*2 would result in dismissal of the case. RYAN, Before MERRITT and Circuit BROWN, Judges, and Senior In Circuit Co., Link Wabash Railroad 370 Judge. 630, 626, U.S. 1386, 1389, 82 S.Ct. 8 L.Ed.2d (1961), 734 Justice Harlan established that
MERRITT, Judge. Circuit courts have the inherent “acting on initiative, their own to clear their Ruby The District Court dismissed calendars Har- of cases that ris’ of have remained be breach contract action under dormant cause of the or Federal Rule Civil inaction dilatoriness of Procedure of parties seeking counsel, to comply fаilure relief.” the Court’s Plaintiff’s pretrial conference, who had prior order to for a final notice of a deliberately conference, did trial. not attend the previously had dilatory prosecuting been 11, Judge July Lambros’ order1 case, and did not file a motion for indicates that a conference would take justifying reconsideration his conduct. Id. place Harris, on October who is 627-28, 82 affirming at S.Ct. at In 79, argues copy that she never received dismissal, the Court stated: of this order and therefore she did not true, course, It appearance her “the fundamen- required know in court requirement process op- tal of due on October is an begin- 14. Harris states that portunity to ning in June be heard such she on notice numerous occa- telephoned proceedings adequate sions as are the court safe- clerk’s office guard spoke right a Mrs. Artz about which constitu- the status began protection her case. keeping Harris notes of tional is invoked.” Anderson August Luckett, her explains calls late 321 1986. She National Bank v. U.S. called, 599, 606, that each time she Artz told her to 246 S.Ct. 692 88 L.Ed. [64 wait, (1944) that there was no adequacy news about wheth- notice and ].... judge er proceedings had In hearing respecting reinstated her case. September October, turns, early rights late party’s Harris affect a to a consid- extent, asked Artz in person knowledge about case erable on Artz told her wait party may three weeks and then the circumstances show such meantime, check the again. consequences file In the on be taken have conference, October the date of his own conduct. 23, 1986, Judge
1. On
discovery
Lambros dismissed
—all
shall be concluded within
(60)
Harris’
because of failure
sixty
days
case
date of this order
prosecute
to obtain new counsel and
further
dispositive
—all
motions
be made
shall
case, allowing
days
60
for reinstatement. Har-
(30)
thirty
days
within
close
from the
ris motioned the Court-for reinstatement of her
covery
Judge
July
case in June.
order
Lambros'
11
be
—a final settlement conference shall
granting Harris’ reinstatement motion states:
held
10:00
at
a.m.
unopposed
Plaintiff has filed an
motion
Courthouse,
Room
United States
Cleve-
hereby
reinstate this action. This motion is
land, Ohio.
granted.
parties
in this case shall abide
following pretrial
schedule:
alty contemplated”);
1389-90. The
at
S.Ct. at
U.S.
Tolbert v. Leighton,
holding
narrowly
(9th
limited its
Cir.1980)(abuse
Court
623 F.2d
particular
circumstances of the
facts and
discretion to dismiss
where,
case.
at
she
trial.
any.
clared that
there was no need for
Two
conferences were scheduled.
February
1986 District court denies
*5
first,
April
plaintiff’s
At the
in
coun-
to
defendant’s motion
dismiss and
appeared
sel
and announced that he could
pretrial
April
schedules
conference for
represent
plaintiff
not
the
because he had
23, 1986,
May
and trial
1986.
been discharged. Plaintiff claimed her
attorney
March
1986 Plaintiffs
indi-
lawyer
discharged,
had not been
and that
cates to
that
the court
he has “re-
she
prepared
proceed pro
was not
to
se.
(returned the
turned filed”
file to the
The case
prose-
was dismissed
want of
plaintiff)
formally
has not
but
with-
plain-
cution and reinstated thereafter at
drawn.
pro
request. Despite
tiff’s
se
the
1986 Pretrial
conference.
understanding
handling
tiffs
that she was
Plaintiffs
counsel moves for with-
se,
pro
the case
she failed to
on
declaring that he had
drawal
been dis-
14, 1986,
pretrial
October
at the second
charged by
plaintiff
the
in November
conference,
again
court
once
dis-
plaintiff
a statement which
dis- missed the case.
putes.
very
This
is
devoted
The court
the аction
dismisses
largely to
a restatement
the essence
prejudice
plaintiffs
failure to hire
presentation during
pro
the
se
given
new counsel. Plaintiff
is
argument
appeal.
oral
on
It
describes
days
within which
reinstate the ac-
telephone
series of
calls with a
member
tion,
which,
failing
“this action is dis-
the
the
district court’s staff and comes to
prejudice.”
missed with
implicit
that
pro
plaintiff
conclusion
the
July
court
District
reinstates
pretrial
was not notifiеd of the second
con-
the action and schedules final settle-
ference on
is
That conclusion
despite
ment
indisputable
conference for October
reached
the
fact that
fendants,
action,
however,
se,
plaintiff,
prosecute
now
this
have
defendants
pretrial
failed
the
at
conference.
period
Ac-
been at risk
entire
of time.
this
Given that defense counsel has been
at-
in
cordingly,
inappropriate
it
be
allow
would
every pretrial
tendance at
conference ordered
defendants
at
to remain
risk in this action.
Court,
by
be
this
it would
an unreasonable
reasons,
is
For the
above-stated
action
imposition
spend
require
defendants to
ad-
hereby
ac-
and this
dismissed
legal
ditional time and
fees in defense of this
is
tion
terminated.
action,
plaintiff
prosecute.
fails to
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Plaintiff
given
years
has been
over four
Thus,
the
of the district court re-
for the first
docket shеets
time insofar as I
know,
court’s order contain-
veal that the district
this court announces a rule that no
date,
time,
place
the
notice of
may
district court
this circuit
dismiss a
pretrial
mailed
conference was
case for
of prosecution
want
unless it has
plaintiff
July
1986.3 The court con- given notice that “dismissal
is contem-
cludes, however,
that
oral
41(b)
plated,”
contrary
notwith-
argument
she
claim before this
that
standing. Presumably, only if such notice
was
nоtified of the
not
scheduled
given
may the case dismissal authority
conference, must be correct because “there
41(b)
by
conferred
be exercised. But more
disputes
in the record that
these
that,
declares,
than
by
the court
negative
contrary,
On
contentions.”
the record
implication, that in a
case which plain-
very clearly disputes
conten-
tiff
prosecute
fails to
the case appropriate-
tions
record shows that
ly but thе
give
trial court fails to
“notice
notice,
plaintiff
given regular
mail
contemplated,”
dismissal is
presumed
which notice is
to have been re-
only
miss the case
if it finds that
regularly
just
ceived
as other
mailed orders
derelict
“has
in ‘bad faith or
directed to the
were received. See
”
contumacious conduct.’
The conditions
#
trial court docket entries
#
# 21
by
newly
created
the court’s
made rules
and #29.
Congress'
are not to be
found
idea about
determined,
The trial court
in its discre-
authority
the trial court’s
to dismiss for
tion,
of progress
utter lack
of this
prosecution,
want of
because such condi-
period
years,
case for
of more than four
part
41(b).
tions are no
of Rule
including history
of dismissal
Quite
complete
aside from this court’s
years
nonprosecution
earlier
two
lack of
to rewrite Rule
by
reinstatement
the court followed
today
rule
the panel
announced
is nei-
failure to
at the
nеcessary application
ther a correct nor
conference, warranted the exercise of the
the somewhat
like-minded announcements
court’s inherent
and Rule
au-
panels
per
speaking
two
this court
thority
dismiss
the case. There is not
*6
in
curiam earlier cases.
slightest
basis in this record to con-
clude that the district court abused its dis-
In
v. City Memphis, Tennes-
Carter
conclusion,
reaching
cretion in
that
and we
see,
(6th Cir.1980),
ful
or contumacious
Cross,
(6th
op
Cir.1986),
file a statement. terson, and Bishop, am satisfied that despite panel disagreed paying This cоurt's with the dis- some obeisance to the Fifth and, judgment citing reading panel trict court’s after Circuit’s of Rule no decision, announce, previously Fifth cited this court ever intended to Circuit Carter, announced, per adoption and a indeed has not divided curiam article, effectively modifying Yale Law Journal declared that dis- a new rule of law an missal of case was abuse Fed.R.Civ.P. to condition a district Patterson, panel power court’s to dismiss a cаse for want of of discretion. then, order, prosecution upon trial court-like in a curious either advance notice that by of the “is directed conditional reinstatement the dismissal authorized the rule or, that, upon compliance contemplated,” with three absent factual court, appellate demonstrating record that “the derelict imposed conditions being noncompli- party has in ‘bad faith or contu- presumably satisfied understandably ance with appellate court’s conditions macious conduct’ ”—and so, power since that is reserved to Con-
gress. DUNCAN, James Plaintiff-Appellant, E. Cross-Appellee,
The district court in this case has demon- strated of patience. an abundance Like nearly courts, all federal district the court PECK, Mr. & Mrs. Harold below has massive docket and a serious Defendants-Appellees, responsibility every to move case on the Cross-Aрpellants, docket promptness. with reasonable An ever-increasing percentage of all district court dockets in this circuit include civil Highland Coal & Chemical cases in which the proceeding are Corporation, Defendant.
pro se. Most district courts are extraordi- 87-3092, Nos. 87-3093. narily patient understandably lenient pro litigants who are unfamiliar United Appeals, States Court of procedure. with the rules of That was the Sixth Circuit. Judge situation in this casе. Lambros dis- missed the case once when the Argued Feb. attorney was relieved and the court was Decided not advised of the attorney’s discharge, permit reinstated the case to proceed tiff to No progress se. what-
ever was plaintiff made in the case.
failed to at the after, according to the records of the dis-
trict being properly notified
scheduled conference. The case
was more years than four and one-half old
and has moved no closer to readiness for
trial than it day was on the it was filed. my judgment, there is in the permits
record that the conclusion that the
district court abused its discretion in exer-
cising its inherent to dismiss this
case or apply provisions of Rule
41(b), whichever route the district court
adopted. me, serious,
What is more it seems to implicit effort to rewrite
41(b) modify a district court’s
to dismiss a case under by adding that rule requirement that dismissal not be
ordered under the rule unless contuma-
cious conduct or bad faith
be shown. Even if that rule were the *8 circuit, not, and I think it is this court
has no adopt such a rewrite of and I respectfully dissent from doing
its so.
