*1
Murphy,
plexing content. The refined prepared adopted was tenant which quarter on a first the trial was based court BELL, Gregory D.D.S., F. quarter of year of the to first the third (Defendant). Appellee year calculation. Landlord contends that comparison period the base should have No. 88-292. quarter year either the last
been Supreme Wyoming. Court of so escalation is effective for change January January from 1st to 1st or 27, July 1989. only January. The latter contention deny use of the index which state basis, only computed quarterly on a while monthly publicat index federal has a Initially,
ion.3 intended lease was date, January
commence but occu
pancy delays remodeling required a later delayed signing
execution and until March possession April 1979 for a date of 1. finally expired
The lease March then
1989. parties agree
The the state index only published quarterly. With that established, component
factual we find no
error in accept the trial court decision to computation comparison based on a be- quarter
tween the first just before the
term quarter commenced with the that ex-
pired adjustment before new would be
made years two later. factual conclu-
sion determining trial court point
base computation was properly logic
founded in and the written contractu-
al terms. Storage Moving Johnson & Co. Inc.,
v. Victory,
(Wyo.1989).
Affirmed. Kelly, (Wyo.1964). Barbe, Goodman v. Agency, 390 P.2d es or waiver. E.C. Cates Inc. v. 1988). (Wyo. brief, questionable 2. In text as stated in the it laches, really argued whether landlord waiver shown difference between tenant’s exhibit estoppel directly, argued $1,987.28; $12,- any apparently but rather 7 and exhibit 6 totals period $10,751.44. two-year refund was limited "previous compared to a since 738.72 If the second adjustments used, accepted quarter rent overpayment totaled paid.” $18,000. authority No case was cited on lach- about *2 McDaniel, Cheyenne, Jack
Rodger Colo., Kintzele, Denver, appellant. George Argeris of Larry B. Kehl and J. Williams, Argeris, Cheyenne, Guy, &White appellee. CARDINE, C.J., and Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
MACY, Justice. specifi- malpractice case This is a dental involving question of informed cally granted sum- The district court consent. Bell, appellee Gregory F. mary judgment to pur- D.D.S., appellant Angelina Roybal appeal. sued this Although variously parties, stated presented is the issues the substance of questions or not factual simply whether appellant’s claim elements of exist on the preclude entry of summa- which material conclude that ry judgment. We record, disputes indicated in the are factual therefore we reverse. 1983, began exten- May appellant In even- course of dental treatment which sive originally tually involved the three dentists in this case: as defendants named Giovale, Do- Bell, and Dr. Rex Dr. Richard Appellant first saw Dr. Giovale lan. regarding bridge. a loose May 1983 performed a root 1983 Dr. Giovale June designated as appellant on a tooth canal swered, generally denying allegations. tooth # was located lower Thereafter, jaw. reported Thereafter, left filed defendants motions experiencing pain summary judgment supported associated affi- According appellant, attempts exhibits, memoranda, # davits, depo- July 15, Giovale next several months to appellant. over sition of On continuing problems alleviate dismissing district court entered an order *3 tooth # 20 were unsuccessful. pursuant Dr. Dolan from the action ato stipulation appellant between and that de- concurrently performing Dr. Giovale was Appellant fendant. then submitted a mem- appellant’s upper various dental work on opposition orandum summary in judg- to teeth, right including bridge work and at accompanied by deposition, ment an least one further root One canal. containing expert opinion affidavit the of upper right developed teeth in the an ab- Tomasetti, Boyd Dr. and various documen- scess requiring surgical on the root an oral tary primarily consisting materials ap- of apicoectomy.1 Ap- known as an pellant’s dental records. Prior to the sum- pellant appellee was referred to for this mary judgment hearing, appellant and Dr. procedure. complet- apicoectomy This Giovale reached an out-of-court settlement. successfully in by appellee July ed 1984. summary judgment hearing Appellant experience prob- continued 1, 1988, August held on appellee as 20, early lems # with tooth and in 1985 Dr. only remaining the defendant. A tran- api- Giovale her to referred an script hearing of motion the has not been coectomy apicoectomy on that tooth. The provided appeal. the Appar- in record on performed April # was in tooth 20 1985. however, ently, reflected # briefs of apicoectomy appel- After the on tooth parties, counsel appellant experienced lant informed pain continued numb- hearing appel- district court at the (paresthesia) general ness area of dropping against lant was all Consequently, appel- tooth. after claims further lee except relating the claim alleged consultation a referral for a second opinion, appellant failure to an Dr. Giovale referred obtain informed consent in #20, apicoectomy Dr. connection Dolan for extraction of tooth with the on tooth January requesting # 20. performed receiving which was 1986. After Ac- fur- cording ther appellant, briefing question on the of extraction informed consent, remedy pain paresthe- tooth did district court entered its deci- asserts, Appellant support granting sia. sion letter and order record, judgment appellee. permanent appeal that she sustained This nerve fol- damage proce- lowed. as a result of the dental
dures # associated with tooth 20.2 begin by reiterating We our standard for 11, 1987, reviewing August summary judgment.
On
a
initiated
Summa-
Giovale,
ry judgment
an
against appellee,
proper only
action
Dr.
when
there are
genuine
no
by filing complaint
Dolan
the dis-
issues material fact and the
Appellant
prevailing party
trict
judgment
court.
causes of
is entitled to
asserted
premised
action
Doud v. First Interstate
negligent
matter of law.
theories
Gillette,
Bank
treatment,
negligent
to obtain
(Wyo.1989);
failure
HI
One,
(1988).4 The essential elements in mal
of a
adverse
98-99
374 P.2d
F. Ro
Treatment,
depends upon
Consent to
zovsky,
treatment
the circumstanc-
ch. 1C at
(1984).
particular
upon
standard, expert
Under
es of the
case
tes
general practice
timony
required
followed
the medical
to establish
awhat
rea
profession
locality;
practitioner
sonable
would disclose in
cus-
Stundon,
same or
profession to
similar circumstances.
tom of the medical
warn
21; Govin,
424;
469 P.2d at
at
by expert
P.2d
established
medical
supra
Williams,
D.
Louisell and H.
testimony.
at
17B.10; 1
Pegalis
Wachsman,
If
S.
and H.
Stundon,
quoted
Id.
469 P.2d at
at
supra at
2:15.5
§
In order to
regarding
overcome a motion for
standards
above
judgment,
plaintiff
in a
conjunction
medical
consent must be read
malpractice case
present
must also
evi
pronouncements
the more recent
of this
dence, usually
expert
form
testi
regarding
malpractice in
Court
medical
mony, indicating
departure by
a medi
general.
away
We have moved
from strict
cal
recognized
from
standard
“locality”
adherence
rule recited
practice
proximate
was a
cause of her
Kobos,
through
Govin. Kobos
Harris,
injury.
plaintiff
H5 successfully on not realize performed 1985 did that before second the dentist had one,of earli- apicoectomy performed her nine months was that she could another teeth extraction, have chosen since er. otherwise clearly continually tooth had caus- stranger to dental no Appellant was ing problems period her during the entire devel- when this course of events treatment commencing treatment with Dr. Gio- started dental treat- oped. Appellant first May Appel- vale’s interview in 1983. first Giovale, John D.D.S. Dr. Richard ment with hope lant elected to like that the benefit bridge which May repair she received from the procedure on tooth early part 1960’s installed in was two, number a similar result could be ob- multi-bridge From initial installation.1 twenty permit tained on tooth number and through interview, continued treatments retention instead of extraction. repair twenty more than sessions continuing I replace bridges cure the dissent without conclusion that a writ- During preferable, by ignor- ten is nor complaints pain. this course consent ing knowledge dentistry treatment, May from current that has which extended 1, 1986, joined litigation the real world of in- through April appellant was now doctors, Bell, accountants, Gregory volving lawyers and referred to Dr. F. twice D.D.S., apicoectomy; first which mandates detailed records and all-in- M.S.D. for the Essentially, do designated July clusive forms. I not dis- for tooth number two 31,1984 tooth, desig- agree analy- then a second with the concise and accurate twenty, April provided nated number sis the law informed consent tooth, Following pain majority. continued twenty, initially which had been number I do Conversely specifically, not find during interview in considered the first question controversy viable this referred painful, appellant 1983 as disclaiming not in- case who, D.D.S., Dolan, January Dr. Rex pro- formed and did consent the second 1986, pulled the tooth. cedure. She what knew leaving Wyoming, appellant After re- would when she went the other den- done, against office what as she turned to the state to file suit all tist’s would be dentists, voluntarily I litigation remains to- both and submitted. three went to ad- day probabilities as her criticism of the intermediate decline to unburden provided by she did not versely dental treatment Dr. Bell from assess chances exactly, specifically completely sufficient under- contended failure to be furnished nothing, consent to stand her three choices: do information for informed procedure, offending pull tooth. decide whether undertake second conception apicoectomy. reality, my concern that we what the case re- It Angelina ally appellant, Roy- is that now substitute formula and formalism means bal, actuality. concept that she It is in the claims failure to understand postured is now July 1984 of extraction consent where case choice conceptualization continuing for retention. that the well-established instead of efforts actuality three present occurs that there are That contention consistent see, I original change you which she what see what pleading worlds: what communication, raising actually a failure is. against made Dr. Giovale Likewise *8 I functions: what warranty objective claim. It belies a scintilla of there are three thought I Gosar, you question, you, 719 intended to tell evidence Cordova v. what person patient that in meant and what the disassociated (Wyo.1986), P.2d 625 Appellant deposition A. No. that the rea- testified of treatment with son for her commencement records and com- Dr. Giovale’s initial interview bridge. a Dr. Giovale was loose absolutely prehensive to reveal a status detail you having pain you any pain Q. contrary, pervasively Were when first is since went to him? starting see se- that shown the motivation A. No. quence of dental treatment. Q. None at all? perceives been said or by appellant’s expert to have written with- material submitted overlay witness, out the of association its attribu- minimally even informative meaning. implied tion for making the choice appellant whether treating should continue the tooth or aban- lawyer practition- involved and the Each hope don pulled. and have it It is healing comprehen- arts er in the should oral nature discussions between jour- current Illinois sively consider the law health-care that and Cohen, article, nal Twerski Informed only provide can a basis realistic deci- Making and Law Torts: Decision sion and Causation, pro not forma forms mean that Myth The Justiciable (1988). nothing to Undoubtedly, party either in the real U.Ill.L.Rev. 607 world springs present hope fact that eternal cannot be with choice illness decisions imme- ignored functioning psychological con- diately presented. as a litigative tent of informed consent. In the informed consent article earlier may corollary appear that if suc- thereafter referenced, the authors remind us that achieved, may cess is not consent have not presentation predominates matter of over adequate been an undesired result because is what said: willingly not been chosen. would have Everyone “half-empty” knows that long As as courts and scholars insist “half-full” have different connotations. damages measuring circumstances, Similarly, many de- personal focusing on the resultant scriptions proce- risks of a medical injuries, they escape cannot the causation dure in terms of the chances of success recognizing the dilemma. essential or the may chances differ- failure have nonjusticiability injury personal of this ent connotations lead to different cases, model for informed do choice we decisions. suggest genre litigation that this For example, following consider Instead, suggest we a obliterated. problems presented groups to two restructuring radical subjects by Professors Kahneman focusing choice doctrine. Rather than Tversky. problem, In the seventy first personal injury damages flowing from that, subjects for,” were told hypothetical addition to “but which seeks own, they they whatever plaintiff what determine presented provided subjects have decided had the defendant $1000. information, suggest (a) we that courts then were asked to choose between a identify should $1000, value decision chance of an 50% additional rights of plaintiff which the (b) defen- chance of an 100% additional $500. destroyed by withholding dant adequate problem, In the second sixty-eight sub- information. that, jects were told in addition what- own, they they presented ever have been Id. at 608-09. $2000; they then were asked to I conclude that record reveals an (a) choose between chance of los- 50% pull pull alternative or not choice ing $1000, (b) chance of 100% los- nothing suggest tooth and ing $500. inadequate information to make A travesty choice. The moments’s reflection will what we do reveal that legal many processes problems the two is to create fictions.2 are identical. In both Here, sign- problems, patient, by subjects fiction that a were asked to ing form, provided (a) gamble choose usable information between in which they reasoned decision. I do not ending find had an even up chance of form, $2000, which was (b) included mass with either a sure $1000 Corbitt, 2. Defined permit dissent Andersen contrived the law to a court 48, 53, (Wyo.1989) (quoting matter, Black's Law dispose though of a it need not be *9 Dictionary (5th 1979)) 804 ed. as: improperly; e.g. grant created Action of lost "Assumption by of fact made court as basis by possession.” as basis for title adverse deciding legal question. A situation
117
authors,
aspects
in
of
expressed by
ty, the
consideration
preferences
Yet the
$1500.
reasoning,
subjects
functionality
including
were far from in the
of
groups
two
of
the
problem,
first
of
illogical
identical.
In the
84%
of
processing
information —under
subjects
$1500
the sure
selected
of base rate information —as-
utilization
$1000);
original
($500 in
addition
sessing multiple
availability
risks or
—man-
gamble.
In the second
chose
16%
invoking framing ef-
presentation
ner of
however,
chose the
problem,
only 31%
anchoring
primacy,
accentu-
fects—
$500);
($2000 minus
sure $1500
69%
idiosyncratic
prior
effect of
ated
gamble.
chose the
information, conclude:
Tversky
Kahneman
Professors
legal system’s
Unquestionably, the
insis-
explanation for the dis-
theorize
that
determining
hypothetical
tence
re-
groups of
parity
the two
sub-
between
hypothetical decision-making
sults of a
normally perceive
“people
jects
that
uncertainty
process incorporates so much
losses,
or
rather than
gains
outcomes as
credibility
is minimal. Accord-
its
or welfare.”
final
of wealth
states
ingly,
decision cau-
determinations about
then,
the risks
Quite obviously,
whether
in
choice
can
sation
the informed
arena
are framed as
a medical
of
only
by blinding
made
ourselves to
be
significant
gains or losses could have
process.
in
complexities
inherent
impact
patient’s
choice.
great,
The
uncertainties are so
framing phenome-
example
An
of the
small,
margin
any judg-
error so
decision-making con-
non in the medical
ment,
way,
either
cannot be made with
provided
study by
in a
Professors
text is
any confidence.
Sox,
McNeil, Pauker,
Tversky. The
Cohen, supra, 1988 U.I11.L.
Twerski and
imagine
subjects
asked
researchers
Rev. at 641.
lung
to choose
they
cancer and
treatment
surgery and radiation
between
application
All
in
of this returns
presented to
on the information
based
totality that the real
case to the factual
outcomes were framed
them.
Identical
it worked on
question involved was since
subjects:
they
for different
differently
if
two,
see
try
tooth
shall we
similar
range
possible
subjects the
of
told some
twenty?
success
occur with tooth
will
Cf
probability
in terms
outcomes
Comment,
Consent —In-
Torts —Informed
living
points (e.g.,
at
chance
various
68%
Pru-
is Determined
Consent
formed
living
year), while
for more than one
Rather Than Reasonable
dent Patient
range
possible
they
told others
Largey v. Roth-
Physician Standard.
probability
outcomes
terms
(1988),
man,
(Wyo.1981) By Through and Kobos Everts, (Wyo.1989), P.2d 534
Kobos v. justification
are fulfilled in
judgment granted. My reverse concern is easily
formalistic reliance on which we can
provide inadequate foundation
patient thoughtful decision make
constituting Having consent.” “informed by-pass commencing
heart chemo-
therapy may expert require assistance to assess the risk-benefit ratio quantum choices that life
provides. However, go go or no cannot, believe, I
tooth extraction fit under
that umbrella of informational need.
I would affirm. Foster,
Robert E. FOSTER and Laura (Plaintiffs),
Appellants WICKLUND, Repre-
Loraine as Personal Mayme
sentative of the Estate I. (Defen-
Lestum, Deceased, Appellee
dant).
No. 88-279.
Supreme of Wyoming. Court
July Willis,
Kaye Laramie, appellants. Smith, John B. Scott of Stanfield and Scott, Laramie, appellee. CARDINE, C.J., Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
URBIGKIT, Justice. A development real estate plan contro- versy intermixing residential and commer-
