*2 BILLINGS, Before GARFF and ORME, JJ.
GARFF, Judge: Evelyn Anthony Rudman and Rudman appeal each a decree of issued from divorce July
FACTS light facts in most We recite the findings. trial favorable to the Bradley, Doelle value, The Rudmans were married increase in par- would remain that April previ- 1981. Both had ty’s property. The court also found that ously been married divorced. At the agreement provided any property marriage, time of the Mrs. Rudman had acquired after the jointly either receiving per perma- been month in or individually, would be deemed marital *3 nent from her former husband. property, less amount utilized for its Mr. premarital property Part of Rudman’s acquisition that could be traced a point to included several movie in theaters three prior marriage. to the states, condominiums, two and a cabin. continuances, After several the trial re- Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman’s April sumed in of 1989. The court issued prepared counsel prenuptial agreement, 28, its April memorandum decision on 1989. parties which the signed April on 1981. Mr. Rudman’s counsel proposed submitted agreement The party stated that each relin- findings of fact and conclusions of law and quished all claims and property interest to divorce, decree of to which Mrs. Rudman the other acquired prior had to the mar- objection. Denying filed an the modifica- riage and property that such could not be Rudman, requested by tions Mrs. the trial deemed a following marital asset the mar- court entered its of fact and con- riage. agreement The was “not intended clusions of law and decree of divorce on apply any property and does not to which is July parties accumulated either individu- ally jointly following or marriage of the regarding alimony state parties.” $1,100 that Mrs. Rudman per lost month in alimony by marriage virtue of her to Mr. Mrs. Rudman’s from her former Rudman and that it was therefore “reason- marriage upon marriage terminated her to just” able and temporary alimony that of During Mr. Rudman. marriage, Mr. $1,100 per paid month be to her until she Rudman made some loans to the business age sixty-five, reaches the age of at which operating entities the various theaters. begin she would security to receive social during These loans became due the mar- benefits. riage. years marriage,
After six Mr. Rudman Concerning Mrs. Rudman’s need for ali- 28, 1987, April filed for divorce on and Mrs. costs, fees, mony, the court Rudman counterclaimed. Mr. Rudman was following finding: made the pay temporary alimony. By ordered to The court finds that the Defendant was trial, $34,500 paid time of he had in tempo- employed agent as an insurance and sub- rary support, $1,500per at a rate of month. sequently self-employed in owning was beginning At the August of the trial on service, answering an in which she sold 18, 1988, parties pre- conceded that the $80,000.00. 1976 for The Court finds nuptial agreement was entered into volun- during marriage, her first she was fraud, tarily, without duress or and that it employed, during marriage, and that unambiguous was clear and and could be operated separate she has two business- interpreted a matter as of law. The trial presently self-employed es and is in the court, request parties, at the of the inter- third. The Court that the Defen- find[s] preted agreement. Based on the City, dant resides in Lake has Salt but interpretation prenuptial purchased Logan, a second home in agreement, both moved for a con- periodically. which she visits The Court tinuance. very pleasant finds Defendant is a woman, dignified-appearing and based agreement, As to the substance of the upon history, why her there is no reason clarifying ruling court issued a agreement she should not continue to work. The August 1988, stating provide means to agreement provided that the Court finds she has the property acquired by party either for her own fees and be- reasonable including fore any interest or costs in this matter. need, her in Rudman’s lack of attorney fees were Rudman’s
Mrs. her voluntarily produce sufficient income to meet de- and were excess $28,000. given the short Her needs. He contends by counsel to creased extensive, fee of one and the amount also duration fees were $27,500. paid temporary support, As the trial court expert CPA alone was awarding any it the court noted was its ali- these abused discretion in- the fees and cost mony “concerned about at all. curred,” rule but found no need to purposes of an reasonableness of such. enabling receiving include award pre- that Mr. Rudman’s The court found maintain, possible, spouse nearly as commingled assets were not marital during the living enjoyed standard *4 he property, marital and that maintained receiving preventing and entities, separate including those them as becoming public charge. a spouse from improved through expansion or that were 116, (Utah Munns, 790 P.2d 121 Munns v. Thus, parties’ pre- remodeling. under the determining alimony, a Ct.App.1990). In agreement, receivables nuptial the loan (1) three factors: trial court must consider premarital properly characterized as
were
of the
the financial condition and needs
assets,
and the
as were the condominiums
(2)
receiving spouse,
ability
of the re
cabin.
ceiving spouse
produce
sufficient income
herself,
(3)
ability
of the
for him- or
and
parties appealed. The issues
Both
support.
responding spouse
provide
No
ex-
alimony,
and
appeal concern
1369,
(Utah
Noble,
P.2d
1372
ble v.
761
property distribution and
pert
and
1988);
Haumont, 793 P.2d
Haumont v.
valuation.
(Utah
Munns,
421,
Ct.App.1990);
423
790
ALIMONY
121.
P.2d at
the court
Both
contend that
long as these three factors are
So
in its
award.
abused its discretion
considered,
we will disturb a trial
Rudman claims the trial court abused
Mrs.
alimony only upon a
concerning
decision
adequate
by failing to make
its discretion
inequity has
showing “that such a serious
findings as to her financial need and
a clear abuse of
resulted as to manifest
that, had
support
herself. She contends
Haumont,
424.
793 P.2d at
discretion.”
appropriate
trial court made the
find
that,
emphasize
again
in consider
We
once
ings,
permanent
awarded her
it would have
factors,
make
ing these
the trial court must
$2,853 month,
per
in the amount of
adequate
factual
on all material
any amount it determined she could
less
in the record are
issues unless the facts
employment.
generate from
“clear, uncontroverted,
sup
capable
hand,
judg
argues
porting only finding
other
Mr. Rudman
a
in favor
On the
omitted).1
(citations
that the evidence
established Mrs. ment.” Id.
Supreme
discovery,
defendant was or-
A footnote in a recent Utah
Court
tion for
wherein
testimony
suggests
findings,
produce
transcript
there are
a
ob-
case
where
dered to
gener
stage
inadequate,
during
investigatory
are
of a rail-
or where
tained
requires
emphasized
us to affirm whenever it would
The
court
al rule
road accident.
Mower
support
given
"findings
required
reasonable to find facts to
a
be
that
of fact are not
Ramirez,
involving
State v.
159 Utah Adv.
conclusion.
Rep.
of a decision on a motion
review
—6,
P.2d —, —n.
7,
(1991)
16 n.
6
constitute a final
issues of fact which does not
1,
McCarthy,
(citing
Utah
Mower v.
122
245 P.2d
judgment.”
77
Huck,
only finding pertaining
417,
(Utah
1986);
to ali
734 P.2d
419
Mor
mony
gan Morgan,
684,
(Utah
states
Mrs. Rudman lost
795 P.2d
687-88
Ct.App.1990);
alimony by
Rasband,
per month
virtue of her
Rasband v.
(Utah
Ct.App.1988).
to Mr.
it
Rudman and that was
We
will reverse an award of
just”
therefore
that tem
fees and
“reasonable
costs when either financial need or
porary alimony
paid
be
to her until she
reason
ableness has not been shown. Haumont v.
age
sixty-five,
reaches the
when she will
Haumont,
(Utah
793 P.2d
begin
Ct.App.
security
to receive social
benefits.
1990);
Munns,
Munns v.
This is error
that the amount of
(Utah Ct.App.1990).
upon remarriage
lost
is irrelevant unless it
figures
somehow
into the three factors.
present case,
In the
only
very gener-
one
Haumont,
where there are observing assessing of witnesses first hand and only place it would be reasonable to the burden credibility. their challenging implied findings on the one and parties. appre- property the marital between specifies any interest and ment Haumont, af- accruing premarital property to Haumont ciation Munns, (Utah Ct.App.1990); Munns v. property. marital becomes ter (failure (Utah Ct.App.1990) the court abused Rudman also claims Mrs. accept party’s proposed one failing that she the court to to find its discretion property is not an pre- to his valuation of abuse labor and/or assets contributed discretion). converting property, it to mar- marital thus Specifically, she claims property. ital reading a fair The court found that failing court abused its discretion clearly separated premarital agreement Mr. Rudman in the that she assisted find property accumulated after property from by helping to of his business operation court also found marriage. The vacuum, “remodel, clean, paint, run er- agreement, any premarital prop- under the rands, purchase hang drapes, make increase, erty, together any interest or and work as a ticket prepare food ... property owner, remain the would taker,” converting businesses to thus those acquired any property after the mar- claims the court property. marital She marital, riage “less that amount would be failing to find that its discretion in abused acquisition utilized for its that can be improved and furnished the condomin- she point prior marriage.” traced to a to the cabin, prop- resulting in those iums and the legal find error in the trial court’s We becoming commingled into the mari- erties interpretation document. Under also claims the tal estate. She prenuptial agreement, terms of the where finding that loans its discretion abused party relinquished rights previ- each all operating entities made to various business ously acquired property party, of the other theaters due to Mr. Mr. Rudman’s were right he or she would also have no alone, rather than to the marital Rudman earnings *6 increase in value or additional improper Mrs. Rudman claims that estate. property. that Like- might that accrue to of this improper exclusion and valuation wise, any property acquired by parties the property by reduced the marital estate marriage earnings after the would accrue $472,589. Additionally, any the marital estate. if into the Finally, Mrs. Rudman claims acquire property during amounts used to undervaluing by court abused its discretion premarital be traced to could property properly classified as marital. property, those amounts would remain the George the- Specifically, she claims St. Thus, separate property of that individual. aters, Logan, in the two new screens premarital integrity of an preserve to by Jeep Wagoneer were undervalued arguably commingled asset that has been the trial court. property acquired after the asset, part, or its severable must be agreed prenuptial original source. traced to its unambiguous and agreement was clear and interpreted be as a matter could therefore considering regard In the claims agreements Premarital are con- of law. ing specific findings, we note that each manner as other con- strued in the same testimony presented expert extensive side Neilson, 780 P.2d tracts. Neilson v. concerning situation of the the financial (Utah Ct.App.1989). Because the trial as parties and his or her individual theories interpreted agreement as a mat- valuation, categorization, to the correct law, interpretation no we accord the ter of property. This exten distribution using cor- weight, and particular review testimony in a five-volume sive resulted standard. Id. rectness transcript and over one hundred exhibits. specifically record relates agreement spells out Most of the prenuptial Fur and valuation. property as mar- distribution property should be classified which ther, evi pre- as the trial court heard substantial should be classified ital and which determined, property dis dence which to base its that has marital. Once been clear and de- tribution. The court made discretion as to how to divide the court has categorization, tailed ry valua- of a second residence. Substantial evi- property. tion and distribution of supports dence findings. these Given findings, those I see no in error the conclu- appeal, On the burden is appellant on the sion that someone of such means was not to marshal all the evidence in help need of professional with her fees. trial court’s and then to show the Moreover, where there adequate is an find- legally evidence to be sup- insufficient to need, ing of no I any point cannot see that port findings, even when viewed would requiring be served in findings as to light most to the favorable trial court. fees, the reasonableness of a matter that is Bradley, Doelle v. of concern to the court only if the court has reviewing In the marshaled first determined that an evidence, award of fees our requires standard of review should be made. us to defer to the trial judgment court’s and not to long disturb it so as we find that Nonetheless, I agree remand to reconsid- the court has exercised its discretion in er the fee issue proper respect. in one accordance with the standards set this The trial court in this case determined Mrs. Haumont, state’s courts. Rudman could bear her own but it did P.2d at 424. in contemplation so receiving, of her inter With an extensive thorough record and alia, alimony of over per month for us, are before reluctant to set years. several We have disturbed that aside absent clear error. On appeal. award on If upon remand and appeal, Mrs. Rudman has failed to ade- proper consideration of the factors relative quately marshal the evidence to demon- the court determines to award support strate insufficient for the trial or less alimony, its view Mrs. findings regarding property dis- help Rudman’s need for with her tribution and valuation. We therefore find may necessarily fees change. the distribution and valuation to be within Thus, I permit would reconsideration of the the trial court’s discretion and we will not question fee if the court on remand awards judgment disturb its regard. less than Conversely, before. if it greater awards the same or alimony, its CONCLUSION finding of no need for assistance with fees conclusion, In *7 we reverse and remand for should stand and should not have to be adequate findings on the issues revisited. and and we affirm the trial court’s I wish also to add a comment about the order concerning property distribution and decision, Ramirez length treated at in foot- valuation. note 1 opinion. of the main Where the compel evidence does particular not a find- BILLINGS, J., concur. fact, ing of permit but would one or more ORME, Judge (concurring in the result findings, difficulty inconsistent I see real part): in appellate with an assuming court the trial IWhile otherwise concur in the court’s court necessarily must have found the decision, I expert see the fee way facts in the which is most consistent issue differently. with judgment. the trial court’s an Such approach would view, subvert our error-correc- my In the court and ade- tion function. If judg- we start with the quately found Mrs. Rudman was not in backwards, ment and work help may need of well with her In see a version of the regard, fees. facts which is consist- court noted not only judgment her ent with the working continue as entered. How- ever, business, her typi- go considerable success in a mistake of law would undetected by court, fied she if evaluating received the trial in the credibili- businesses, it, sale of one of her ty but appeared also that the witnesses who before she had the wherewithal to afford actually the luxu- had determined facts to be otherwise, applying in but had erred facts.
law to those highlight the diffi- simple example
A will turning on the Suppose in a
culty. case estoppel that
application of the doctrine of establish- explicitly facts
a trial court found except requirements of doctrine
ing all reliance, the find- as to which
detrimental law, In ings were silent. its conclusions estoppel apply. Further court found as to the evidence in conflict
assume was had detrimental
whether there been Ramirez,
reliance. Under the court empowered is to infer that
court establishing re-
actually found facts
liance, that would be consistent since if judgment. But
the court’s what found, actually weighing the evi-
dence, oc- that no detrimental reliance was conduct, by particular a
casioned course say failed to so in its because
but incorrectly
it determined that reliance was longer requirement under necessary estoppel law to doc-
Utah establish
trine? by
I rath- think a safer course is steered requirement
er strict adherence
adequate be made
court, required under Utah R.Civ.P. where only being where the exception with the harmless, i.e., to make failure ‘clear, facts in record are
where “the
uncontroverted, and capable of ” judgment.’ only favor of the Deliran, (Utah v.
Acton
1987) added) (emphasis (quoting Kinkella 1983)). (Utah Baugh, 660 P.2d *8 Utah, Appellee, v. Plaintiff and
STATE ARCHULETA,
Dell D. Defendant Appellant.
No. 900375-CA. Appeals
Court of Utah.
May