Case Information
*1 Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge JOHNNY M. RUFFIN, JR., Appeal from the United States
Plaintiff-Appellant , District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division v.
No. 04 C 50258 ROCKFORD MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, et al., Philip G. Reinhard,
Defendants-Appellees . Judge .
O R D E R
Illinois prisoner Johnny Ruffin brought suit pro se claiming that Rockford Memorial Hospital (“RMH”) and two of its employees discriminated against him in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. , by refusing to admit him to the hospital’s rehabilitation program solely because he was a near-quadriplegic. RMH contends that it did not feel it had the qualified personnel or the proper equipment to treat him in the most efficient way. The district court concluded that Ruffin failed to state a claim under Title II or Title III of the ADA, and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Ruffin now appeals. We agree with the district court that Ruffin cannot proceed under the ADA, though some of our reasons differ.
We accept as true the facts alleged in Ruffin’s complaint.
Dawson v.
Newman
,
In October 2001 Ruffin brought this action in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, claiming that RMH’s decision to exclude him from its rehabilitation program cost him some mobility in his back and possibly the chance to walk again. His complaint invoked Title II of the ADA, which prevents a “public entity” from discriminating against disabled persons in the provision of services, see 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and Title III of the ADA, which prevents such discrimination in “any place of public accommodation,” see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Ruffin sought compensatory damages for his alleged loss of mobility, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.
The defendants removed the case to federal court and then moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Ruffin had failed to state a claim. The district court agreed with the defendants, holding that Ruffin failed to allege that the hospital was a “public entity” within the meaning of Title II, and that in reality it was not a public entity but rather a private entity. The court also considered whether Ruffin might have stated a claim under Title III, but concluded that he did not because his claim amounted to nothing more than a contention that the hospital had refused to provide “a particular treatment for a particular disability,” which it had no obligation to provide.
As a preliminary matter, we note that this case is in an unusual posture since it concerns Ruffin’s medical treatment while he was in the custody of the Winnebago County Jail. But since neither Ruffin nor the defendants suggest that RMH’s decision was affected in any way by the jail’s willingness to permit the transfer or to pay for the treatment, we will assume that his status as a pretrial detainee has no bearing on the outcome. We review the district court’s dismissal of the ADA claim de novo . See Frank Bros., Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp. , 409 F.3d 880, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2005). Dismissal is appropriate only if a plaintiff could not establish any set of facts that would entitle him to the relief he requests. Id. at 885.
On appeal Ruffin argues that the district court erred in holding that he failed
to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, which applies to public entities alone.
See
42 U.S.C. § 12132. Ruffin contends that, contrary to the district court’s
representation, he does allege in his complaint that RMH is a public entity. The
defendants concede this, but assert that the question whether the hospital is a public
entity is a legal conclusion that Ruffin fails to support with adequate factual
allegations. Ruffin, though, was not required to identify, let alone allege facts
concerning, the elements of the legal theories underlying his complaint,
see Doe v.
Smith
,
Still, we agree with the outcome reached by the district court even though we
do not endorse its reasoning. We rely on the fact that Ruffin has disclosed on appeal
that his basis for believing that RMH is a public entity is that it is incorporated
under state law. The definition of “public entity” in the ADA does not support this
theory: for purposes of the Act, a “public entity” is a “department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.
”
42 U.S.C. § 12131. Thus, Ruffin cannot prevail on his Title II claim. He argues that
the district court should have converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment so that it could take evidence on whether or not RMH is a public
entity. However, where the appellant has not established that he can “point to any
pertinent evidence that he might be able to obtain and present in opposition to
summary judgment,” the district court’s error is harmless and “remand to enable [a]
formal conversion” of the motion “would be pointless.”
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v.
Substance, Inc.
,
Ruffin next argues that if RMH
is
a private entity he nonetheless states a
claim under Title III of the ADA,
[**]
which applies to places of “public
accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The defendants and the district court
concluded that Ruffin was alleging that he was deprived of benefits equal to those
received by persons with other disabilities who are served by RMH’s rehabilitation
program. The defendants also suggested that Ruffin might simply be claiming that
the treatment he received was inappropriate. The district court and the defendants
are correct in stating that the ADA does not impose liability on these grounds. It is
permissible to extend a service to disabled persons suffering from a certain disability
without offering that or another service to persons suffering from another disability.
Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.
,
But this is not what Ruffin alleges. He has tailored his complaint closely to
the statute and actually does claim that RMH made the sort of “categorical refusal to
treat someone because of their disability” the district court said might be a predicate
for liability. Moreover, we reject the defendants’ suggestion that Ruffin pleaded
himself out of court by attaching to his complaint a report that recounts RMH’s
statement to his doctors that appropriate services were not available. We have
repeatedly held that a “plaintiff may tell the court what his adversary has said
without throwing in the towel.”
Gale v. Hyde Park Bank
,
Nonetheless, we still conclude that Ruffin fails to state a claim under Title III
because the language of the subchapter’s enforcement provision provides a remedy
only to a person “who
is being subjected
to discrimination on the basis of disability or
who has reasonable grounds for believing that such person is
about to be subjected
to
discrimination.
See
42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added). This language does
not apply to Ruffin, whose complaint concerns past events and seeks only money
damages. Money damages, however, are not available to private parties under Title
III,
see
42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1);
Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc.
,
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Notes
[*] After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
[**] Ruffin might also have brought a claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which we construe consistently with section 12132 of Title II of the ADA in most respects, see Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram , 383 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2004). Like Title II, the Rehabilitation Act authorizes private citizens to bring actions for money damages, Tennessee v. Lane , 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004), but its coverage is not restricted to public entities. The Rehabilitation Act (continued...)
[**] (...continued)
applies to any “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a);
see also Jackson v. City of Chicago
,