKWA”) on Mr. George Younger and Dwayne Walker (Ms. Williams’ son), id. at §§ 22-501, -3202; and assault with a dangerous weapon on Mr. Ronald Moten and Ms. Michelle Royster (passengers in Mr. Younger’s auto at the time of the shooting), id. at §§ 22-502, -3202. 1
The trial court imposed consecutive sentences upon appellant of twenty years to life imprisonment for the murder of Ms. Williams, ten years to life for the assault with intent to kill upon her son, ten years to life for the assault with intent to kill upon Mr. Younger, two to ten years for each of the two convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon, and one year for carrying an unlicensed pistol. The trial court also sentenced appellant to five to fifteen years for possessing a firearm while engaging in a crime of violence, but this sentence was to run concurrently with the other sentences.
Appellant asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder, and his two convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon. He also urges that since a single bullet, out of the ten to fifteen that were fired, mortally wounded Ms. Williams as well as injured her son, his conviction for assault with intent to kill the child must be vacated. Further, subsequent to submission of his brief and prior to oral argument, appellant brought to this court’s attention a recent decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals,
Ford v. State,
I. The Murder Conviction
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant states (Brief at 30-32) his contentions as to the insufficiency of the evidence to support the murder conviction as follows:
There was no evidence that Ruffin premeditated or deliberated a homicide. Even assuming, arguendo, that appellant fired the fatal shot (from a gun never found) he was at most guilty of second degree murder, not of a premeditated and deliberated murder.... In sum, Shawn Ruffin simply had no motive to murder George Younger in cold blood.... Since he lacked the mens rea for the premeditated murder of George Younger, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the premeditated murder of Marcia Williams under the doctrine of transferred intent.
Appellant argues in conclusion (Brief at 46) that this court must reverse his first-degree murder conviction and “order a new trial on the lesser included offense of the second-degree murder of Marcia Williams.... ”
*1291
We preliminarily note that first-degree murder is a purposeful killing with “premeditated and deliberate malice,” D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989), while second-degree murder is “unplanned or impulsive.”
Watson v. United States,
Our standard of review when the defendant asserts insufficiency of the evidence at trial is “whether there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
McAdoo, supra,
The evidence presented at trial showed that at the time of the attack on Younger, appellant occupied the front passenger seat of a car driven by George Jeffries. The other passengers in this vehicle were the brothers Dwight and Garnett Davis, and a juvenile, Niles Dabney. Tr. I, 625-26. 2 The attack was the culminating event in an ongoing “beef’ that paired Younger and his friend “Bimbo” against the Davis brothers and their companions. The beef began when Younger and Bimbo alleged that Garnett Davis and Tony Watkins had burglarized Bimbo’s apartment and that Garnett Davis had stolen $30,000. Tr. I, 607-15, Tr. 6/12 P.M., 45-46.
One week prior to the shooting, Bimbo and Younger had gone to the Davis’ home to discuss these allegations. 3 At that meeting, Dwight Davis argued with Bimbo, stating that his brother had not been involved in the theft. Tr. I, 614-15; Tr. 6/12 P.M., 48-49. Appellant was observed standing in the hallway of the Davis’ home at the conclusion of the meeting but was not in the kitchen where the discussion took place. Tr. 6/12 P.M., 49-50.
The next day appellant, as well as Dwight Davis, George Jeffries and Tony Watkins were riding in Davis’ car when they saw Younger walking his dog. They exited their vehicle and Dwight Davis stepped forward to question Younger as to whether Younger still believed Davis’ brother was involved in the burglary. Tr. I, 616-19. Younger responded that nothing had changed and then lifted *1292 his shirt to display a pistol he was carrying in the waistband of his pants. Tr. 6/12 P.M., 53-56. Appellant and his friends then returned to their car. Tr. 6/12 P.M., 56. Although appellant was present during this confrontation, he did not say anything. Tr. I, 617; Tr. 6/12 P.M., 84.
Prior to the shooting on the evening of July 9th, appellant, the Davis brothers, Jef-fries and Dabney, all of whom were armed, drove Dwight Davis’ girlfriend to an appointment in Maryland. Tr. I, 624-25. As the six of them drove back into their neighborhood, Garnett Davis saw Younger’s car moving in the opposite direction and told the driver, George Jeffries, to turn around and follow Younger. Tr. I, 629, 716. 4 Jeffries made the necessary turns around a block so that they could follow Younger’s vehicle. During this time appellant and the others stopped the car in order to enable Davis’ girlfriend to alight from the vehicle. Tr. I, 630, 814. Appellant and the others then followed Younger for half of a mile, a route that takes two and one-half to four minutes to travel. Tr. II, 47.
There was evidence that as they followed Younger’s car Jeffries tried to persuade the others not to “do it” because there were too many cars around. Tr. I, 709-10. 5 The others responded that this was the “best time.” Tr. I, 709. They approached Younger’s ear when it was stopped at a traffic light. By happenstance, Ms. Williams’ car was nearby. Appellant was seated in the front passenger seat. They veered to the left in order to pull up alongside Younger’s vehicle. Tr. I, 631. Then, appellant, Jeffries, Dabney and the Davis brothers opened fire, unloosing ten to fifteen shots which wounded Younger, killed Ms. Williams and wounded her son. 6
We are persuaded on the basis of this evidence that the jury could reasonably con-.elude that appellant acted with “consideration and reflection upon the preconceived design to kill.”
Mills, supra,
Moreover, there was evidence that appellant and the others, after sighting Younger’s car and turning to follow it, stopped to discharge from their vehicle the woman who was with them and the further evidence that in spite of one participant’s attempt to dissuade the others from their pursuit of Younger, they continued to pursue his ear. A jury could reasonably find on the basis of all of this evidence that appellant and the other men in the car had reached a decision to pursue and kill Younger and that they had had time to reflect on that decision.
See Watson, supra,
Finally, appellant’s decision (and that of his associates) to carry weapons in the car while driving to the scene of the shooting provides additional evidence probative of premeditation and deliberation on appellant’s part.
See Thacker v. United States,
Transferred Intent
The trial judge instructed the jurors that under the theory of transferred intent they could attribute appellant’s premeditation and deliberation in firing at Younger to the first-degree murder charge arising from the death of Marcia Williams and the AWIK-WA charge arising from the injury to Dwayne Walker. The judge stated:
Under th[e principle of transferred intent], one who intends to kill one person and kills another person is deemed to have committed whatever form of homicide would have been committed, had he killed the intended victim.... If he harms but does not kill another person, he’s guilty of assault with intent to kill the other person if the government proves an assault against the other person along with assault with intent to kill the intended victim. In each instance, the intent to kill the intended victim is transferred by operation of law to the unintended victim.
Tr. II, 293.
Appellant made no objections to the instructions as given. Tr. II, 302. On appeal, appellant acknowledged (Brief at 38) that “in this jurisdiction, the theory of transferred intent applies to uon-lethal assaults as well as to homicides” (citing In re
E.D.P.,
Appellant now contends that (Supplemental Brief at 4) “the proper application of Ford to the facts of this case should result in reversal of [appellant’s] convictions for first degree murder of Marcia Williams and the AWIKWA on Dwayne Walker.” According *1294 to appellant (Supplemental Brief at 6), the precise issue raised in the instant case is “whether the concept of transferred intent applies to unintended victims of specific intent assaults when the intended victim is actually injured, and when the defendant is prosecuted, convicted, and punished for the harm done to the intended victim.”
Without resolving disputed procedural and statutory construction issues regarding whether this claim can now be raised and what weight, if any, this court should accord Ford, 9 we conclude that even if we were to assume that Ford is an authoritative exposition of the common law of transferred intent the decision in Ford does not support the reversal of appellant’s conviction for the first-degree murder of Marcia Williams. 10 Moreover, while Ford does speak more directly to appellant’s contention regarding the AWIK-WA of Dwayne Walker, we nevertheless find sufficient support in Ford to sustain this conviction. 11
The Ford court concluded that
[t]he purpose of transferred intent is to link the mental state directed towards an intended victim ... with the actual harm caused to another person. In effect, transferred intent makes a whole crime out of two component halves.... Transferred intent does not make two crimes out of one. Where the crime intended has actually been committed against the intended victim, transferred intent is unnecessary and should not be applied to acts against unintended victims.
The court in
Ford
extensively cites
People v. Birreuta, id.
at 998-99 (citing
*1295 Relying on Birreuta, the Ford court reasoned that where the crime charged is assault, and the assault has been completed with respect to the intended victim, the theory of transferred intent cannot be used to convict the defendant of an additional specific intent assault against an unintended victim. Id. at 999. Accordingly, appellant cites Ford to support his contention that because he committed AWIKWA on his intended victim, Younger, his intent to kill could not be transferred to Marcia Williams to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder.
We reject appellant’s contention because it fails to recognize that Ford’s reasoning with regard to transferred intent in the context of specific intent assaults is inapplicable here where a defendant fails in his attempt to kill his intended victim but mortally wounds an unintended victim. It is only by pairing appellant’s premeditated and deliberate intent to kill Younger with the actual harm (death) caused to Marcia Williams that the proper punishment can be imposed on appellant under the circumstances of this case. Thus, appellant’s reliance upon Ford is misplaced insofar as he argues that Ford requires vacating his first-degree murder conviction.
II. The Assault with a Dangerous Weapon Convictions
Appellant argues (Brief at 44-45) that there was insufficient evidence to support his two convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon, 12 asserting:
[Tjhere was insufficient evidence for a jury reasonably to conclude that one or more shots were intentionally fired at Michelle Royster or Ronald Moten.... Moten and Ms. Royster were not the targets or intended victims of assaults. Since no shots or other assaultive actions were intentionally directed against them, and they were not physically injured, appellant Ruffin must be acquitted of assaulting them.
To convict on a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon the prosecution must prove each of the elements of assault in addition to proving that the assault was committed with a dangerous weapon.
Parks v. United States,
The intent element of assault is “the general ‘intent to perform the acts which constitute the assault.’”
Smith v. United States,
Although appellant admits (Brief at 41) that assault with a dangerous weapon is a general intent crime, he maintains that a conviction may be had only where the defendant “intentionally directs some hostile action against the
particular
person who is the victim of the crime.” (Emphasis added.) While there was no
direct
evidence presented that he observed either Mr. Motten or Ms. Royster in Younger’s car, there was suffi
*1296
cient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s reasonable inference that appellant was cognizant that Younger was
not
alone.
See Jones, supra,
Niles Dabney, who was seated in the rear of the car in which appellant was a passenger, testified that five seconds before the shooting began he saw that there were passengers in Younger’s car. There was evidence that appellant was looking in the direction of Younger’s ear at the time Dabney made this observation. Tr. I, 825-31. George Jeffries, who was seated in the driver’s seat across from appellant, saw a passenger in the front seat of Younger’s ear. Tr. I, 633. Two bystander eyewitnesses also noted that more than one person was visible through the untinted windows of Younger’s car. One bystander saw a passenger in the front seat, and the other bystander said that there were at least three persons in Younger’s ear. Tr. 1, 287, 316 The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that appellant, who was seated in the front passenger seat of the shooters’ car, was as able as either Jeffries or Dabney to see inside Younger’s car. The evidence showed that Jeffries veered the shooters’ car to the left to pull up alongside Younger immediately prior to the group opening fire. Therefore, appellant was extremely close to the Younger car before they began shooting at it.
Evidence supporting the inference that appellant could see three persons in Younger’s car as he joined in unloosing a hail of gunfire at the vehicle is sufficient to sustain his convictions for the general intent crime of assault with a dangerous weapon against Mr. Motten and Ms. Royster. This is so even if appellant and the other assailants did not specifically aim at them or intentionally seek to harm them. Appellant’s knowledge that others in addition to Younger were in his car constituted a “potential for serious bodily harm through the reckless use of dangerous weapons,” which is one of the concerns underlying the prohibition on assault with a
dangerous
weapon.
See Parker v. United States,
Moreover, the pertinent inquiry in an assault case is “whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.”
Sousa, supra,
III. The Conviction for AWIKWA Against Dwayne Walker Single Assaultive Act
Appellant argues (Brief at 37-38), with respect to his conviction for AWIKWA of Dwayne Walker (the child of Marcia Williams who was seated in the front seat of her car) that
The prosecutor consistently argued, and the evidence showed, that the same bullet *1297 inflicted the injuries on mother and son. Appellant Ruffin was convicted of both the murder of Marcia Williams and AWIK on Dwayne Walker based on the doctrine of transferred intent — the intent to kill Younger. Under controlling case law, however, a single assaultive intent, coupled with a single bullet, constitutes only a single assault (or homicide). Accordingly, appellant’s conviction for AWIK on Dwayne Walker must be vacated.
The record reflects that the bullet that killed Marcia Williams grazed the temple of Dwayne Walker. Appellant essentially argues that the single bullet can give rise to either a charge of assault or homicide, but not both. Appellant relies primarily on
Ladner v. United States,
In Ladner, appellant violated a federal statute prohibiting the assault of federal officers when he fired a single shotgun blast into a car in which two federal officers were seated. Both of the officers sustained injuries and consequently appellant was convicted on two counts of violating the federal statute. The Supreme Court overturned one of the convictions, holding that the single blast gave rise to only one assault. The Court relied on its interpretation of the purpose of the federal statute, 15 rather than a controlling legal principle limiting the number of charges that can arise where a single gunshot results in multiple injuries. 16
Alexander
is also distinguishable because the court there held that a single gunshot directed at a group which “put [them] in fear” gave rise to only one charge of assault.
Our decisions in
Murray v. United States,
Although this court has not previously reviewed the statutory crimes of murder and AWIK to determine whether multiple convictions can arise from a single criminal act, we think it beyond question that the purpose of both statutory prohibitions is the protection of individuals. 17 Thus, reasoning from Murray and Williams, we hold that where a single assaultive act results in the criminal injury of multiple victims, there may be as many offenses as there are victims. On the facts of this case, the trial court was justified in allowing the jury to determine whether appellant was guilty of one or both of these charges. 18
Transferred Intent
Appellant also argues, relying on Ford v. State, supra, that the theory of transferred intent cannot be used to sustain the AWIKWA conviction arising from the injury of Dwayne Walker by the bullets fired at George Younger because the jury convicted appellant of AWIKWA against Younger.
Appellant’s reliance on
Ford
is misplaced, for even if we adopted the reasoning in
Ford
for the purpose of determining this appeal, we would not reverse appellant’s conviction for AWIKWA against Dwayne Walker. This is because the
Ford
court does
not
abandon the result it reached in
Wilson, supra
(upholding convictions for attempted murder vis-a-vis the intended victim
and
the injured bystander), but rather provides that, in circumstances where the theory of concurrent intent is applicable, a defendant can be convicted of murder or assault with intent to kill of bystander victims even where the defendant has been convicted of murder or assault with intent to kill against the intended victim. The court declares in
Ford
that under the theory of concurrent intent “[w]here the means employed to commit the crime against a primary victim
[e.g.,
a hail of gunfire] create a zone of harm around that victim, the factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that harm to all who are in the anticipated zone.”
Ford, supra,
In the instant ease, the evidence was that appellant and his fellow assailants unloosed a hail of bullets at Younger. One bullet injured him but another killed Marcia Williams and wounded Dwayne Walker who were in appellant’s “direct line of fire.” Id. Under these circumstances, “the evidence permitted finding concurrent intent to kill everyone in the path of the bullets.” Id. Thus, the conviction for AWIKWA of Dwayne Walker can be sustained upon the theory of concurrent intent expressly recognized by Ford. 19
In sum, we are persuaded that the trial court did not commit reversible error in the *1299 instant case; and therefore, the judgments must be and are
Affirmed.
Notes
. The jury also found appellant guilty of the offenses of possessing a firearm while committing a crime of violence, id. át § 22-3204(b) (1993 Supp.), and carrying a pistol without a license, id. at § 22-3204(a) (1993 Supp.).
. "Tr. I” refers to the consecutively paginated transcripts dated June 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 (a.m.). "Tr. 6/12 P.M.” refers to the separately paginated transcript for the afternoon of June 12. “Tr. II” refers to the consecutively paginated transcripts of June 15, 16, 17, and 18.
. At trial, testimony about this meeting was provided by Younger and George Jeffries, who was also present.
. There was no evidence that Younger was aware that appellant and the others were near him, much less that Younger provoked them in any way immediately prior to their shooting at him.
. Jeffries gave a different version of events in his direct testimony at trial. However, on cross-examination he acknowledged that he had told the police of this conversation and testified that his statement to the police was true. (Tr. I, 710).
.We note that it is not necessary to determine which of the shooters fired the particular shots that caused the death or injury of the various victims in this case. The evidence shows that appellant was an active participant in this premeditated enterprise and as a joint principal may be held responsible for any harm ensuing from any of the shots fired.
See Hazel v. United States,
. Appellant argues that the large number of shots fired in this case supports the inference that he and the others were acting in a panic rather than a premeditated fashion. In support of this contention appellant cites
Watson, supra.
There, in sustaining a first-degree murder conviction, we noted that the appellant “did not fire a series of shots, as though in a panic, but a single shot, which went directly into the [victim's] chest.”
. Appellant noted that this court’s decision in
O'Connor
relied on
Gladden v. State,
.The parties disagree on two threshold issues: (1) whether or not appellant implicitly waived his transferred intent argument when he did not object to the instruction at trial and conceded the issue in his appellate brief,
see Brown v. United States,
. In
O'Connor v. United States, supra,
this court affirmed a first-degree murder conviction based on transferred intent. Following the familiar rule of this jurisdiction that a panel of this court cannot overrule a prior decision,
M.A.P. v. Ryan,
. See Part III, infra, for discussion of transferred intent vis-a-vis appellant’s conviction for AWIKWA against Dwayne Walker.
. Appellant was charged with AWIKWA on each of Younger’s two passengers. He was acquitted of those charges but convicted of the lesser included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon upon these victims.
. The instruction states in pertinent part: ”[V]oluntarily using [a dangerous weapon] in a way that would reasonably create in the other person a fear of immediate injury, would be an assault with a dangerous weapon.”
. The instant case is distinguished from those cases in which single assaultive acts directed at a group of individuals (injuring none of them) have been found to give rise to only one count of assault.
See Joiner v. United States,
. It is important to note that because the intent of Congress in passing the statute was unclear, the Court applied the rule of lenity, construing the statute as one intended to promote the orderly functioning of the federal government rather than to protect each officer as an individual.
Id.
. The Court further supported its holding by noting that "an interpretation that there are as many assaults committed as there are officers affected would produce incongruous results.”
Ladner, supra,
. With regard to murder, a majority of states have held that each death resulting from a single act by a defendant constitutes a separate offense of murder.
Williams, supra,
. We note that appellant in this instance intentionally joined his cohorts in firing a barrage of bullets on a public street so that it was mere fortuity that their gunfire did not result in the death or injury of numerous others who were passing by at the time of the shooting.
See Williams, supra,
.The defense at trial made no objection to the court giving an instruction on transferred intent rather than concurrent intent with reference to AWIKWA on Dwayne Walker. Accordingly, our decision in
White v. United States,