56 Ga. App. 49 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1937
Ethel Lee brought a slander action against Dora 5. Rubenstein, alleging that the defendant in the presence of other persons used certain false, defamatory, and slanderous words of the plaintiff, to wit: ’“You [Anna Belle Miller] and that other
In Harbin v. Hunt, 151 Ga. 60 (3) (105 S. E. 842), it was said: “If . . the defendant passes over, without demurring, a petition which does not set forth a cause of action, he may still attack the same on this ground by an oral motion to dismiss the case at any time before verdict; and after verdict, by motion in arrest of judgment, by direct bill of exceptions, or by motion to set aside the judgment.” In O’Connor v. Brucker, 117 Ga. 451 (43 S. E. 731), it was said: “The . . case of Kelly v. Strouse, 116 Ga. 872 (4), adjudges that no technical rule, or failure to demur or to plead, will authorize the courts to impose a liability on the defendant, where, from the facts stated in the petition, or from the facts as they appear in evidence, there is no liability in law. Advantage ought to be taken of such defects by demurrer. It saves the time of the country and the expense incident to a trial. Raising such issues by demurrer is not only proper, but it is in the interest of the parties and of the country alike. Civil Code, § 5048. But if no demurrer or plea is filed, and if judgment is rendered by default, on a petition which sets out no cause of action, the defendant may even then move in arrest of judgment. Of course, in such case every intendment will be in favor of the verdict, and all amendable defects will have been cured thereby.” “A motion to set aside a judgment does not question the competency or sufficiency of the evidence which induced the judgment.” Penn v. McGhee, 6 Ga. App. 631
It is a good defense in such case if the defendant can satisfy the jury that the words used were not intended to impute crime, but merely as general words of abuse, and meant no more than
Judgment affirmed.