*1 way in some different of the accident by appellant and
from described in evi- introduced pictures
disclosed any result in possibly This
dence. could error There was no
prejudice appellant. see the scene allowing jury to
accident. affirming superior court
The order of af- the district court judgment
firmed. RUBEY, Appellant,
Twyla Mae FAIRBANKS, Appellee. OF
CITY
No. 956. Court Alaska. 23, 1969.
June *2 Curran, Savage, Jr.,
Thomas E. Er- Curran, Anchorage, appellant. win & Stephen DeLisio, Merdes, Schaible, S.
Staley DeLisio, Fairbanks, appellee. & NESBETT, J., Before C. DIMOND RABINOWITZ, JJ. appointed counsel retained DIMOND, Justice. warn- complete Miranda enough a—that court without by the district In a trial she be informed she ing required that of- convicted appellant was jur,y, attorney presence of a misdemeanor. assignation,1 fense of interrogation. during both before affirmed judgment conviction *3 then appeal was An court. superior be a defendant require that Miranda does court. taken this an “presence to right of his to warned to have “counsel attorney” right the—of was not that she point is first Appellant’s But the questioning.4 present” during any right to counsel of her adequately advised specifically that Tannenbaum not fact did Ari- Miranda v. requirements of under to right had the appellant that tell she signed statement zona,2 her therefore and question- “present” during counsel have with the offense admitted in which she ad- that she not ing not mean does have not should charged which she was respect. in He told right her vised of her.3 against evidence been admitted into that he was appellant, prior questioning, to testi- Tannenbaum City Officer Police her police officer, that intended ask he to he appellant prior questioning to fied that arrest, questions in connection with her asked rights”. “her When advised her of any ques- that did have answer she not to about, said: talking he rights he was what tions, anything say that did would be she her, and police against used and that she was entitled her that I was officer I told attorney. con- also questions her, in to an He then asked going to ask her I was particular to prior interrogation, that to if wanted nection the arrest she with attorney” to answer “call an she “no.” and have and answered morning she didn’t anything that any my questions, and Considering the in circumstances against her in say she did would used appellant which Tannenbaum said to attorney an Court and she was entitled to did, appellant he we believe that must have an call and I asked her if she wanted to understood that if she had asked for an attorney and she said no. attorney he would present have been dur stated, appellant’s regard Later he with to ing questioning. The warning given her: counsel, advised right to that he right counsel, her together to to with attorney one “[Sjhe’s an and entitled to the query as to whether she wanted to not her if she provided would be did attorney, call an all which place took get have the funds one.” prior questioning, reasonably would leave impression mind that if Appellant’s is that Tan- contention here she had wished have represent counsel right warning nenbaum’s that she had person prior any must be warned charged 1. was a violation of The offense questioning that he City to remain Code, 6.301 the Fail-banks section silent, any “assignation” statement he does make (a) (1) of which defines against him, be used as evidence meaning: presence and he has the any appointment making or [T]he attorney, ap of an either retained or engagement prostitution or lewdness pointed. In the absence such a warn ap- any or furtherance of such act ing proof knowing intelligent of a pointment engagement. or privilege against waiver one’s self-in 16 L.Ed. 86 S.Ct. ap crimination and to retained or 2d 694 pointed counsel, no evidence obtained as police interrogation a result of the can States In Miranda v. Arizona the United against be used the defendant. Ham person when a Court held that (Alas monds v. 40-41 custody with in connection is taken into ka matter is otherwise de a criminal any Arizona, 436, 444, prived 4.Miranda freedom of action U.S. of his way by significant the authorities 706- subject interrogation, police telephoned ap- have been de- A man named had questioning would her pellant consult suggestion until had time to Tannenbaum’s after she ferred had arrangements appellant made to meet attorney. an in Room Building 201 of the Polaris strengthened conclusion is This gave Fairbanks. Tannenbaum Potter some only not re- appellant did fact money. marked Tannenbaum testified that attorney, but ex- presence quest he and plan Potter had a prearranged wish call one. pressly stated she did not whereby Potter would turn over the marked There no reason believe money appellant, then Potter would rights her not understand what were. did open the door to Room 201 and let Tan- Tannen- Officer speaking nenbaum in. said: baum educated, appeared fairly she She After Tannenbaum waited in the *4 if talk- looked as she knew I was hall of Building the Polaris for about 20 about, minutes, ing and she seemed to understand opened Potter the door Room to comprehend and I saying. what was 201 and asked Tannenbaum to in. come Potter stood in doorway the unclothed. construe actions as amount- ap- Tannenbaum the entered room and saw intelligent a waiver knowing to ing and pellant entering only the a bathroom with right present.5 to her have counsel slip on. At pointed ap- this time Potter to ap- to urged by reach the order conclusion pellant said, “[Yjou’re under arrest pellant, adequately that she advised was not prostitution.” counsel, right of her we to to would have appellant may assume that not have waived immediately Almost thereafter Tannen- right had her counsel if she been told to baum advised that she was under expressly right regard that her this was arrest, money asked her the present during questioning. have to counsel given Potter had her. Tannenbaum testi- logically such an assumption And would fied: require assumption appel- another if—that going give you, She said I’m not it to lant had right had the understood she I well, earned it. I said afraid I’m “presence attorney”, the of an than rather * * * ** you’re going to have to ah just right attorney general, give it to me and that’s when she took it would have requested she then or demand- out of her bra and handed it me*** attorney ed that an present ques- at the did, tioning, saying rather than as she
that she did not to call wish one. These Appellant acquisition contends assumptions are not reasonable to make the money by Tannenbaum was the result under the circumstances. of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Appellant
properly
advised
her
Appellant
counsel,
at first
appointed,
refused
hand
retained
un-
Tannenbaum,
over the money to
der Miranda
cases
Officer
and the
where the re-
capitulated
and then
quirements of
at
Miranda have
his insistence.
been con-
by
Since she
sidered
us.6
revealed the location
knowingly
She
and intel-
of and hand
ed
money
police
over the
a
ligently
right.
waived that
The statement
officer’s de
mand,
seizure,
signed,
she
there
was a search and
admitting
offense with
voluntary
rather than a
charged,
which she was
ad-
surrender of the
properly
money.8
mitted into evidence.7
State,
State,
(Alaska
7.
(Alaska
Thessen v.
Thessen v.
The kind provisions regarding Tannenbaum’s seizure by constitutional forbidden money A was inadmissible because search that which is unreasonable. type given if done with not at that time Miranda unreasonable a seizure would warrant, are silent warning facts as to her remain unless the out a search exception appointed within an have retained or counsel the case bring such to represent a merit must be search war her. There is no that there to the rule exception concerned the use in we are contention. Miranda forbids rant. defend recognizes of a a that which evidence statement made here is custody of his seizure ant who was not warned resulting validity of a search and his privilege against the search self-incrimination a warrant when made without And has no to a lawful arrest.9 to counsel. The Miranda rule made incident application question with of whether in this case was made since the arrest warrant, and the involved was search and seizure is lawful.12 out offense the ar misdemeanor, lawfulness Tannenbaum testified that Officer arresting offi depends whether rest on appel- Building Potter met Polaris where present at commission cer was City Fair- lant was located inside offense.10 police banks. He testified that also placed the tele- station from which overheard *5 Tannenbaum phone appellant city. call to was the Potter between telephone conversation However, Key appel- the where Board Club made arrangements were appellant where city. lant call received the was the outside appellant in Room meet latter for the Appellant “assigna- contends that the term of Building purposes for 201 the Polaris of appointment, appoint- that an tion” means entered Tannenbaum prostitution. When ment the essence of the of as- offense appel unclothed the Potter was room signation, appellant and that since made an Tannenbaum partially unclothed. lant was appointment meet Potter she was while appellant she was say that heard Potter court, outside the was city limits the which cir These prostitution.” for “under arrest trying municipal a violation a ordi- of reason Tannenbaum give cumstances would nance, no jurisdiction had over offense. appel he the time told that at to be aware This contention untenable. The commit arrest she was under lant she was assignation only the offense of includes not assignation she because ting of the offense appointment prostitution making of an of an act in furtherance in an engaged was lewdness, or “any but also act in prostitu further made appointment previously appointment.”13 Appellant ance of such ob Tannenbaum tion What or lewdness. kept appointment by she had made prior light his served, in the of considered meeting Building. Potter at of the Polaris sufficiently It indicative knowledge, was was at the that Building Polaris she re being in assignation offense money ceived from engaged Potter and arrest made The course of commission.11 prostitution. the act of lawful, These were acts search and a a without warrant furtherance the appointment, they consti to such it incident seizure, as was made tuted “assignation” within the definition of arrest, not unreasonable. lawful Viale, 11. United v. State, States 312 F.2d 454 P.2d 252 v. der.” Sleziak See (2d denied, Cir.), 600 cert. 1969). (Alaska (1963). S.Ot. L.Ed.2d 199 (Alas State, P.2d Goss State, States, 12. See Sleziak v. 1964) ; v. United ka Preston 1969). (Alaska U.S. 13. Fairbanks 6.301 Code Ordinances (a) 10. Drahosh (Alaska not offense, general in conflict Article they within laws.” place took X, had section 11 of the Alaska constitution jurisdic- The City of court Fairbanks. provides city’s city, ordi- that a such home rule try this violation of tion to Fairbanks, “may legislative exercise all nance. powers by by prohibited not law char- where instances Appellant lists some ter.” legislative There no enactment regu- by legislature has Alaska statute expressly Alaska that prohibits a rule home activity. aspects sexual lated the criminal city making assignation a from criminal of- made Assignation included—it is not is not not prohibition fense. We do find such ar- Appellant by legislature. a crime legislature from the fact the Alaska regu- extensive gues legislature’s that the has extensively covered field sexual of its evidence lation of sexual behavior is offenses. We believe there would have any pre-empt intent this field so be some additional factor from which the made criminal phase of such behavior not legislature intent prohibit local by the made legislature not be criminal regulation reasonably in this area could be by political state. subdivision of this inferred.16 are any We not aware of such Appellant argues this that the at- from factor in pass this case. shall not fur- by tempt assignation to make offense ther general on the subject pre-emption City of Fairbanks is invalid. by law, state subject because the is com- Appellant primarily Cali- relies on the plex adequately been briefed in the case fornia Court decision in this case.17 Lane,14 in In re That case invalidated portion Municipal Angeles the Los Code telephoned po- from the any which inter- made criminal sexual lice station at request. Tannenbaum’s Ac- party course whom the one other cording to testimony Tannenbaum’s not married. court held conversation between Potter and state legislature pre-empted field *6 was as follows: sexual offenses, simple fornica- since * * * Mr. Potter dialed the number adultery by or and tion was not made a crime ah***2**¡i¡ah*** law, legislature by state the heard had determined pick up someone phone the on implication the other that such conduct not be should * * * end, and it awas male a man California, criminal attempt in and that the said, that answered phone and he regulation at local subject of in * * * “Key Board and ah Club” conflict with state law and was void.15 * * * * * * * * Potter said ah persuaded adopt are not to Twyla. let me talk It was a moment to doctrine of the Lane case. California’s or two and then I heard the female’s prohibition against constitutional local voice, Rubey’s Mrs. voice that saids regulations is different from Alaska’s. hello and Potter said this is [sic] Willie. XI, Article section 11 of the California con He [sic], saids hey can you see to- I * * * n ** * night? provides stitution city “may that a make And she well, saids you go do local, want to for [sic] and enforce within its limits all such fifty? yea, He saids fifty, police, sanitary got I’ve regulations and [sic] other are flicts Between Cal.Rptr. State 14. 58 Statutes Mu- Cal.2d nicipal Ordinances, (1962). 72 Harv.L.Rev. P.2d 897 (1959); Sargent, 744-45 Chavez Lane, 15. In re 58 Cal.2d Cal. (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1958); Rptr. 857, (1962). 372 P.2d Ayers City Tacoma, of 6 Wash.2d Antieau, Municipal Corporation 16. See 1 (1940); People 108 P.2d ex rel. 5.38, Law at 292.38 Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Mountain States Antieau, Municipal Corporation Co., 17. See 1 Tel. & Tel. 397, Colo. 3.36, 5.35, (1968); Law 5.38 §§ Calif. (1962) ; Note, L.Rev. Con- 741-42 The sixth Appellant is correct. saids then she fifty. And go for I’ll federal constitution amendment twenty minutes to in you well, meet I’ll [sic] I, Alaska constitu of the section 11 article He Building room the Polaris prosecu in all criminal provide that tion ya. And that see o. k. I’ll saids [sic] con entitled “to be accused is tions was it. him.” against witnesses with the fronted “conspiratorial that a contends Appellant by this re primary interest served The Tannenbaum between Officer association” to a defendant afford quirement appellant to commit induced Potter de Appellant was cross-examination.21 appellant assignation. What offense of allowing Tannenbaum By this right. nied entrapment. the defense of urging testify telephone conversation as to to entrap there be In order Potter, the court appellant and between crim that the show ment, must the facts a witness Potter effect allowed in the mind originated not design inal is re since Potter appellant, what against minds Tannenbaum in the appellant, but ported to that he wished see have said is induced Potter, appellant was and that in an particular appellant night, aon to commit offense by people these he question to her whether swer she would not otherwise assignation which “go expressed he his will fifty” would have committed.18 pre pay ingness appellant for what $50 prostitution, sumably was to be act a light Viewing evidence ap meeting agreeable and that he was state,19 believe we most favorable to Building pellant in Room 201 Polaris by the disclosed entrapment is not Appellant not af in 20 minutes. telephone conver According to the facts. veracity of this forded the to test the Tannenbaum, sation as related testimony by Potter. cross-examination of meet Potter willingness to stated her was denied her She constitutional response “price” her gave of $50 against with this her. confronted witness question whether Potter could innocuous testimony of Tannenbaum as to night. would tend appellant that This “see” telephone said on disposed Potter was inadmis to com show that sible. assignation even without mit the offense Tannenbaum. inducement design that the criminal The facts indicate colleague In his dissent our states mind,
originated and the most admitted, non-hearsay where evidence is *7 that to en question Potter Tannenbaum did was “no of right constitutional [the] Although confrontation is involved.” courage appellant’s in boldness.20 many hearsay situations the and the rule the trial. Potter a witness at was not requirement confrontation serve the same telephone as to the Tannenbaum testified purpose, we do always not believe it follows appellant, conversation between Potter that since certain hearsay evidence is not Appellant already as we have noted. ob- its admission does not violate the accused’s testimony, contending at the jected to right of confrontation. Both the federal trial that to that and also here allow testi- and Alaska provide constitutions that an mony deny appellant’s be right was to to accused is entitled “to be confronted with against confronted with a witness her. 21.Douglas Alabama, 415, 418, v. 326, 380 U.S. Goresen 482 327 1074, 934, 85 (Alaska 1967). S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d (1965); Texas, 400, Pointer v. 380 U.S. 19. Id. 13 L.Ed.2d Legal (1965); Williams, Entrapment Gladden, Parker J. —A Technique, on Police J. S.Ct. Limitation (1966); McCormick, C. & P.S. of Evi Orim.L.C. Law dence at was with the statement: “This is sufficient against him.” the witnesses * ** prove charge beyond a rea- appellant, because “against” a witness tele- sonable doubt.” It would seem from this reported to have said on the he was judge, holding appellant that the act that was phone implicated her in the criminal guilty charged, of the relied not alone assignation. Appellant had the crime confession, appellant’s on written but in ascertain cross-examine Potter order addition the evidence actually is re- on of Potter’s conver- say what he whether he did true, appellant. sation with If then this is ported to have said. conversation, say one could that such evi- con- said that It been dence of which we have held to be inad- “fundamental essen- frontation is a missible, did contribute ultimate find- .prosecu- tial a fair trial in a criminal ing judge appellant guilty. that was denial question tion.” The whether In a application this circumstance literal here, a requires that right, done Chapman26 rule would seem re- judgment reversal of the of conviction. quire a reversal of the conviction. have a harmless error rule But we cannot be to the fact that blind “Any (a) providing —Criminal Rule 47 telephone there was evidence other than the defect, error, irregularity or variance which conversation which was more than ade- be rights does not affect substantial shall quate to sustain the conviction. Tannen- disregarded.” applies This to constitutional baum testified that he had observed Potter errors as well All trial errors others. in a room at the Polaris provisions do which violate constitutional Building in state, an unclothed which awas call automatically But reversal. strong indication they had previously such cannot if errors be declared harmless made arrangements to meet for pur- there there a reasonable evi possibility that poses prostitution. of lewdness or There dence admitted in violation of constitutional was the money evidence of the marked rights might have contributed to conv which given Tannenbaum had to Potter and iction.24 way Another it is putting which Potter had paid appellant. There before constitutional error can signed confession where she harmless, held to be the court must able admitted prostitute, that she was a that she beyond declare belief a reasonable engaged in an act prostitution doubt that the error was harmless—that about January 4:00 a. m. on it did not contribute to the verdict obt date, Building, the 201 of the Polaris Room ained.25 place testified time and that Tannenbaum holding that appellant was convicted together, he observed and Potter assignation, offense of trial charged that she had of sexual for act $50 judge said appellant’s statement, according whom, a man intercourse with offense, which she admitted committing the description to her and Tannenbaum’s testi- “would indicate that there was such an as- Potter, mony was agreed and that she had signation.” judge then went on to dis- engage in the act of sexual intercourse cuss the telephone substance of the conver- when Potter talked to her on street *8 sation between Potter and appellant, as tes- Key later her at the called Board Club— by tified Tannenbaum, appellant stating: concluded wanted me to “[H]e Const, VI; 22. Chapman U.S.Oonst. Amend. California, 18, Alaska 25. v. 386 U.S. I, 24, art. 824, 11. 705, 87 S.Ct. 17 E.Ed.2d 710- (1967); State, 711 Thessen v. Texas, 400, 404, 23. Pointer v. 380 U.S. 341, (Alaska 1969). 350 1065, 1068, 923, 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 926 Fahy Connecticut, 85, 26. v. 375 U.S. 86- (1965). 87, 229, 171, 84 11 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 173 Fahy Connecticut, 85, (1963); Chapman v. California, 375 U.S. 86- v. 386 U.S. 87, 229, 171, 18, 24, 824, 84 11 705, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 173 87 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 17 (1963). (1967). 710-711 478 WITZ, where, (dissenting). told him to RABINO him I told
meet him so I Justice 201.” the Polaris room meet me at Arizona, the In Miranda v. United States a is
Supreme person held that when Court custody in a taken into connection evidence, no or even was There deprived criminal matter or otherwise confession appellant’s any that suggestion, any significant of his freedom of action in voluntarily. knowingly given was way by subject the authorities have it. We deny made having did not She any police interrogation, prior then admissible the confession was held that questioning adequately ad been appellant had because intelligent knowingly and vised of has person the must be that he warned rights under Miranda. her ly waived silent, any right a to remain that state- judge, why trial no the reason are aware of ment he make used evi- does evidence, not have should weighing the him, against dence and that he has attorney, confession. We weight right presence the given full the appointed.1 either retained or that the con ignore the fact are unable to light in the of evi fession, when considered warning fell Here Officer Tannenbaum’s telephone the con than that of dence other ap- short Miranda’s standards because entirely sufficient to estab versation, was pellant right was not advised of her beyond a reasonable guilt lish attorney, presence of an either re- “the the requirement appointed” any interrogation. the at doubt. Under tained I admis- opinion am therefore constitutional Chapman harmless rule on sion into evidence of the statement which a belief error, to declare are able we erro- obtained from admitting testi Tannenbuam’s the error in neous.2 I am of the further view be mony telephone conversation as to superior ruling court’s cannot be char- harmless Potter was appellant and tween cannot acterized harmless error I beyond doubt.27 a reasonable find, beyond doubt, ad- reasonable did superior mission of this statement not con- court af- judgment tribute to the court’s determination firming district court judgment guilt.3 I would therefore set aside is affirmed. California, 18, Fendley States, 923, Chapman, v. v. 386 U.S. United 384 F.2d 705, (5th 1967) ; 824, 24, 17 L.Ed.2d 710- 923-924 Cir. Brooks v. 87 S.Ct. Del., ; State, 833, (1967) (1967); State, v. 454 229 A.2d 835 711 Thessen State, 248, 341, (Alaska 211 v. So.2d 249-250 Woods 350 State, (Fla.App.1968); Md. Thomas v. 3 1612, 1602, 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1. 384 U.S. ; App. 101, 558, (1968) A.2d 561 (1966). 694, In sev- 706-707 State, Md.App. 522, v. A. Robinson opinion, subsequent points in their eral 2d reiter- States Court United using following requirement ated this 3.Chapman California, 18, 24, v. merely language: consult “not L.Ed.2d 710-711 87 S.Ct. questioning, prior but also with counsel any ques- during present to have counsel State, Thessen v. Neither P.2d 341 tioning if the so desires.” defendant (Alaska, May State, 12,1969); Nicholi at 1626. at 86 S.Ct. U.S. (Alaska 1969) ; P.2d 351 nor Soolook 721; “that he at L.Ed.2d (Alaska 1968), in- P.2d 55 attorney, presence of an present- precise volved issue which attorney afford an if he cannot and that Nieholi, at bar. coun- ed ease any appointed prior to for him one will present during inter- sel was fact questioning U.S. if so desires.” he rogation ; Soolook, the accused ad- 1630. 16 at attorney vised his have an *9 694, at L.Ed.2d 726. present; Thessen, question this (6»f 7, 731, States, Montoya not raised see note F.2d at 7 392 2. v. United v. United opinion). 1968) ; (5th Windsor 735 Cir. (5th 1968) ; 530, States, F.2d 533 Cir. 389
479 superior judg- affirmance of the iered special court’s for a purpose, namely, as was entered ment and commitment which assertions to evidence the truth asserted,5 re- the district with directions to court matter a new trial. mand to court for the district In State,6 Watson v. adopted we this the ma- regard In another facet of view. There we said: agree I find that jority’s opinion, I cannot conclusion that court’s Evidence of statement made other than infringed. I am of confrontation was by a testifying witness who is is ex- opinion Tannenbaum’s Officer hearsay only cluded as when it is of- testimony during the what said as to fered to establish the truth of the fact telephone conversation with stated. it Where is offered without and, therefore, question hearsay not no truth, reference to its but for some other in- right of confrontation is constitutional purpose, relevant hearsay then the rule volved.4 does not apply. Professor regard question, evidentiary The rule adopted which we
Wigmore states:
in Watson
been
in many
has
followed
If,
extrajudicial
utterance
therefore,
jurisdictions.7
bar,
In the
at
case
to evidence
offered,
an assertion
is
not as
truth of
extrajudicial
Potter’s
statements
asserted,
the matter
but
without
is
reference
What
and ma
irrelevant.
is relevant
asserted,
the matter
the truth of
terial
the fact
Potter made these
* * *
apply.
Hearsay rule does not
extrajudicial
utterances
the course of
* * *
Hearsay
excludes
telephone
rule
appellant.
conversation with
only when of-
extrajudicial utterances
testimony
Officer
Pot
Tannenbaum’s
as to
Concerning
constitutional
McGrath,
534,
monwealth v.
Mass.
351
confrontation
and its
relation
(1967).
222 N.E.2d
In the Markis
774
Wigmore
Hearsay rule,
states:
Professor
Friendly
case, Judge
wrote at 863-864 of
by the Constitution
The rule sanctioned
352 F.2d:
Hearsay
cross-examina-
is the
tion,
rule
Markis
it
claims
was error to admit
exceptions
Ripa’s testimony
with all
placing
as to Mento’s
found, developed,
legitimately
or cre-
by telephone
of bets
absence of
ated therein.
identification
Markis’ voice as that
result,
then,
con-
under the
The net
receiving
plain
on the
Ripa
end.
It
rule,
that,
as tes-
so
stitutional
testify
far
not be
could
allowed to
Hearsay
required
timony is
under the
said;
Mento said
the receiver
infra-judicially,
taken
rule to he
it
could
Mentó alone
do that.
See Van
way, namely,
in a certain
shall be taken
subject
Riper
961,
States,
v. United
F.2d
13
cross-examination,
se-
(2
Cir.),
—not
968
cert. denied [Ackerson v.
cretly
parte’ away
the ac-
from
or ‘ex
702,
States]
United
273 U.S.
S.Ct.
47
pre-
cused. The Constitution does
102,
(1926) ;
rule reference without receivable
tion is asserted.8
truth of the matter Collart, less; SQ.
6,656 FT., D. W. more or Collart, Jerry Collart; City Lee Hazel Borough; Kodiak; Ruth C. Kodiak Island owners, Appel Coffin; unknown all lants, Alaska, Appellee.
STATE of
No. 981. of Alaska. Court
July 9, 1969.
George Kodiak, appellants. Vogt, for appearances appellee. No NESBETT, DIMOND, J., Before C. RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, BONEY JJ.
DIMOND, Justice. brought by a condemnation
In action report August state a master’s filed on 21, 1967, appellants’ $8,610. valuing land at September 28, appellants Ruth On filed notice Coffin and D. W. Collart report. appeal master’s On from trial ver- appeal jury was held and a valuing appellants’ dict returned land at $14,976.1 Cal.App.2d beverages long they Munro, not as Greenblatt purchase (1958), court did ask the witness to the bev- erages. the violation is the solicita- As said: accomplished by only tion, such can statements In the instant case the words. employees bartender and female of the truth provides: were introduced 1. AS 09.55.320 only Right jury damages what was to show but trial contents property. party part said, value An interested said is for what was appeal difference master’s award It made no itself. violation damages prop- employees his valuation of wanted the female whether