Ricky L. Ruffin was convicted of possession of cocaine in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30. He appeals from the trial court’s denial of his amended motion for new trial.
1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to suppress contraband found in his possession on the basis that it was found as the result of a stop which was not based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion. See
Terry v. Ohio,
2. In his second enumeration of error, appellant maintains the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial made on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. “Under the holding in
Strickland v. Washington,
(a) As evidence of ineffectiveness, appellant first points to coun
*793
sel’s failure to file a motion to suppress. In
Wong Sun v. United States,
The еvidence adduced at trial showed that at approximately 10:00 p.m. on December 26, 1988, Officer Dauphinee of the Savannah Police Department was on routine patrol оf an area of downtown Savannah in which frequent car break-ins had occurred and in which was located a known crack house. While patrolling, Dauphinee noticed apрellant walking on the east side of the neighborhood. Before leaving the area for approximately 30 minutes on official business, Dauphinee observed appellant again closer to the crack house. Upon returning, he saw appellant standing with another man in a parking lot behind a motel. Dauphinee testified that upon seeing the patrol cаr appellant and the other man parted company and appellant walked briskly away. Dauphinee crossed through traffic to stop appellant, placed him against the patrol car, and patted him down for weapons. Neither weapons nor drugs were found as a result of the patdown. However, after Dauphinee’s routine computеr check indicated an outstanding warrant for appellant’s arrest for probation violation, appellant was arrested pursuant to the warrant and taken to jail. After appellant’s arrival at the jail, Dauphinee searched the police car and found a ziplock plastic bag with several pieces of what was later determined to be rock cocaine behind the back seat. A search of appellant’s person at the jail revealed another ziplock bag in his jacket pocket containing brownish white residue which later tested positive for cocaine.
We agree with appellant that under the holding of
Terry,
supra, the initial stop in the case sub judice was unlawful. See
Brown v. Texas,
We have found no Georgia case specifically addressing the issue whether a valid outstanding arrest warrant which is discovеred in the course of a routine check during an unlawful Terry stop sufficiently attenuates the connection between the illegal stop and a subsequent search incident to an arrest pursuant to the warrant so as to render contraband found in that search admissible into evidence. Our review of applicable federal decisions, rather than revealing a single rule, demonstrates that the result in each case depends upon the application of the considerations behind the exclusionary rule to the facts at hand. Federal cоurts have found insufficient attenuation in situations where the arrestee’s response to illegal police conduct reveals evidence of a prior crime, e.g., United States v. Beck, 602 F2d 726 (5th Cir. 1979), but have admitted evidence despite its strong causal connection to illegal police conduct where, after the unlawful arrest, the arrestee commits a new crime in the presence of the arresting officer and the evidence is obtained in a search incident to the “second” arrest. E.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F2d 1009 (11th Cir. 1982). In United States v. Nooks, 446 F2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1971), a car was stopped by a sheriff without a sufficient articulable suspiсion. However, the court held that the nexus between the original unlawful arrest and the subsequent search of the car’s trunk — revealing evidence connecting the occupants to а recent bank robbery — had been attenuated by intervening events, including a police radio report indicating that the driver of the car matched the description of the robbers. Aсcordingly, “[b]efore the trunk of the automobile was opened it had become academic whether [the driver’s] original arrest was lawful or not. . . . Under the circumstances known at the timе of the actual search of the automobile, there can be no doubt as to the validity of that search. . . . The fruits of that search cannot realistically be treated as fruits of [the driver’s] original arrest.” Id. at 1288 (I).
Similarly, we hold that under the facts sub judice, the evidence discovered in appellant’s pocket cannot realistically be treated as fruit of the originаl, illegal stop, and that Dauphinee’s discovery of the valid outstanding warrant attenuated the connection between the illegal stop and the search that revealed the evidence within the meaning of Wong Sun, thereby rendering that evidence admissible. *795 To hold otherwise would effectively render the outstanding warrant invalid because of police conduct unrelated to its issuance, and would immunize appellant from arrest for past conduct already properly determined to constitute probable cause for his arrest. We decline to do so. Since the warrant was valid, appellant’s arrest pursuant thereto was lawful, and he was lawfully searched incident to that arrest. It follows that the evidence uncovered in that search need not be supprеssed, and that the test set forth in Strickland, supra, was therefore not met.
(b) “ ‘ “The decisions on which witnesses to call, whether and how tо conduct cross-examinations, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive prоvince of the lawyer after consultation with his client.” ’ [Cits.]”
Fortson v. State,
Judgment affirmed.