Jоseph P. RUDOLPH, M.D., Family Professional Center, P.C., a Professional Corporation and Family Professional Center Laboratory, Appellants, v. PENNSYLVANIA BLUE SHIELD, a Professional Health Service Corporation, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Aug. 21, 1998.
717 A.2d 508
Argued Sept. 17, 1997.
Kevin J. McKeon, Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania Medical Soc. (Amicus Curiae).
Charles P. Falk, for Pennsylvania Blue Shield.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.
OPINION ANNOUNCING JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.
When a doctor аffiliated with Pennsylvania Blue Shield has been denied payment for services by a medical review committee appointed by Blue Shield, what review of the decision is permitted under the contract between the doctor and Blue Shield within the limitations set by the Pennsylvania Health Services Plan Corporations Act?
Between June 1986 and November 1987, Rudolph, a participating Blue Shield physician, and Family Professional Center, P.C., his prоfessional corporation (hereinafter “the doctor“) provided certain medical services to Blue Shield patients for which he was denied payment by Blue Shield on the grounds that the services were neither medically necessary nor cost effective. Pursuant to the
Blue Shield appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that the trial court lacked subjеct matter jurisdiction to review the decision of the medical review committee. The Superior Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that an award of a professional health corporation‘s dispute review committee, promulgated pursuant to
All ... disputes ... relating to the professional health services rendered by health service doctors ... shall be considered and determined only by health service doctors as selеcted in a manner prescribed in the bylaws of the professional health service corporation.
Blue Shield‘s bylaws provide:
Section 1. Review Committees. All matters, disputes or controversies arising out of the relationship between the Corporation and doctors of medicine ... shall be considered, acted upon, disposed of and determined by the appro-
priate one of the two Review Committees hereinafter referred to. Section 2. Medical Review Committee. There shall be a Medical Review Committee consisting of at least five (5) members, each of whom shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation and each of whom shall serve until his successor is appointed. A majority of the members of the Medical Review Committee shall be doctors who are either members of the Board of Directors of the Corporation or members of the Corporation.
Bylaws, Article X, Sections 1, 2. (Emphasis added.)
The contract between the doctor and Blue Shield provides:
Participating Doctors Agreement with Pennsylvania Blue Shield
I, the undersigned doctor of medicine duly licensed to engage in practice under the applicable laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in consideration of being registered by Pennsylvania Blue Shield ... as a Participating Doctor, do hereby agree as follows:
I will pеrform services for Blue Shield subscribers, make reports to Blue Shield concerning such services and accept compensation therefore, as provided for in the Blue Shield Regulatory Act, as heretofore or hereafter reenacted or amended, and the Bylaws [and] the applicable rules and regulations....
In sum, the doctor agrees to abide by the regulatory act and the bylaws of Blue Shield in making claims for services. The regulatory act, in turn, provides that the medical review committee, which decides claims made by the doctor, will be selected in a manner prescribed by Blue Shield‘s bylaws. The agreement, the bylaws, and the regulatory act are silent on whether the doctor‘s claims are reviewable beyond the medical review committee.
The majority in the Superior Court held that the phrases “determined only by,” “acted upon,” and “disposed of” mean that the committee award is not subject to review, for such phrases contemplate finality in the committee‘s decision.
This court has held that “the requirement of due process of law extends to administrative as well as judicial proceedings....” Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 473, 9 A.2d 408, 410 (1939). Since the medical review committee is formed and functions pursuant to the terms of the regulatory act, it is a creature of the state, and like an administrative agency, is subject to due process review. The question then becomes the nature of the due process that is required in this setting.
On thе one hand, it is plain that the purpose of the regulatory act is to put medical claim review decisions in the hands of experts, i.e., physicians. It is less clear whether this forum of experts is intended to be the only forum. Neither the regulatory act nor the contract states that the medical review committee is the sole and exclusive forum. Regardless of the exclusivity of the forum, however, it would be absurd to conclude that the legislature would have contemplated an inherently unfair forum.
The majority of the Superior Court is correct that due process requires that a person aggrieved by the award of a medical review committee is entitled to judicial review for notice and the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate forum and for fraud or other misconduct. But it is axiomatic that due process also rеquires that the forum be fair and impartial. Without that, the guarantee of notice, a hearing, and the right to be heard would be no more than an illusion.
Since this panel was not, by definition, impartial, the doctor was entitled to some sort of review which could provide appropriate relief. If the bylaws of Blue Shield were written to include the possibility of an unbiased panel, a remand for a new hearing before a reconstituted and impartial panel would have been appropriate. In this case, however, the bylaws provide only for the creation of a per se biased panel. A remand for another medical review hearing before another panel, therefore, would necessarily have repeated the original error. For this reason, the trial court was correct in determining that the doctor was entitled to а de novo hearing in the court of common pleas on the merits of his claim.
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is reversed and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is reinstated.1
NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion in which CASTILLE, J., joins.
NIGRO, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result of the Majority Opinion. I write separately because I find that judicial review of the findings of the Medical Review Committee is not grounded in due process, but, rather, the unconscionability of thе contract provisions providing for no review other than the Medical Review Committee.
The
The standard contract between Blue Shield and its participating physicians requires that, in exchange for being registered as a Blue Shield provider, the physician agrees to be governed by the Regulatory Act and the bylaws of Blue Shield. Insurance contracts such as this are therefore generally viewed as contracts of “adhesion.” Bishop v. Washington, 331 Pa.Super. 387, 400, 480 A.2d 1088, 1094 (1984). Under such a contract, the parties are usually not of equal bargaining power and the weaker party must adhere to the terms of a form contract which are not negotiable. Id. In other words, its terms are not bargained for but rather dictated by the insurer. Antanovich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 507 Pa. 68, 87, 488 A.2d 571, 581 (1985). Not every such contract is necessarily unconscionable. Once a contract is deemed to be one of adhesion, its terms must be analyzed to determine whether the contract as a whole, or specific provisions of it, are unconscionable. Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 415 Pa.Super. 164, 608 A.2d 1061 (1992).
The doctrine of unconscionability is both a statutory and a common law defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair provision in a contract. Wagner v. Estate of Rummel, 391 Pa.Super. 555, 561, 571 A.2d 1055, 1058 (1990) alloc. denied, 527 Pa. 588, 588 A.2d 510 (1991). Furthermore, whether a contract or clause is unconscionable is a question of law for the court. Bishop, 331 Pa.Super. at 399, 480 A.2d at 1094. This Court has adopted the definition of unconscionability articulated by Judge Skelly Wright in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.Cir.1965):
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an аbsence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 495 Pa. 540, 551, 434 A.2d 1222, 1228 (1981).
This Court has exрlained the circumstances under which we may determine whether public policy is violated by a particular insurance clause:
Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest. As the term “public policy” is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy....
It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. There must be positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right and in the interests of the public weal ... Only in the clearest cases, therefore, may a court make an alleged public policy the basis of judicial decision.
Blue Shield‘s contract of adhesion presents provider physicians with no choice but to accept that their adversary is also the final adjudicating authority. As а consequence, the provider physician is often “stuck” with making treatment decisions based, not in the best medical interests of the patient, but on likelihood of reimbursement. Thus, an unconscionable contract, driven substantially by economics favorable to Blue Shield, may ultimately result in the physician‘s being hamstrung in providing the best possible medical care for the patient. I believe that such is contrary to the “beliefs of the people and ... their conviction of what is just and right and in the interests of the public weal ...” and, as such, requires this Court to interpret the intent of
ZAPPALA, Justice, dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority‘s conсlusion that the medical review committee is “a creature of the state, and like an administrative agency, is subject to due process review,” op. at 510, I dissent.
It is axiomatic that the due process protections afforded by the
In Burton, the United States Supreme Court held that essentially private conduct does not do violence to the Fourteеnth Amendment (in that case Equal Protection Clause) unless the state has become involved to some significant extent. The amount of involvement must be measured by the facts of each particular case.
Adler, 453 Pa. at 69, 311 A.2d at 639.
Here, the majority, in concluding that procedural due process applies to the proceedings of the medical review committee, relies on the fact that the medical review committee “is formed and functions pursuant to the terms of the regulatory act.” Op. at 510. However, the mere fact that a certain area is highly regulated is not sufficient by itself to establish that a private party covered by such regulation acts under color of state law. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) (the action of a partial monopoly, a highly regulated utility company, in terminating service to a customer did not constitute state action). In order to demonstrate state action, there must also be a showing that the state ordered the private party to act in a specific manner. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). The appropriate inquiry in determining whether state action can be imputed to a private entity is whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S.Ct. 449.
The parties to this action are Blue Shield, a private, non-profit, professional health services corporation, and former participating Blue Shield physicians and professional corporations. Pursuant to
The Legislature, in enacting the Regulatory Act, did not specify in what manner professional health service corporations are to resolve disputes relating to the professional health services rendered by health service physicians. To the contrary, the Legislature specifically left it to the discretion of professional health service corporations, through their bylaws, to establish how disputes should be resolved.
Given that professional health service corporations are free to set forth, in their bylaws, whatever dispute resolution scheme they deem appropriate, without direction from the Legislature, i.e., the state, there is not a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action for due process to be implicated. See, e.g., Staino v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, 98 Pa.Cmwlth. 461, 512 A.2d 75, 77 (1986), wherein the court noted:
Because a private corporation is licеnsed and pervasively regulated by the state does not make its actions “state actions” meaning that those actions must comport with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution....
Moreover, the fact that a private party follows a procedure outlined in a state statute does not convert the private action into state action.
Based on the foregoing, and contrary to the majority, I conclude that the proceedings of the medical review committee are not subject to the requirements of due process. Accordingly, I would affirm, for different reasons, the Superior
CASTILLE, J., joins this dissenting opinion.
FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.
Notes
No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
(Emphasis added).