Royal v. Campbell CountyRoyal v. Campbell County
I am writing to rule on the pleas in bar of Steams, Conrad, and Schmidt, Consulting Engineers, Inc. (“SCS”) to the third-party and fourth-party complaints of Joyce Engineering, Inc. (“Joyce”). In this regard, I overrule both pleas in bar and grant Joyce’s motion to strike the pleas in bar.
These cases arise from the alleged contamination of groundwater, surface water, and air on the real estate of Claude M. Royal, his wife, and their corporation (“Royаls”). This contamination is alleged to have come from a landfill operated by Campbell County, Virginia, since 1979. Royals filed their initial lawsuit against the county in 2005, Case No. CL0500074-00. In June 2008, the county filed a third-party complaint against Joyce. It also filed a separate cause of action against Joyce, Case No. CL07000351-00. Thereafter, in May 2008, Joyce filed third-party and fourth-party complaints, respectively, against SCS. Both the third-party cоmplaint and the fourth-party complaint assert claims against SCS for indemnification and contribution. SCS has filed its pleas in bars to both complaints.
Under the allegations in this case, Joyce was employed by Campbell County to provide environmental engineering services related to the landfill. In particular, Joyce was employed by the county to oversee and provide construction and environmental services for Campbell County, prepare reports for regulatory agencies, upgrade the groundwater monitoring system, and oversee the installation of groundwater monitoring wells.
SCS is also an environmental engineering firm. SCS maintains that it was employed by the county to act as a litigation consultant and provide an independent second opinion concerning the services of Joyce. Joyce maintains, however, that SCS actually served as an environmental consultant with oversight responsibilities for direct action taken by the county, including the selection and design of the groundwater remediation system.
Generally, the right to indemnification grows out of a contractual relationship. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Wilson,
SCS argues that Joyce cannot claim indemnification because Joyce cannot prove that it was without personal fault. Further, SCS argues that certain writings demonstrate that SCS was not negligent and thus cannot be determined to be negligent as required for equitable indemnification.
Implicit in every contract of professional employment is the professional’s duty to exercise the care of those ordinarily skilled in the business. O’Connell v. Bean, 263 Va. 176, 180 (2002); Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing,
In their plea, SCS invites the court, based upon pleadings, documents, transcripts, and discovery to find that Joyce is unable to be without fault in this case. While there may eventually be sufficient evidence to find Joyce at fault under the standards for professional engineering services at the trial of this case, the court at this stage cannot rule that this is established as a matter of law. Very simply, this is a matter that must be resolved at trial, or perhaps, on a motion for summary judgment after the evidence has been developed through discovery.
As noted above, a prеrequisite to recovery based on equitable indemnification is the initial determination that the negligence of another person caused the damage. Pulte Home Corp., id. at 528. SCS argues that Joyce cannot prove that SCS was at fault. This, again, is based upon the pleadings, transcripts, documents, and discovery set forth above. At this stage, the court cannot, as a matter of law, rule that the county or Royals could not find SCS at fault. There is sufficient evidence in the record and otherwise submitted to the court at this time to allow this case to proceed on the possible fault of SCS.
SCS argues that any negligence claims against SCS are barred because Joyce’s own writings demonstrate that SCS was not negligent. A review of these documents does not allow the court to agree that the documents rise to the level of a bar at this early stage of the proceеdings.
SCS cites the Fairfax County Circuit Court case of Kristiansen v. William A. Hazel, Inc.,
Phillip Morris, Inc. stands on the proposition that, if a defendant is guilty of “active negligence,” there is no right of indemnification from another defendant. Referring to Texaco, one of the defendants, the Supreme Court noted that the jury found Texaco negligent and therefore Texaco was not entitled to indemnification. Likewise, the Supreme Court held as a matter of law that Phillip Morris was negligent and was precluded from indemnification. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
The next issue is contribution. SCS correctly notes that a plaintiff cannot recover from a contribution defendant unless the injured party could have recovered against the contribution defendant. Pierce v. Martin,
At this point, however, the court cannot make a determination that SCS has no liability to the county for a departure from engineering standard of care, nor can the court hold that there are no circumstances where SCS could not be held liable to Royals for breach of a duty of care. The court certainly agrees that liability of SCS to the Royals for breach of a duty of care may be difficult for Joyce to prove. Nonetheless, at this stage, the court cannot rule that Joyce’s contribution action must be barred because the documents indicate SCS could not be liable to the Royals.
Next, after a review of the information provided to the court at this point, Joyce certainly has an arguable position that the court could establish that SCS has some liability to the county, and that SCS may have breached a duty of ordinary care and skill required of professional engineers. This is certainly the case with respeсt to the design, testing, and implementation of the groundwater remediation system.
Last, Joyce moves the court to strike the SCS pleas at bar to the third-pаrty complaint and fourth-party complaint. The essence of the motion to strike of Joyce is that a plea in bar is a defensive pleading that reduces the litigation to a single issue and the pleas in bar in the instant cases do not reduce the cases to a single issue. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Melendez,
After a review of the SCS pleas in bar, the court finds that the pleas in bar do not reduce the litigation to a single issue. The arguments supporting the pleas in bar to contribution and indemnity actions of Joyce are based on theories that Joyce had fault, SCS was not negligent, SCS has no liability, and Joyce cannot meet its burden of proof. These are not single issues that are appropriately addressed by a plea in bar.
September 30, 2008
I am writing to rule on the demurrers of Steams, Conrad, and Schmidt Consulting Engineers, Inc., to the third-party and fourth-party complaints of Joyce Engineering, Inc. In this regard, I overrule the demurrers.
These cases arise from the alleged contamination of groundwater, surface water, and air on the real estate of Claude M. Royal, his wife, and their corporation. This contamination is alleged to have come from a landfill operated by Campbell County, Virginia, since 1979. Royals filed their initial lawsuit against the county in 2005 (CL0500074-00). In June 2008, cоunty filed athirdparty complaint against Joyce. It also filed a separate cause of action against Joyce (CL07000351-00). Thereafter, in May 2008, Joyce filed third-party and fourth-party complaints, respectively, against SCS. Both the third-party complaint and the fourth-party complaint assert claims against SCS for indemnification and contribution. SCS has filed its demurrers to both complaints.
SCS is also an environmental engineering firm. SCS maintains that it was employed by the county to act as a litigation consultant and provide an independent second opinion concerning the services of Joyce. Joyce maintains, however, that SCS actually served as an environmental consultant with oversight responsibilities for direct action taken by the county, including the selection and design of the groundwater remediation system.
A demurrer only tests the suffiсiency of the factual allegations to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. Fun v. Virginia Military Inst.,
SCS maintains that the third-party and fourth-party complaints of Joyce fail to state a claim for indemnity because they do not allege any contract between Joyce and SCS. SCS asserts that indemnity must grow out of a contractual relationship. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Wilson,
While indemnity can arise out of a contractual relationship, it can also arise when a party, without personal fault, is legally liable fоr the damages caused by the negligence of another. This is equitable indemnification. Carr v. The Home Ins. Co.,
SCS also argues in its demurrers that Joyce cannot claim indemnification because Joyce is not without personal fault. SCS is correct that there cаn be no equitable indemnification unless the party seeking indemnification is without personal fault. Pulte,
The arguments advanced by SCS appear to be based on a construction of documents and evidence beyond the third-party and fourth-party complaints of Joyce. This invites the court to go beyond the allegations and reasonable inferences from these complaints to sustain the demurrer of SCS. This would be improper.
SCS next argues that the third-party and fourth-party complaints fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for indemnification beсause Joyce seeks solely economic losses. SCS is correct that the “economic loss rule” does not allow a party to recover for purely economic losses from another party unless there is privity of contract. Ward v. Ernst & Young,
SCS argues that Joyce seeks solely economic damages in its third-party and fourth-party complaints. As noted by Joyce, however, the underlying consideration of tort law is the prоtection of persons and property from injury. Filack v. George,
SCS further argues that Joyce has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted for contribution against SCS. As noted by SCS, a contribution plaintiff cannot recover from a contribution defendant unless the injured party could have recovered against the contribution defendant. Pierce v. Martin,
In both the third-party and fourth-party complaints, Joyce alleges that the negligence of SCS contributed to, or was the sole proximate cause of, any damаges that may be awarded to Campbell County. This is based upon the factual allegations of Joyce in its complaints that if the groundwater remediation system is determined to be deficient, it was caused by the negligence of SCS. These, along with the other allegations in the third-party
SCS further suggests that because there was not privity between SCS and the Royals, SCS does not owe the Royals any duty. Accordingly, SCS maintains that there could be no recovery by the Royals against SCS, and thus the fourth-party complaint cannot state a cause of action.
The court again disagrees with this analysis. If the Royals’ propеrty was damaged by failure of SCS to comply with a duty of care in the design of its system, it may be possible for the Royals to recover against SCS. At the least, the allegations in the fourth-party complaint are sufficient to satisfy the requirements that the pleadings state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Further, even if SCS did not have any liability to the Royals, it may have liability to the county for negligent design of a remediation system that cаused damage to the Royals. Thus, the county would have a cause of action on its third-party claim against SCS based upon the county’s liability in tort to the Royals.
February 25, 2009
I am writing to rule on the demurrer of Joyce Engineering, Inc., to the First Amended Third-Party Complaint (“First ATPC”) [in Case No. CL05000074-00], The demurrer is overruled.
Joyce maintains that Campbell County fails to allege any facts in support of a cause of action for indemnification. Rule 3:2(c) requires that the complaint ask for specific relief sought and contain an ad damnum clause stating the amount of damages sought. These requirements have been met in the First ATPC.
Next, Rule 1:4(d) requires that a pleading “state the facts on which the party relies in numbered paragraphs.” Further, it is stated that the pleading is sufficient if “it clearly informs the opposite party of the true nature of the claim or offense.” Additionally, Rule 1:40 states that “[B]revity is enjoined as the outstаnding characteristic of good pleading.”
The Supreme Court has held that, even though a complaint may not be perfect, where it is drafted so that the defendant cannot mistake the true nature of a claim, the trial court should overrule the demurrer. CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc.,
In the instant case, the First ATPC is truly a brief pleading. Nonetheless, it does contain sufficient allegations and material facts to inform Joyce of the nature and character of the claim. In particular, it refers to the
Further, while it is helpful to state the actual cause of action upon which relief is being sought, this is neither required under the Rules of Court or under the case decisions. It is simply necessary that the defendant be informed of the nature and the character of the claim.
Joyce also asks in its demurrer that the court rule that Campbell County cаnnot base a claim on three of the fourteen documents because they were not mentioned in Campbell County’s supplemental bill of particulars. This portion of Joyce’s demurrer is overruled because the court is being invited to venture beyond the text of the pleadings and rule on matters that may be relevant to proof at trial. The Supreme Court has held that on demurrers trial courts are not required to descend into statements of details of proof. Hunter v. Burroughs,
February 26, 2009
I am writing to rule on the demurrer of Joyce Engineering, Inc., to the Second Amended Complaint in the above case [CL07000351-00]. The demurrertothe August 13,1992, and June 18,1993, documents is overruled. The demurrer to the claim for attorney’s fees and сosts is sustained. The demurrer to the violation of 18 VAC 10-20-690 is sustained.
Joyce demurs to the August 13,1992, document and the June 18,1993, document because Campbell County does not make any reference to any contractual obligations in these documents in its bill of particulars. These documents, however, were produced in response to the motion craving oyer. Further, they are documents that are part of a series of contractuаl documents between Joyce and Campbell County, Any of these documents may be relevant to the Campbell County cause of action against Joyce for failure to perform its contractual duties. As noted by the Supreme Court, on demurrers, trial courts are not required to descend into statements of details of proof. Hunter v. Burroughs,
Joyce also demurs to the allegation that Joyce was required by 18 VAC 10-20-690 to advise Campbell County in a manner to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the general public. A “professional” is defined by 18 VAC 10-20-10 as “an architect, professional engineer. . . who is licensed or certified.” By the use of the word “professional,” the administrative code applies this requirement to individual professional engineers rather than to a corporation such as Joyce.
Additionally, Campbell County is attempting to аpply an administrative regulation for the conduct of professional engineers to its contractual relationship with Joyce. There is nothing in my review of the administrative code to indicate that the provisions of 18 VAC 10-20-690 are intended to be applied to contractual relationships of professional engineers. To the contrary, it appears to apply to the requirements for licensing of professional engineers.