OPINION BY
Travis Ruane, a student, petitions for review of the decision of Shippensburg University 1 suspending him for two years based on the University Judicial Board’s (Board) finding that he sexually assaulted a fellow student. Ruane asserts that the Board’s hеaring did not afford him due process and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Discerning no merit in these contentions, we affirm.
Based on an e-mail from Allison Morris to Dean Roger Serr, accusing Ruane of sexually assaulting her at a campus party, *861 the University scheduled a Judicial Board hearing to determine whether Ruane had violated the Student Code of Conduct. By written notice, the University informed Ruane of the datе and time at which the Judicial Board had scheduled a hearing to adjudicate the charge that he had violated Regulation 3.1 prohibiting harassment, Regulation 3.2 prohibiting threatening behavior, Regulation 3.7 prohibiting disordеrly conduct and Regulation 3.8 prohibiting sexual assault. Three days prior to the hearing, Ruane and his legal counsel attended a pre-hearing conference and discussed the charges and the hearing prоcedure with the Dean. Two days prior to the hearing, Ruane received a copy of Morris’s e-mail detailing the offensive behavior. At the hearing on December 11, 2003, both Morris and Ruane attended with their respective “friendly advisers” as permitted under the school’s written judicial process. Morris attended the hearing with the Director of the Women’s Center and Ruane with Joseph Ruane, an attorney. Morris testified, authenticating her e-mail, confirming the accuracy of the statements therein and answering questions from Travis Ruane. In rebuttal, Ruane introduced testimony from three fellow students, but he did not testify in his own behalf.
On December 23, Dean Serr announced the Board’s decision in a letter to Ruane, stating in pertinent part, as follows:
After hearing the facts of the case, and following thorough deliberation, the members of the University Judicial Board found you in violation of Community Regulations 3.2 and 3.8. This decision was made because the individuals judging your case believed that Ms. Morris provided enough specific information to make her account plausible. In contrast, the information provided by you and your witnesses was neither substantial nor specific. The members of the Judicial Board also believed that your use of alcohol both before and at the party impaired your judgment, while it was never substantiated that Ms. Morris was consuming alcohol.
As a result, the following sanctions and stipulations were levied. Please understand that these sanctions and stipulations took into consideration your previоus violations of the student code of conduct.
Suspension: Effective Spring Semester 2004, you are suspended from Shippens-burg University for two years. You may return to classes, provided you fulfill the following stipulations for Spring 2006 classes.
You are to have no contact of any kind with Ms. Morris henceforth.
You are not allowed on campus during your period of suspension.
You must provide proof from a licensed therapist that yоu received an assessment to determine whether you have dependence and/or abuse issues related to drugs and/or alcohol. If it is determined that such issues exist, you will be required to prove that you sucсessfully completed therapy to address such issues.
The letter further informed Ruane that he could seek review of this decision by an Appeals Board.
In a letter, Ruane appealed the decision, сhallenging the sufficiency of evidence to support the Board’s finding and contending that the hearing did not comport with due process. Specifically, Ruane alleged that the Board scheduled the hearing and provided notification thereof without affording him sufficient time to prepare a response. Ruane further asserted that the Board should have granted his request for a continuance due to pending final examinations and the associated difficulty of se *862 curing witnesses, the unavailability of his lawyer (an associate in the same firm as the attorney who did accompany Ruane) and the necessity that he not testify before the Board in order not to jeopardize his right to avoid self-incrimination while criminal charges were pending. Dr. Harp-ster, the Vice President for Student Affairs, agreed to reconvene the Board to recеive additional testimony. At the reconvened hearing, only Ruane testified and answered questions from Morris. Thereafter, in a letter dated May 7, 2004, Dr. Harpster notified Ruane that the Board had sustained the original decisiоn but modified the two-year suspension to begin in May of 2004 and permit Ruane’s return to classes in the fall of 2006. After Ruane filed a second appeal letter with the school, Dr. Harpster stated in a letter dated May 25, 2004, thаt the Board’s confirmation of the original decision ended the school’s appeal process. Ruane promptly filed the present appeal on June 1.
In summarizing his arguments, Ruane asserts that the Board’s process was fundamentally unfair insofar as it based its decision on “wholly unsubstantiated factual findings, confusion about the Board’s standard of review, improper and prejudicial evidentiary rulings, obstruction of Ruane’s right to cross examine witnesses.” Without question, prior to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, Ruane was entitled to a measure of due process comporting with basic principles of fundamental fairness. At a minimum, the University had to provide Ruane with notice of the charges and some opportunity for a hearing.
See Boehm v. Univ. of Pennsylvania Sch. of Veterinary Med.,
Before the Board, the parties’ presented conflicting testimony regarding the critical fact as to whether Morris consented to the sexual contact, which neither party disputes occurred. It was solely for the Board to resolve this conflict by determining the credibility and weight of the testimony.
See Kusnir v. Leach,
64 Pa. Cmwlth. 65,
Ruane asserts that the Board erred in relying on Morris’s e-mailed account of the evening’s events because that e-mail was hearsay. First, Ruane, who was accompanied by an attorney, did not raise this objection at the hearing and therefore it is waived.
See Jackson v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania,
There is no merit in Ruane’s contention that the Board erred in refusing to entertain his questions as to whether Morris attemрted to thwart the assault by slapping, punching or scratching or whether Morris and her girlfriends had flirted. The Dean properly refused to permit these questions as insufficiently probative on the issue of sexual contaсt and consent therefore.
There is also no merit in Ruane’s contention that the Board demonstrated bias in questioning him about his alcohol consumption on the evening at issue. Evidence regarding possible intoxication is relevant to Ruane’s judgment at the time of the incident and his capacity to recall the events. In addition, the Board’s reference to Ruane’s prior disciplinary sanctions for two incidents of underаge drinking did not demonstrate bias. The Board considered the prior violations only in connection with its determination as to the appropriate sanctions for the present offense. The prior transgressions were never mentioned during the hearing and there is no indication in the record that these violations were considered in determining whether Ruane committed the instant offense. Indeed, in the letter announcing the Board’s decision, Dr. Harpster stated, “Your prior violations were only disclosed to the members of the Judicial Board after they made their determination about you being in violation or not in violation of the resрective charges.”
Finally, to the extent, as Ruane contends, that the Board may have considered the evidence under a clear and convincing standard of proof, this error is harmless inasmuch as the proper standard, a preponderance of the evidence, requires a lesser quantum of proof.
Accordingly, we affirm.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of February, 2005, the order of Shippensburg University in the above captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The University is a part of the State System of Higher Education. See Section 2002A of the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, added by the Act of November 12, 1982, P.L. 660, ás amended, 24 P.S. § 20-2002A. Therefore, it is a Commonwealth agency, over which we have appellate jurisdiction to review student disciplinary proceedings. See Section 763 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 763.