History
  • No items yet
midpage
Royal v. Walsh
96 P.3d 1
Wyo.
2004
Check Treatment

*1 2004 WY 96 Jennifer

In re Calvin WALSH and Cleve

Lynn Walsh, Debtors.

Randy Royal, Appellant

(Trustee/ Obj ector), Lynn

Cleve Calvin Walsh Jennifer

Walsh, Appellees (Debtors/Respon

dents).

No. 03-164.

Supreme Wyoming. Court of

Aug. 2004. Royal,

Representing Appellant: Randy L. Greybull, Wyoming. Appellees: R.

Representing Stephen Win- P.C., Winship Casper, ship Winship, & Wyoming. HILL, C.J., GOLDEN,

Before KITE, LEHMAN, VOIGT, JJ. VOIGT, Justice. bankruptcy petition, In their Cleve (the Lynn

Calvin Walsh Jennifer Walsh Walshes) seventy- an exemption claimed percent garnished five of the funds bankruptcy their bank The trustee objected the claimed exemption. Court, Bankruptcy the Dis- United States Wyoming, trict of then Court certified to this following questions, which we have agreed answer: funds Are derived from a debtor’s deposited wages and garnish- account exempt bank *2 2 ¶ Franscell, 169, 9, 1226, Wyo. § 1—15— Ann. 2002 WY 57 P.3d

ment under Stat. 40-14-505(b) (LexisNexis (Wyo.2002) Wyoming (quoting 1230 Commu 408 or 2003)? nity College Casper Community Com’n v. ¶¶ 86, 16-18, College 2001 31 WY P.3d Dist. what yes, If under circumstances? will, 1242, however, (Wyo.2001)). 1249 We particularly pertinent rules note a few FACTS primary legis is construction. Our concern 29, 2003, filed April the Walshes On [¶ 2] intent, lative which intent must be ascer bankruptcy petition. On the 7 Chapter from the of the statute. Id. tained words date, garnished creditor same unnecessary statutory is where Construction money in the ac- The their bank language unambiguous. Id. The intent of is solely $2,541.18—was derived count — unambiguous statute is determined from earnings with personal service Mr. Walsh’s ordinary meaning and the obvious objected The has to employer. trustee ¶ 105, Wilson, 6, used. In re 2003 WY words Ann Stat. claim under the Walshes’ 669, (Wyo.2003) (quoting Wyoming 75 P.3d (LexisNexis 2003) seventy- Haglund, 982 pt. Transp. v. P.2d De the percent of funds are five “ (Wyo.1999)). words ‘When the are garnishment. pertinent portion of that unambiguous, an im and a court risks clear reads as follows: statute views, of its own permissible substitution (a) post judgment garnishment A writ of others, legisla for intent of the those of attaching any interpret ture if effort is made portion of the defendant’s shall attach any on other than construe statutes basis unpaid earnings, accrued ” Pagel, legislature.’ language invoked (b) of this specified subsection section. ¶ 169, 9, (quoting 57 P.3d at 1230 2002 WY garnishee direct to with- The writ shall Com’n, College Wyoming Community disposa- from the defendant’s accrued hold “ ¶ 1249). 86, 16, P.3d ‘A statute at is WY pursuant the amount attached ble unambiguous wording if its is such clear and exempted to pay to the writ persons agree that reasonable are able at time his to the defendant amount meaning consistency predictabili with its normally Earnings for paid. are ” ¶ 169, 9, P.3d ty.’ Pagel, 2002 WY at shall deemed to ac- personal services be Community (quoting Wyoming College day period the last crue on ¶ 1249). Com’n, at 2001 WY 31 P.3d they relate. earned to which were on the date If is served before or the writ general to these [¶ 4] addition earnings accrue and before the defendant’s construction, spe also note more rules we defendant, same have been ignore cifically any that courts not free to be to have been the writ shall deemed has used. Keats v. word periodic at the time the served State, ¶28, 64 P.3d 2003 WY “ If more writ accrue. than one (Wyo.2003). finally, And ‘it is a universal served, the writ first shall have served stretch, enlarge, rule that courts will not Notwithstanding any pro- priority. other to matters expand or extend a statute not subsection, ” with- vision of an income provisions.’ its falling express within holding order child obtained ¶ Corkill, 119, 19, Knowles v. 2002 WY 20-6- pursuant W.S. 20-6-201 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Lo Sasso P.3d priority gar- 222 shall have over Braun, (Wyo.1963)). 386 P.2d nishment. DISCUSSION OF STANDARD REVIEW reasonably It is questions impossible 5] The certified re [¶ quire meaning unpaid” Wyo. this Court determine read the words “accrued l-15^408(a) meaning any Ann.' rules of 1-15-408. Our Stat. statutory thing money we than the debtor has construction are well known and This repeat Pagel yet will not has received. length. them See earned but LEHMAN, Justice, sub- especially dissenting, true inasmuch as entire with whom HILL, Justice, employer’s joins. with an re- section is concerned Chief gar- sponsibilities when served with a writ I respectfully must Upon dissent. example, garnishee is to nishment. For questions, consideration of the certified I *3 pay- “withhold” amount attached before reach a different conclusion than that ... ing exempted amount “at the time by majority. reached Accordingly, I normally paid.” Wyo. Ann earnings are Stat. disposable would hold thát income derived l-15^408(a). § language That is not direct- wages deposited from a debtor’s into the holding deposits. ed to a bank debtor’s bank gar- account are from Further, requires income the statute that Wyo. §§ nishment under Ann. Stat. 1-15-408 withholding for which support, orders child 40-14-50'5(b) (LexisNexis 2003) if the “payments” orders attach to due to an obli- by competent debtor can establish evidence gor, priority. Wyo. continue to have See . that such sums were from earnings derived (LexisNexis seq. § Stat. Ann. 20-6-201 et personal for services. 2003). Clearly, statutory this is a construct yet designed paid to monies not It pursuant Wyo- [¶ 10] reach clear that to .is (LexisNexis debtor. ming Ann. Stat. 1-20-109 2001), Wyoming “opted-out” has of the feder- Wyo. The same true of [¶ 6] al exemptions prescribed and has its own 14—505(a)(ii)(LexisNexis 2003), 40— recognized exemption structure, allowed resulting which garnishments concerns provides Section law. such an that consumer credit transactions. Under exemption. That provides: statute statute, certain amounts are (a) post garnishment A writ of earnings “the an in- where attaching earnings for required dividual are to be withheld for portion shall that attach the defendant’s added.) payment (Emphasis of a debt.” unpaid disposable earnings, accrued legislative clear on the of both intent is face (b) specified in subsection of this section. l-15-408(a) Stat. Ann. garnishee shall The writ direct to with- 14—505(a)(ii)—these Stat. Ann. statutes 40— from the disposa- hold defendant’s accrued unpaid wages earnings. deal with or other earnings pursuant ble the amount attached They wages do not with earn- deal other pay exempted to writ and to ings way their have made debt- amount to the at the defendant time his or’s bank account. earnings normally paid. Earnings are for illogical it seem ex- .While personal services shall be deemed to ac- only tend. an to a such debtor until day period the last crue on which hand,” earnings time as he or has “in it is she they were earned or to which relate. job say not this law Court’s If writ is served or on the before date something should be other than it Rath- is. earnings the defendant’s accrue and before er, job only it is this Court’s determine defendant, the same have been legislative intent from the law as it is. And shall to have the writ be deemed been is, exemp- as it the law now limits this periodic earnings at the served time the unpaid” tion to earnings. “accrued and (1) If one writ' accrue. more than n served, the writ first served shall have any priority. Notwithstanding pro- CONCLUSION subsection, vision income with- ques- the first holding answer certified order for obtained child We. making unnecessary tion in negative, pursuant to W.S. 20-6-201 20-6- question. answer the priority gar- second shall over

nishment. Justice, (b) LEHMAN, dissenting portion aggregate filed a The maximum HILL, Justice, opinion disposable earnings with individual which which Chief of an joined. is the lesser of: are hourly wage (25%) minimum the federal (i) of defen- times percent Twenty-five (6)(a)(l) week; prescribed section earnings for that disposable dant’s Act of Fair Labor Standards 206(a)(1), 29, § in effect at the tit. U.S.C. (ii) defendant’s The amount payable; time the are earnings computed aggregate (iii)In pay for a the case of thirty times exceeds that week week, the adminis- period other than hourly wage pre- minimum the federal multiple by rule a prescribe trator shall Fair Labor Standards by the scribed hourly wage minimum the federal 206(a)(1), 1938, 29 U.S.C. Act of to that set forth equivalent effect pay- at the time effect (b)(ii) paragraph of this section. or, any pay able, in ease of *4 execute, (c)No make, or en- court week, any equivalent a period other than process or in violation force an order by the ad- prescribed multiple thereof section. this Wyoming Uniform of the ministrator manner Code Consumer Credit majority concludes that when The [¶ 11] 14—505(b)(iii). by provided W.S. personal services are periodic 40— character as paid, lose their (c) in- specifically is garnishee a Unless Wyoming’s statutory exemp- property under plaintiff that the by formed affidavit argument, In of this tion scheme. periodic earnings from defendant has other § majority spe- 1-15-408 points out that garnishee and than from the sources other wage garnishment ap- cifically provides that thereof, garnishee shall the amount unpaid” disposable and plies only to “accrued becoming defendant’s treat surmises, therefore, majority earnings. The the defendant’s garnishee due from exception provi- of some limited that with the purpose earnings for the aggregate entire Wyo. Ann. accounts found Stat. sions for gar- sum attached computing (LexisNexis 2003), -111 §§ and 1-20-110 nishment. exemption Wyoming for cash there is no sets forth: Section 40-14-505 improper to accounts.1 I feel it is or bank (a) part: purposes of For the exemption specified within if the determine (i) earnings” means that “Disposable apply upon § based the va- 1-15-408 should part of an individual judgment a garies and arbitrariness of where remaining the deduction from after wages are located at the time of required by earnings of amounts those garnishment. It makes service of writ withheld; and law to be judgment to allow a creditor little sense (ii) any legal means or “Garnishment” until wait serve equitable procedure places such wages creditor required to earnings of an individual are (or his account payment into his wallet bank payment of a be withheld for debt. otherwise) and deposit or via automatic (b) thereby percent of those aggregate receive one hundred part of the The maximum § purpose 1-15- wages circumventing the an individual for disposable subjected gar- any which is 408. workweek payment judg- of a to enforce

nishment addition, 1-15-408 re- because sale, arising a consumer credit ment services,” “earnings personal fers to lease, may not or consumer loan consumer terminology found within for that definition the lesser of: exceed (LexisNex- l-15-102(a)(vi) Wyo. Stat. (25%) (i) Twenty-five percent 2003) of his dis- applied this court. must be week; that or posable earnings for “earnings personal “Earnings” or (ii) compensation paid pay- services” means amount which his The services, personal whether denom- thirty able for earnings for that week exceed process Wyo. 1-20-111 exempts while Stat. Ann. retire- cial Stat. Ann. 1-20-110 ment, contributions to medical sav- pension, annuity execu- does the same for accounts from tion, attachment, ings any judi- accounts. commission, ordinary salary, Resort to the and obvious common bo- wages, mated as “accrued,” meaning “payable,” nus, any pension or retirement of the terms proceeds of compensation plan or “paid” help. is of little The American benefits or deferred (Second Edition, Heritage Dictionary College otherwise. 1991) defines “accrue” as: “3. Law. To be- Thus, majority’s ultimate determina- Id. permanent right.” come an enforceable or legislature’s defi- ignores the improperly tion authority “pay- That same defines the term services,” “earnings from nition of Requiring payment able” as: “1. on a certain earnings may also be that such specifically date; Thus, “payable” “accrued” and due.” simply “accrued “paid” and need not be virtually meaning. the same On the payable.” hand, Heritage Dictio- American manner, parallel In a somewhat nary “paid” “[p]ast defines as the tense and “garnishee” also uses the term pay” “pay” word as: “1. participle of and the “employer.”2 There rather than the term give money goods To return for fore, recognize should this court Therefore, appears services rendered.” l-15-502(a) (LexisNexis 2003), §Ann. “ac- distinction between words continuing garnish addressing crued,” “paid” timing “payable,” and is one ments, “garnishee is an is limited to a who alone, *5 definitively in which does not aid us indicating judgment employer of the debtor” § interpreting 1-15^408. spec to legislature knew how that the employer” had it desired to ify “garnishee § The fact that 1-15-408 uses the [¶ 15] Hence, legisla § 1-15-408. do so within “employer” “garnishee” term and not does “garnishee” opposed as ture’s use of the term my analysis. not assist me It is true that §in 1-15-408 must infer that “employer” statute, garnishment § continuing 1—15— to include “garnishee” was meant the term 502(a), garnishment “garnishee limits to a depository institutions. banks and debtor,” employer an who is Furthermore, exemption statutes are to be legislature perhaps implying that the meant liberally in favor of construed the debtor depository to include banks and other insti- purposes. accomplish their beneficial order to § tutions within the ambit of 1-15-408. Lindell-Heasier, 748, 154 B.R. 751 In re However, 1-20-111, §§ 1-20-110 and (D.Wyo.1992); Barney, v. 842 F.2d Johnston ac- provide for retirement fund (10th Cir.1988); 1221, Lingle State savings and contributions to medical counts Podolak, 392, (Wyo. 740 P.2d 393-94 Bank accounts, specifically those enumerate (7th Barker, 1987); 191, 196 In re 768 F.2d execution, “exempt from attach- accounts are Cir.1985); Wright v. Union Central Life ment, any process or is- Co., 273, 278-79, 196, 61 S.Ct. Ins. 311 U.S. Thus, simi- sued court.”3 one could (1940). 200, 85 L.Ed. 184 larly argue knew how to Upon my applicable review the [¶ 14] language in utilized this same and could have statutes, particular attention Wyoming giving exemption for § had it desired the 40-14-505, 1-15^408, § I also as well as deposited disposable income to continue once ambiguous. conclude that 1-15-408 is As into a debtor’s ques- parties’ arguments, a evidenced Nonetheless, clearly es we have whether earn- tion remains statutes, interpreting our tablished that when ings/earnings personal be primary must be to determine through garnishment when consideration attached Winters, In re legislature’s intent. unpaid” “paid payable.” “accrued and or Likewise, (LexisNexis l-15-102(a)(vii) language used within Section 407 3. Stat. Ann. (42 407) Security pro- 2003) of the Social Act U.S.C. sets forth: payable ... of the monies vides: "none person other than a "Garnishee” means Security shall be sub- [the Act] under the Social plaintiff possession or defendant who is in attachment, execution, levy, garnishment, ject to property and who defendant legal process.” See also S & S Diversi- or other is in accordance with Services, Taylor, F.Supp. 549 L.L.C. v. fied chapter. provisions of this (D.Wyo.1995). omitted.) ¶ (Footnotes ¶ 1231, (Wyo.2002). P.3d WY legislative history formal there is no While attempting to balance the above not- purpose of the enactment suggesting the bankruptcy principles, ed basic we believe 1-15-408, exemp purpose of the historical approach that the better is to allow debt- protect a debtor tion statutes has been ors an as to their own him to retain the basic necessities permitting wedding rings thereby requiring debt- Therefore, that after wedding rings it was intended of life. ors to hand over those levy nonexempt property, satisfy recog- the debtor claims of As their creditors. family long ago should not be left in the case of Towns v. and the debtor’s nized Norris, Pratt, 203 B.R. Am.Dec. In re 33 N.H. destitute. See (1856): Monrean, (D.Nev.1996); Miller v. 465-66 (Alaska 1973). In accord

P.2d 773-76 object [exemption] statute Pellish, Cooper, Wyo. see Bros. enjoy- is not to secure to the debtor (1934). Further, purpose P.2d 607 property ment of of that character at the explanation Wyoming’s with our creditors, consistent expense prevent of his but to ring exemption. We said: wedding being stripped of those articles of convenience, utility and under the limit- approach is conclude this limited We prescribed, requisite ed value for the general purposes and consistent with the family in main- comfort of himself and allowing guidelines debtors file behind taining every a household in condition of protection. 4 bankruptcy Cottier ¶ (15th ed.) life. ex- Bankruptcy at 522.01 rev.

plains: ¶¶ Winters, In re 12-13. component

A of an individ- fundamental Furthermore, pointed out bankruptcy ual fresh start footnote 1 of Hancock v. Stockmens Bank & *6 ability the to set aside certain debtor’s Co., (Wyo.1987), Trust 739 P.2d exempt of property as from the claims (Miehie Ann. 1-17-411 Stat. Cum. Exemption property, to- creditors. language Supp.1986) provided applicable the claims, discharge of lets gether with the concerning garnishment exemption for earn- appropriate the maintain an stan- debtor ings personal services rendered until it living goes as he or forward dard of she legislature to its was amended the bankruptcy case. after the present form. ¶ (Miehie Bankruptcy Cum.Supp.1986) provided 1.03[2][a] that: Cottier recognizes that: also any property The court order of the judgment money due him in the debtor Bankruptcy

Chapter 7 of the Code is person, of either himself or another fully hands “Liquidation” and the title entitled law, applied exempt to be toward expresses purpose chapter’s the of the judgment. Upon the satisfaction of a sei- Chapter provides provisions. the money, property judgment a zure of his taking the mechanism for control of it, may request hearing pursuant debtor, debtor selling and property of the l-17-405(c). (1/2) One-half in W.S. distributing proceeds the to creditors judgment debtor accordance with the distribution scheme sixty personal services rendered within of the Code. (60) days immediately preceding levy chapter 7. From Two ideals underlie attachment, levy and due of execution viewpoint, chapter 7 es- the creditor’s levy, owing and at the time of the are concept equitable tablishes the dis- appears by when it among of a debtor’s tribution creditors that the are affidavit or otherwise which, eases, in- in most resources necessary family residing for the use of his full all. permit payment sufficient to state, supported wholly part or in in this vantage From the individual debtor’s by his labors. permits honest point, chapter 7 form, legisla- Accordingly, previous financial life in its debtor to obtain a new obviously the debtor an discharge unpaid debts. ture desired to afford (1985); Annot., provide for P.2d 129 Joint Bank Ac continue to opportunity to his/her Attachment, Subject personal count half of his Garnish family through use of ment, exemption was limit- or Execution Creditor of One of earnings. This services ed, however, merely Depositors, the Joint A.L.R.3d 1465 (1967). sixty-days harmony owing within This rule is with the earnings due and “ levy. language ‘general This infers prior to rule evidence the burden legislature person then intended to narrow proof lies on the who wishes to applicable frame by particular time his case fact which implies legislature’s perhaps even peculiarly knowledge, within his lies more exemption only to limit the supposed cognizant.’ desire or of which he is to be exemp- continue the owing Evidence, 274; and not due Principles of 1 Greenl. were 79; Selma, once these tion Ev. 589.” Ev. Starkie hands or de- placed into either the debtor’s Company Rome and Dalton Railroad v. posited into an account. States, 560, 567-568, United U.S. (1891). 638, 640, S.Ct. 35 L.Ed. 266 See However, when York, Ha also United States v. New New present form in language to its modified the Company, ven Railroad any sixty-day period preced- it deleted Hartford 212, 2 U.S. 78 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 247 levy This modification ing of the funds. (1957); United States v. Denver and Rio legislature’s intention to surely evidences Company, Railroad 191 U.S. Grande owing exemption to due and apply the (1903); v. S.Ct. 48 L.Ed. 106 Lake re- earnings of the debtor personal services Callis, (1953); 202 Md. 97 A.2d 316 In any prior time frame. addi- gardless of America, Stanley Company Skeen tion, change signals the I that this believe (1949); Wig IX 362 Pa. 66 A.2d designated legislature’s choice to allow (1983). Evidence, § more on 2486 at 290 even portion of these funds remain paid. after were majority rule is consistent with Although this court has not direct- approach, and “is the fair common sense case, ly posed issues addressed the depositors and reasonable rule because limited direction the area. given has some position are in a much better than Co., Bank & Trust Hancock Stockmens pertinent to know the creditor *7 761-63, pre- interpreting in 1-15-408’s Gardner, Hayden supra, 381 facts.” v. statute, recog- impliedly this court decessor at 754. This rule also conforms S.W.2d exemption for the funds within a nized an in principle is well established insofar as the debtor debtor’s bank account Wyoming jurisprudence that the burden of accounting in form of provide could some party the affir proof is on the who asserts tracing deposited funds came from Manning, v. mative of issue. Osborn disposable income. said: We (1984); 1121, 1124 Morri Wyo., 685 P.2d 970, Reilly, Wyo., 511 P.2d 972 majority that the burden of son v. The rule is (1973). account, Younglove v. held See also Graham proving what funds a bank (1974) Hill, 689, Wyo., jointly by and anoth- 526 P.2d 693 debtor (affirmative defense); Hawkeye-Security depositor, er are not to execution Wyo., Company Apodaca, v. depositors. Adjustment Insurance on the Yakima (1974) Service, Durand, 180, 874, (exception to stat Wash.App. 524 P.2d 879 Inc. v. 28 (1981). 408, v. Hayden estoppel); Gonzales P.2d 411 See also ute 622 limitations — Service, Gardner, 361, Wyo., 494 Personal Collection v. 238 Ark. 381 S.W.2d 752 (1972) (affirmative defense); 201, (1964); McGowan, 58, 207 Ill.App.2d v. 13 P.2d Leaf (1957); Cody Fay, 80 Clayco First National Bank at v. 141 67 Miller v. N.E.2d (1959) (entitle Bank, 659, 245, 257, Wyo. P.2d 79 Kan.App.2d 10 708 P.2d 341 State Stark, reimbursement); (1985); v. 224 Kan. ment Takahashi 997 Purma v. (1978); Contracting Company, Valley Pepper State Tank and 585 P.2d 991 Walnut 330, 362, Stovall, Wyo. 131 P.2d 339 Bank v. 223 Kan. 574 P.2d Baker, license); (1978); Okl.App., (exception such as First National Baker v. Ford, v. exceptions-to Bank Morrill orders statutory limita- (1923). 691, 692, P. 31 A.L.R. parties tions on collection. Because the here did not raise or brief the issue wheth- l-17-405(c), intention of The manifest er the statutory exemptions W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1986, in accordance apply to court-ordered child pursued Hancock with which claimed arrearages money judgment, reduced to exemption, is that the debtor should assert deciding we assume without that the statu- right exemption. statutory tory exemptions apply to this exemptions serve to avoid the execution or proceeding. garnishment, thus are affirmative de 8(e), (LexisNexis fenses in accordance with Rule 2001) Sulphur Compa W.R.C.P. See Texas defines as follows: Gulf Robles, ny Wyo., 511 P.2d v. (a) As used in chapter this unless other- (1973) (An affirmative defense is “a direct wise defined: plaintiffs implicit admission of claim and assertion of other facts which would (vi) “Earnings” “earnings per- * * *.”). recovery right defeat a Han compensation paid sonal services” means proving cock the burden of had services, payable wheth- in, joint garnished funds bank ac er wages, salary, denominated as com- count were from execution. He mission, bonus, proceeds any pension acknowledged failing that burden or retirement benefits or deferred com- object argue in the trial court or to otherwise; pensation plan or appear imposing proof the burden of that, improper. on him was It follows upon McManaman relies our decision in rule, only majority but because under Lingle Podolak, Lingle State Bank v. ease, it became the law of this Hancock (Wyo.1987). 740 P.2d 392 Podolak consid- proving had the those burden amounts ered an exemption un- available joint in the bank account which were ex 1-17-411, der superseded, now and de- State, empt Wyo., from execution. Fife cided the intended the (1984). 676 P.2d apply produced by to income (Footnote omitted.) In accord see &S S farming and ranch. Id. at 394. Because Services, Taylor, L.L.C. Diversified statutory provisions new had taken effect (D.Wyo.1995). F.Supp. decision, at the time of the Podolak we recently, More this court indicated noted that consequently the case was cir- McManaman, in McManaman v. 2002 WY application. cumscribed future Id. n. 1. (Wyo.2002), dealing 53 P.3d 103 awith Relying upon this footnote and our deci- garnished proceeds claimed FDIC, sion Coones v. 796 P.2d 803 sales, account, deposited cattle a bank (Wyo.1990), the State contends that *8 that it was not the location of those funds already Court has proceeds decided that origin within the account but the of those from the sale of exempt cattle are not l-15-102(a)(vi). funds that was of an determinative whether under exemption applied. This court stated: Coones, general exemption the stat- utes, Wyo.

McManaman next contends that the dis- 1-20-110, determining trict in court erred provide any provision did not for statutory exemption however, for not exemption; does appel- the apply proceeds from the sale of his lants in the case contended that a trans- ranching op- cattle. He contends that his application garnishment ferred of the stat- execution, 1-15-102, erations are sole source of income and provided ute a basis n allowing the intended to earn- a rancher or farmer to claim a ings provide which for the basic seventy-five percent exemption necessities proceeds of proceed of life. with our non-purchase money We discussion of from the sale of live- issue, majority this seventy-five but note that a of stock percent and of the value jurisdictions recognize support now that crops planted of and livestock born after cannot be im- security perfected. simply logically was Id. livestock interest the pressed garnishment concept. rejected appellant’s conten- with the 805. Coones first, tion, provided by noting that Podolak Id. at 805-06. ad- precedent because the statute

no Although bankruptcy involved is- Coones existed, and, longer in sec- it no dressed sues, broadly holding sweeps this last and statutory language ondly, because the permit argument not does McManaman’s “earnings could not services” prevail. McManaman’s bank account interpreted any income other to include be to a third-party funds are not traceable payable by third periodically that a than payable obligation periodically. Addition- Specifically, Coones stated: party. ally, exemption apply if the did the when owing, were not funds McManaman has comparison a of the We find from any argument authority provided that broadly changed phraseology that extinguished upon was not Wyoming in found earlier based rules payment into his bank by were the 1987 defini- law constricted We, therefore, account. hold McMa- that a of identi- tion which itemizes character naman’s bank account funds not ex- rights, wages, salary, commis- e.g., cal empt garnishment writ of sion, proceeds any pension bonus and affirm the court’s order. district com- or retirement benefit deferred ¶¶ McManaman, Hence, this pensation plan. are entitled to 10-14. while Statutes particular interpretation a and we con- court did address issue reasonable McManaman, appeal this we did character of benefits raised sider the possibility wage salary recognize charac- that defined within being might earn- income continue after terization. Profits and business meaning wage placed in a ings are outside the debtor’s bank interpretation gathers salary. This jurisdictions that 21] Courts [¶ garnishment from the statute faced this have issue found that recognizes obligation provision which funds in account traced extent a bank can be being pay profit as different from wages, portion exempt. to the debtor’s right business which involve a bankruptcy reasoning I find the used to receive. Kobemusz, in In re 160 B.R. 847- court (D.Colo.1993) (footnote omitted), in- when Appellants further contend statutory very terpreting Colorado scheme pro- could word “otherwise” suffice Wyoming, particularly per- to that of similar for the character vide entitlement broad suasive. rights in Podolak result from found Plaintiffs had from this counsel issued prior accept statute. We cannot garnishment. a writ of That writ Court thoughtful effect contention since its was accordance with Colorado state would disassociate the structure of be to practice set forth Colo.R.Civ.P. relating to one charac- clause when upon the properly The writ was served adding funds an almost ter Bank, responded that promptly which unlimited character other funds in the De- had funds on account name of particular no with- would have validation At of the fendant. the time service wage continuing in the of a constraints garnishment, Defendant received writ statutory system. limit We partial list notice *9 any application 1- of “otherwise” in W.S. exemptions of that could be claimed. 15-102(a)(vi) third-par- to a character of ty obligations exemption claim payable for services ren- Defendant filed his for § He by exemption. dered the claimant for under Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-54-104. meaning money exempt, Intrinsic 1-15- of his as of W.S. claims 75% wages by 102 are of earned him. On provisions W.S. it constitutes hand, argues earnings person- Plaintiff which are related for exemption periodically payable. ability al Busi- to claim this was lost services joint profits receipts crop money placed ness was when into co-mingled questioned with vitality account and the continued bank of Rutter Shumway. v. monies. See Holmes v. Blazer Fi Services, Inc., nancial 369 So.2d provides that no law mote than Colorado (Fla. App.1979). aggregate twenty-five percent of the of subject earnings per week is Plaintiff does call the Court’s attention garnishment.. Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-54- Arizona, Usery v. Nat. First Bank of 104(2)(a). Multiples minimum of the fed- (9th Cir.1978). 586 F.2d 107 This case wage eral also be used. That is the first, appear, fully would at paid case are other than where position. reading Plaintiffs Yet a careful by the week. 13-54- Colo.Rev.Stat. duty indicates that it deals with a bank’s 104(2)(b). Plaintiffs claim is that this stat- exemption an calculate for a debtor under all, apply money at ute does not since the Consumer Act Credit Protection identity placed lost its when (CCPA). seq. If U.S.C. et this the bank hinged interpretation case on an proof It is clear from the offer of CCPA, Usery compelling then would be paid in Defendant was not the normal case, precedent. In though, Defen- fashion, weekly but was as a subcon- rely upon dant has chosen to Colorado law pay tractor. His was not to deduc- exemption. for his tax tions for federal income Secu- Social Defendant has stated his offer of token, rity. By the same the income falls proof receiving earnings that he was for category “earnings” into the of as defined construction. Such 13-54-104(l)(b). by Colo.Rev.Stat. payment appears to fall into the money in Court is satisfied that category “earnings”, of as indicated account came from Defendant’s labor and 13-54-104[(l)](b)(A). Colo.Rev.Stat. . is, thus, earnings purposes claiming Supreme The Colorado Court’s decision in exemption. Shumway wages Rutter stressed that argument Plaintiffs is that the character designation solely should not lose such placed is lost once are funds being placed the basis of into a bank ac- Indeed, into a bank account. there case count. The same could also be said of law that ap that such a view is indicates money being pocket. held in a defendant’s propriate. Melby John O. & Co. v. Plaintiff, logic money To follow the re- Anderson, 88 Wis.2d 276 N.W.2d 274 employer, from an if ceived even at (1979); Henry, Mich.App. Edwards v. payment, exemp- time of would lose such (1980); Dunlop 293 N.W.2d 756 placed tion when into a wallet. Such Arizona, F.Supp. First Nat. Bank improper. result would be absurd and (D.Ariz.1975). old, Though years one hundred and two hand, On the other Colorado case law Shumway the decision Rutter v. is still opposite has taken the view the law. applicable controlling. Shumway, Rutter v. 16 Colo. 26 P. 321 (1891), Norris, Supreme specif- Similarly, the Colorado Court in In re B.R. ically held that recognized did not lose such that court that in order to identity placed permit when into a wage enjoy bank account. earner to benefit protection This case has not been overruled from the afforded under Nevada Indeed, law, Supreme necessary wage Colorado Court. it has it was to allow the earn- followed, though admittedly been all opportunity negotiate cases er a reasonable many years general funds, concept “disposable earnings” spend old. The sanctity wages otherwise the would be rendered Thus, upheld Acceptance Compa- meaningless. was Finance that court reasoned that Breaux, ny v. deposit earnings, Colo. 419 P.2d 955 a whether the debtor (1966) (refusal directly by to allow set-off for employer, debt should not cause *10 employer wages upheld). statutorily exempt wages owed to At to lose their least one court exempt long proceeds outside of Colorado has status as as the earnings. moneys, In and have not are traceable to those been converted account holding, the court said: support permanent of this investments. jurisdictions recognized that Other (citations Id. at 162 S.Ct. [82 1231] omit- statutorily exempt funds do not lose their ted). Exemptions And 31 Am.Jur.2d per deposited into a exempt status when § 224 states: checking In re account. See Caslav sonal authority deposit There that a of ex- (Bankr.N.D.Iowa ka, 179 B.R. empt in funds a bank does not affect a 1995) (construing “protection Iowa law that exemption, change nor the ex- ren afforded would be fund, empt long character so as meaningless exempt if status is lost dered exempt the source of the funds is rea- by negotiating paycheck”) (citing Mi sonably If impossible traceable. it is Miehe, Savs. Bank dAmerica separate exempt nonexempt out (Iowa 1989); Ar In re N.W.2d funds, general exemp- rule is that an (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1996) nold, 193 B.R. 897 tion ap- cannot lie. This rule has been (”[I]t form substance to claim elevates over plied, though exception, not without to a [paycheck that the hand was debtor’s] deposit exempt wages, exempt com- cheeking ac wages, but the cheek his awards, pensation exempt veterans’ ben- not); Frazier, In re 116 B.R. count was efits, exempt proceeds insurance (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1990) (exempt disabil funds. ity deposited into bank ac benefits check exempt count with other funds retained Id. at 467. status; exempt “readily benefits were by citing The trustee counters Us identifiable”). Arizona, ery v. First Nat’l Bank 586 F.2d Supreme At least two United States (9th Cir.1978) Adcock, and In re 264 B.R. opinions recognized that Court have also (D.Kan.2000). persuaded by I am not exempt exempt funds do not lose their reasoning Usery within the case for those upon deposit if status the funds in the expressed same reasons the court in In re account can be traced to funds. Kobemusz, Additionally, I at 847. find the Co., Casualty Porter v. Aetna & See Sur. distinguishable case of In re Adcock to be L.Ed,2d 370 U.S. 82 S.Ct. presented by the instant case. The facts In (1962) (veterans’ benefits) Philpott bankruptcy re Adcock dealt with a trustee’s Bd., County Essex U.S. Welfare powers opposed avoidance to an actual (1973) (wel- 93 S.Ct. 34 L.Ed.2d 608 garnishment. recognize I that there exists a benefits). Porter, at 159 fare U.S. split authority. In re Kober case law See 1231], Supreme S.Ct. the United States [82 nusz, However, I at 847-48. do not find the Court held that veterans’ benefits retained contradictory reasoning within those cases being deposited their status after and, thus, convincing adopt I be would not account, savings reasoning in a that: holdings therein. legislation type Since of this should be if complains The trustee also construed, liberally protect funds by § exemption provided 1-15-408 is al- granted by Congress for the mainte- to continue after such monies are lowed support nance and of the beneficiaries account, placed into a debtor’s bank there thereof, deposits we feel that such as are no will be end because should involved here remain inviolate. may always argue debtor his believe, Congress we intended that residence, purchase were used to vehi- safekeeping veterans of their ben- cles, tangible I do not or other assets. to utilize those nor- efits should be able agree. legislature’s I intent believe adopted by community mal modes only is served insofar as such monies are purpose provided for that the benefit — funds, earnings into an traceable from the debtor’s regardless of the technicalities of formalities, the debt- readily account and does continue once title and other spend for the available as needed for or chooses to such monies maintenance, assets, actually qualities purchase tangible retain the unless such as- *11 independent their own may qualify for sets

exemption. further expresses The trustee is served where situations bank, ability not have does a bank wage exemption earner’s because

calculate amount deposited

it know if the will not prop- if account comes withholdings

er have been made from those However, process provided

amounts. Wyoming garnishment does not scheme

require a bank to determine the sta-

tus monies held bank accounts.

Rather, debtor’s responsibility is the

affirmatively assert that he in the assets. Thus, having carefully

[¶ considered 26] arguments Wyo- parties’ reviewed

ming’s statutory ap- scheme

plicable authority, I would hold disposa- wages

ble from a income derived deposited into the debtor’s bank account §§ 1— under 40-14-505(b) insofar

15^408 and as the debt- by competent evidence can establish that

such monies were derived from

personal services.

2004 WY Anthony MESSER, Appellant

John

(Defendant), Wyoming, STATE (Plaintiff).

Appellee

No. 03-231.

Supreme Wyoming. Court of

Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: Royal v. Walsh
Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 23, 2004
Citation: 96 P.3d 1
Docket Number: 03-164
Court Abbreviation: Wyo.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In