80 Pa. Commw. 28 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1984
Opinion by
The Township of College (Township)
. On August 19, 1977, Mr. Rudolph purchased two contiguous lots in an area of the Township zoned as a C-l General Commercial District. A two-story building, with commercial space on the first floor, and two apartments on the second floor, was located on the first of these lots, and a stable, with no provisions for human occupation, was located on the second. At the time of this purchase, the applicable Township ordinance, enacted in 1965, provided, inter alia, that buildings located in C-l General Commercial Districts were permitted “one single family residence per lot on the top floor over a commercial establishment.”
Here, the Township initially alleges that the court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the Board improperly invoked the doctrine of res judicata. Although we fail to see the -significance of this argument, since the Board, while citing the doctrine of res judicata, nonetheless decided the -only issue before it, the question of whether Mr. Rudolph had a valid nonconforming use, we shall briefly address the point.
“In determining whether the doctrine of res judicata should be applied ‘ [t]he essential inquiry is whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been decided in a prior proceeding in which the present parties had an opportunity to appeal and assert their rights.’ ” Philadelphia County Board of Assistance v. Vinson, 75 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 518, 524, 463 A.2d 73, 76 (1983) (quoting Township of Ohio v. Builders Enterprises, Inc., 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 39, 276 A.2d 556 (1971), aff’d, 446 Pa. 319, 284 A.2d 686 (1971)). The ultimate and controlling issue that was before 'the Board in 'the first proceeding initiated by Mr. Rudolph, was whether Mr. Rudolph met the requirements for a variance from -the dwelling unit restriction found in the Township’s 1977 zoning ordi
The Township next alleges that the court of common pleas erred as a matter of law by concluding that Mr, Rudolph was authorized under the terms of the Township’s 1965 zoning ordinance to .rent an additional apartment in his building because he also owned a vacant lot in the district. We agree.
The general rules of statutory construction, codified with respect to statutes in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Act), 1 Pa. C. S. §§1501-1991, are applicable to statutes and ordinances alike. Diehl v. City of McKeesport, 60 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 561, 432 A.2d 288 (1981). Under these rules, when the words of statute or ordinance are clear and free from all ambiguity, a court may not .disregard the letter of the statute or ordinance under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Hyser v. Allegheny County, 61 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 169, 434 A.2d 1308 (1981).
Here, the Township’s 1965 zoning ordinance clearly and unambiguously limited buildings located in C-l General Commercial Districts to “one single family residence per lot on the top floor over a commercial establishment.” We believe this provision, along with
We ¡shall accordingly .reverse.
Order
Now, January 26, 1984, the order of the ¡Court of Common Pleas of Centre County ,at No. 1980-2805, dated August 10,1982, is reversed.
The Township properly intervened in the proceedings before the court of common pleas, and hence has standing to pursue the present appeal. See Gilbert v. Montgomery Township Zoning Hearing Board, 58 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 296, 427 A.2d 776 (1981).
Section 301.1 of Township ordinance No. 17.
Article II, Section 4.1.2. of Townssihip ordinance No. 59.
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §10912(1).
The Board, did state that “[s]ince both ¡the present and preceding Township Zoning Ordinances contained this restriction, such information was available to Mir. Rudolph at the time he considered [the] purchase of the property.” Rather than being a determination as to whether the ¡property in question was a valid nonconforming use, however,' this statement merely indicated that any financial harm resulting from the denial of a variance was self-inflicted. See Section 912(3) of the MPO, 53 P.S. §10912(3).
This question is significant since jtbe Board found, based on substantial evidence of record, that ¡the property had been converted