RUBBERMAID, INC., APPELLEE, v. WAYNE COUNTY AUDITOR ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 2001-0451
Supreme Court of Ohio
May 29, 2002
95 Ohio St.3d 358 | 2002-Ohio-2338
Taxation—Complaint for reduction of taxable value—R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19 as amended by 1998 Sub.H.B. No. 694 violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Submitted February 6, 2002. APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 97-J-1119.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶1} In early March 1997, a vice president of the home products division of appellee Rubbermaid, Inc. signed and filed a complaint with appellant, the Wayne County Board of Revision (“BOR“), seeking a reduction in the taxable value of certain of its properties for tax year 1996. While the complaint was pending, this court decided Sharon Village, Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932, where we held that since the preparation and filing of a valuation complaint by a nonattorney corporate officer constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, a board of revision does not have jurisdiction to consider that complaint under former
{¶2} Rubbermaid was dissatisfied with the amount of the reduction and filed an appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA“). The BTA then issued a show cause order based on Sharon Village, requiring Rubbermaid to demonstrate why its complaint should not be dismissed. However, before the BTA decided whether to dismiss the case, the General Assembly enacted 1998 Sub.H.B. No. 694 in response to Sharon Village. Sub.H.B. No. 694, effective March 30, 1999, 147 Ohio Laws Part III, 5373, permits some nonattorneys, including corporate officers, to file valuation complaints on behalf of a property owner. On this basis, the BTA considered the appeal, and on February 8, 2001, it granted an additional reduction to Rubbermaid. The BOR and the Wayne County Auditor appealed, and this cause is now before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.1
{¶3} At issue in this case is the constitutionality of
{¶4} Appellants contend that Sub.H.B. No. 694 violates
{¶5} With regard to the first determination, the uncodified Section 3 of Sub.H.B. No. 694 as amended specifically provides that its terms apply to any complaint filed for tax years 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997, and to tax years 1998 and later. Sub.H.B. No. 694 became effective on March 30, 1999, and an amendment to it became effective October 5, 1999. 1999 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 283, Sections 149
{¶6} Having determined that the statute meets the threshold inquiry, we next consider the constitutionality of the intended retroactivity, by determining whether the retroactive statute is remedial or substantive. A retroactive statute is substantive if it impairs vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, or imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction. Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 106-107, 522 N.E.2d 489. Remedial laws affect only the remedy provided, and include laws that ” ‘merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.’ ” Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 308, 316, 744 N.E.2d 751 (the “Mirge” decision), quoting State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 411, 700 N.E.2d 570.
{¶7} Although the uncodified Section 3 of Sub.H.B. No. 694 refers to the amendment as remedial in nature, this court is not bound to accept that characterization but must instead undertake its own analysis. In arguing that Sub.H.B. No. 694 is a substantive law, appellants urge us to apply the rationale set forth in our recent decision in Mirge, supra. In Mirge, a corporation‘s vice president had prepared, signed, and filed a valuation complaint with a county board of revision. After that complaint was deemed defective because the filing by the corporate officer constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the corporation refiled the complaint pursuant to newly enacted Sub.H.B. No. 694. Under those facts, this court held that ”
{¶9} Although this case is distinguishable in that the complaint at issue is an original complaint rather than a refiled complaint, we agree with appellants that the rationale expressed in Mirge applies with equal force to the instant situation. Regardless of whether the complaint is an original as opposed to a refiled complaint, Section 3 of Sub.H.B. No. 694, if upheld, would take away a legal right. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, county officials had a vested legal right to have Rubbermaid‘s complaint dismissed as invalid, since it was filed by an unauthorized individual. The legislation strips county officials of this right. Furthermore, it imposes new and additional burdens on counties to defend against what would have been an invalid complaint in the absence of the new law. Therefore, under the rationale of Mirge,
{¶10} Accordingly, we find that the BOR was without jurisdiction to rule on Rubbermaid‘s complaint. The decision of the BTA is reversed.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., concurs in judgment.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents.
{¶11} I believe that we should dismiss this case due to the lack of jurisdiction. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of
{¶12} Assuming that jurisdiction does exist, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s determination that
Rich, Crites & Wesp and Jeffrey A. Rich; and Martin Franz, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants.