33 N.W.2d 593 | Minn. | 1948
The questions for decision are:
(1) Whether a motorist was negligent was a question of fact where he approached at night on a paved highway at a speed of 45 to 60 miles per hour an automobile with its headlights on bright facing him standing on the shoulder to his right practically parallel to the pavement, which he first saw, as he came over a knoll about 700 feet away, approaching him in its right lane and cutting across the pavement where it stopped, and after it stopped it appeared to him to continue to approach him in its right lane, with the consequence that he was misled thereby to attempt to pass it by turning right onto the shoulder and then to his left to get back again on the pavement, but too late to avoid a collision; and
(2) Whether under the circumstances stated in the preceding question the operator of the standing automobile was negligent in permitting it to stand on the shoulder with headlights on bright was a question of fact.
Because under the doctrine of Munkel v. C. M. St. P. P. R. Co.
It is practically undisputed that the accident occurred at about one o'clock in the morning of February 15, 1947; that William Rue *451 was operating his automobile east on a paved trunk highway having a 20-foot pavement with approximately 9-foot shoulders on either side; that his wife, Esther, and their friends Mr. and Mrs. Percy Skelton were his guest passengers; that after proceeding east to a point near the driveway to the Skelton farmyard William cut across the pavement and stopped on the north (his left) shoulder, or the part of the Skelton driveway which connected with the pavement, practically parallel to the pavement; that Mr. Skelton immediately started to get out; that while he was so engaged defendant, who had come from the east over a knoll about 700 feet distant, turned to his right onto the shoulder and then turned to his left to get back onto the pavement, but before he did so hit the front of William's car. It is also undisputed that there was, as both William and defendant observed, no other traffic, vehicular or pedestrian, on the highway anywhere within view.
The testimony is conflicting as to other facts. Plaintiffs' version was that William's car had come to a full stop before defendant's car came over the knoll; that William had his headlights on bright before and when he cut across the pavement; that he dimmed them when he stopped; and that defendant for no apparent reason turned onto the shoulder and collided with William's car.
Defendant's version was that, while the night was clear, it was difficult to see the center line of the pavement and the line between the shoulder and the pavement because there was frost on the pavement and the shoulder was covered with smooth snow and ice which was flush with the pavement; that when defendant first saw William's car as he (defendant) came over the knoll it was approaching him on its right side of the road; that after William's car stopped he was blinded by its headlights, which were on bright; that William's car appeared to him to be approaching him in its right lane; that his (defendant's) lane of travel was to the right of its headlights; that he turned right onto the shoulder when he was somewhere between 100 to 150 feet away from William's car; that he did not know at first whether he was on the shoulder or the pavement because the former was so hard and smooth that he could hardly *452 tell any difference between them; that after he had gone a short distance he discovered not only that William's car was standing, but also that it was on the shoulder to his (defendant's) right of the pavement; and that thereupon he not only put on his brakes, but also turned to his left to get back onto the pavement, but, being unable to turn sharply enough to do so without running the risk of losing control of his own car, he collided with William's car. A highway patrolman testified that marks on the shoulder showed that defendant turned onto the shoulder about 165 or 170 feet east of William's car and that defendant stated that he was going about 60 or 65 miles per hour at the time.
1. By providing that in a civil action a violation of the highway traffic regulation act (M. S. A.
An essential element of negligence is the actor's knowledge, actual or imputed, of the facts out of which the alleged duty arises. Negligence involves the idea of fault, and, because that is true, an act or omission is not negligent unless the actor had knowledge or notice that it involves danger to another. Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co.
"* * * the rule [that negligence consists of failure to exercise the same degree of care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances] would be shorn of all its fairness. Men cannot be expected to governtheir actions by what to them lies in the realm of theunknown. Their actions cannot be compared to that of others — to that of the ordinarily prudent man — in respect to the degree of prudence exhibited therein, except upon the common basis of a common knowledge as to the surrounding and attending circumstances, actual or constructive. In this way only can the circumstances be made similar, and the specific man be brought under the same circumstances and conditions as the typical ordinarily prudent one who supplies the standard of comparison." (Italics supplied.)
One's perception, memory, and experience bear upon the question of whether he had knowledge. As a practical proposition, defendant's knowledge here consisted of what he perceived at the moment and his correlation thereof with his memory and experience. While a person is required to exercise his senses not only for the protection of others, but also of himself, the rule of reasonable care requires only that perception shall be reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable perception does not require a person to perceive what is not apparent. As said in Prosser, Torts, § 36, p. 235, "* * * the individual will not be held to knowledge of risks which are not apparent to him." A party deceived by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person may regulate his conduct by such appearances, even though they may be contrary to actual fact. Mangan v. Des Moines City Ry. Co.
Automobile drivers are no exception. They too may be deceived by appearances calculated to deceive ordinarily prudent persons. Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co.
"* * * It is to be remembered that this was in the nighttime when drivers of cars judge of the position in the road of other motor vehicles by the headlights thereof.
* * * * *
"* * * Upon no testimony in the case at bar could the jury view Twet's negligent driving as distinct from the deceptive position which the act of appellant gave his car by stopping on the wrong side of the road with the headlights lit."
In the Smith case, the court said (
"* * * When one looks at the lights of an automobile on the road directly ahead of him, it is very difficult to tell whether or not that car is moving. That the defendant did not instantly realize the significance of the lights before him is no element of negligence on his part."
In this connection, the fact that the operator charged with negligence was confronted with the lights of another car immediately after coming over a knoll or hill has an important bearing upon whether he was negligent. Olson v. Neubauer,
The operator of an automobile may make reasonable assumptions that other operators will obey statutory requirements and act upon those assumptions until it appears either that they are without factual basis or that to do so will involve unreasonable risk of harm. Moan v. Aasen,
The evidence here presented fact questions for the jury, and not questions of law for the court, as to whether William's car standing on the shoulder to defendant's right with its headlights on bright facing him after it had approached him in its right lane with its headlights on bright, crossed the pavement and stopped on the shoulder reasonably appeared to defendant to be approaching him in its right lane until he claims he discovered otherwise, and whether thereby defendant was misled to attempt to pass William's car on his (defendant's) right with the consequence that he got on the shoulder and collided with it in attempting to avoid it by turning back onto the pavement again.
Geisen v. Luce,
2. Whether William was negligent as to defendant also was a fact question for the jury. The question whether the operator of an automobile was negligent as to a motorist approaching him from the opposite direction is a fact question, where there is evidence showing that he stopped his automobile and permitted it to stand at night on his left side of a paved highway either wholly or partly on the *457
shoulder with its headlights on bright; that the standing automobile reasonably appeared to the approaching motorist to be approaching him in its right lane; and that thereby he was misled to attempt to pass it on his right and to collide with it in attempting to avoid it. Edblad v. Brower,
Knutson v. Farmers Co-op. Creamery,
"However, the evidence presents more than the simple situation of an automobile parked on the left-hand side of the highway. In addition there were the following peculiar circumstances: A dark night. A roadway which, in width, afforded abundant opportunity for parking a south-bound truck elsewhere than in the usual pathway of north-bound cars. A slight curve, around which a north-bound *458 car had to turn until it was within one hundred feet, and because of which, until then, its lights would be reflected to the east of the parked truck. A truck parked so as to face, and to cast its lights, slightly to its right, because of which, aggravated by the further deception caused by the vibration of the wind-shield of the approaching north-bound car, the driver thereof was misled into believing that the truck was in motion and passing along, or toward, its right side of the road. In view of that combination of circumstances, the issue of whether the truck driver was negligent presented a question for the jury."
What the court there said of the Schacht case applies to others also, except the Beck case, which we have distinguished on other grounds.
Our conclusion is that whether defendant was negligent as to both William and Esther and whether William was negligent as to defendant were fact questions for the jury. Hence, there should be an affirmance.
Affirmed.