30 N.W.2d 484 | Iowa | 1948
This case has previously been before this court upon an appeal from an order sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss. On that appeal, Rudolph v. Davis,
While in the prior appeal, supra, the facts are set forth at length, we briefly restate them. The Davises originally owned this land and were in possession. All of the land was mortgaged. One mortgage on two hundred acres was foreclosed and a sheriff's deed taken by the mortgagee. At about the same time two other tracts, consisting of sixty-four acres and eighty acres — the three tracts comprising the entire farm of three hundred forty-four acres — were conveyed by warranty deed by Davis to one Wilson, who held the mortgages thereon. At about the same time Wilson purchased the two hundred acres from the holder of the sheriff's deed. There was some arrangement between Wilson and Davis, who was still in possession, whereby Davis paid a stated sum annually to Wilson. This was about equivalent to interest on Wilson's investment but it is claimed by Wilson to be rental. Thereafter Wilson conveyed the entire tract to Rudolph, plaintiff herein. Shortly thereafter Davis commenced an action against Wilson and Rudolph claiming ownership and alleging that Wilson held the deeds merely as security for the purchase price. Upon appeal to this court we held in that case, Davis v. Wilson,
Thereafter, on January 21, 1947, defendants answered and after numerous amendments thereto the matter was tried and a decree entered adjudging plaintiff to be entitled to immediate possession and ordering execution to issue. From this decree the present appeal was taken by defendants. While this case was pending in the lower court, Davis filed an application for a new trial in the original case of Davis v. Wilson, supra, which motion was overruled and which matter is now before this court on appeal by Davis. The question involved therein is as to the title to the real estate. In Davis v. Wilson,
In the instant appeal appellants urge three propositions as a basis for reversal: (1) The forcible entry and detainer statute should be strictly construed. (2) Plaintiff has not proven a case that falls within any of the grounds set out in section
[1] I. That the statute must be strictly construed: the authorities generally are not in accord on this question, and in our own we find what appears to be conflict. In Fritch Himes v. Reynolds,
"In interpreting the statute in question [forcible entry and detainer] * * * we must give it a liberal construction with a view to promote its object. The object * * * is to enable a person entitled to the possession of real estate to obtain such possession from anyone illegally in the possession of same." (Italics added.)
In Putnam v. McClain,
[2] II. Appellants' second alleged error is that the facts in the case do not come within the provisions of the statute, section
[3] There can be no question but that under the record appellants' original possession was that of owner. Thereafter, so far as Rudolph is concerned, that relationship terminated by the sheriff's deed and the two warranty deeds to Wilson. Presumptively the possession of appellants was that of tenant under Wilson. The sale by Wilson to Rudolph would be subject *376 to such tenancy. During the litigation in the case of Davis v. Wilson, supra, appellants' possession was that of a tenant under the lease with the receiver. The receivership terminated with the holding by this court that Rudolph was the owner. There is nothing in any of the decisions in this long series of litigation which in any way warrants a holding that upon termination of the tenancy under the receiver's lease, appellants assumed any other status than that of a tenant. Under the rule of liberal construction, and in accord with the authorities herein cited, we hold that appellee has established facts sufficient to entitle him to the benefits of chapter 648, Code, 1946.
III. Appellants' third assigned error is that the proper action is an action of right, not forcible entry and detainer. Appellants, after answer, moved to have the matter transferred to law and tried as an action of right. This motion was overruled as having been filed too late, under section
"Appellant is holding over after the termination of the contract, and contrary to its terms. She had no right to the possession at the time this action was begun. We see no reason for compelling appellee to resort to an action of right, and thus delay proceedings and permit appellant to continue in possession perhaps for a considerable time without paying rent, and after her right to possession has fully terminated."
This statement applies equally to the instant case.
We find no error and the decree of the trial court should be and is affirmed. — Affirmed.
MULRONEY, C.J., and OLIVER, BLISS, HALE, GARFIELD, MANTZ, and SMITH, JJ., concur. *377