64 Vt. 456 | Vt. | 1892
The opinion of the court was delivered by
To the defendant’s second plea, the jdaintiff interposes a general demurrer. If this plea, which is to the whole declaration, sets forth in substance a full answer to the grievances alleged, it is sufficient, no matter how defective it may be in form, as matters of form are not reached by a general demurrer. To take advantage of them, the pleader must demur specially.
The Municipal Court of Bennington had jurisdiction of the subject matter, the person, and the original process, in the case of State v. Hill, referred to in this plea. In that case, the plaintiff was produced and sworn as a witness, and refused to 'answer certain questions pertinent to the issue, put to him, and after being admonished by the court that if he persisted in his refusal to answer, he would be adjudged to be in contempt of court, he still “ wilfully and contumaciously refused ” to answer the questions. This was contempt in facie curiae, and the de - fendant as judge of the court, had the authority to commit for it; indeed he would have been derelict in his duty had he not done so. In Rapalje on Contempts, sec. 66, it is said : “ It may safely be laid down as a general rule, that the refusal-of a witness to testify at all, or to answer particular questions pertinent
It has been held that this power is inherent in his justices’ courts as well as in the higher courts of this State. In re Cooper, supra. The Municipal Court of Bennington is declared to be a court of record by the public act creating it, and of which this court is bound to take judicial cognizance. St. 1884, No. 226 ss. 48, 74. Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 285. It also has this power to punish for contempt.
A judicial officer acting within his jurisdiction and in his judicial capacity is not liable in a private action for his judicial acts. Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt.; S. C. 23 Atl. Rep. 585; and cases there cited. On the allegations in this plea with reference to defendant’s adjudging the plaintiff to be in contempt of court and ordering his commitment, which are admitted by the demurrer to be true, this immunity accorded to judicial officers, is a complete justification of the act of the defendant in making such adjudication and ordering the imprisonment of the plaintiff until he should purge himself of the contempt.
But the plaintiff contends that if the plea alleges a justifica
If this officer in executing this order used more force than was necessary or otherwise assaulted the plaintiff, or detained and imprisoned him contrary to the order of the court, the defendant is not liable for such excess of force or abuse of authoritjr'on the-part of the officer. A judicial officer is not liable for the acts of a ministerial officer in executing the lawful orders or valid process issued by such judicial officer as a court. In executing* an order of this kind, the officer executing it is not the agent of such judicial officer, but is simply the hand of the law the same as in any other lawful, criminal proceeding. “A con
Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.