OPINION
In this declaratory judgment action, ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (“Royal Indemnity”) and AMERICAN AND FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY (“American”) seek a declaration that their policies of insurance issued to SONE-CO/NORTHEASTERN, INC. (“Soneco”), do not provide coverage for the intentional tort claims asserted by DUBIE SOWELL and RICHARD ARCHAMBAULT against their employer, Soneco, in two underlying state court actions. Royal Indemnity and American have filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., asking this Court to enter judgment in their favor because there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law [Doc. # 29]. After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions and after hearing oral argument of counsel, the Court concludes that these policies of insurance do provide coverage and denies the Motion for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
Most of the facts giving rise to this action are undisputed. Archambault and Sowell, employees of Soneco, instituted separate personal injury actions in state court against Soneco, claiming damages for personal injuries that they sustained in a work-related accident during the course of their employment. For all purposes relevant to this declaratory judgment action, their complaints are identical.
In their complaints, they allege that So-neco, their employer, had entered into an agreement with Konover Construction Company, the general contractor, under which Soneco was to dig and excavate the trenches for the installation оf water lines at the BJ’s Wholesale Club site in Willi-mantic, Connecticut. On October 30, 1998, Archambault was operating an excavator when a portion of a nearby trench collapsed, burying a co-worker, James Dowd. Archambault and Sowell, a co-worker who was also at the site, rushed to free Dowd. While they were attempting to rescue Dowd, another portion of the trench collapsed, completely burying them, causing personal injuries to both of them. (Ar-chambault Am. Comp. ¶ 4; Sowell 2d Rev. Comp. ¶ 4.) 1
Both complaints allege in the first count, which is entitled “Intentional Misconduct as to the defendant, Soneco/Northeastern, Inc.,” that the injuries and damages sustained by Archambault and Sowell were proximately caused by the “intentional and reckless misconduct” of Soneco, 2 in that it:
*528 a. refused to provide trench boxes or other cave-in protection for employees engaged in trenching operations, such as the plaintiff, when it knew that such protection was required by law and necessary to protect the plaintiff from injury or death;
b. failed to require trench boxes or other cave-in protection for employees engaged in trenching operations, such as the plaintiff, when it knew that such protection was required by law and necessary to protect the plaintiff from injury or death;
c. ordered the plaintiff to excavate trenches when it knew that such work was dangerous and hazardous under the circumstances;
d. failed to provide trench boxes or other safety equipment in order to sаve money and time and speed productivity;
e. ordered the plaintiff to excavate trenches without providing trench boxes or sufficient space to step or slope the trench walls so as to prevent cave-ins;
f. knew that said trench had a high probability of collapse and failure due to soil conditions consisting of loamy sand;
g. violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(c)(2) by failing to provide a safe means of egress from trench excavations;
h. violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(h) by allowing employees to work in excavations in which water accumulated and failed to protect its employees from hazards associated with water accumulation, such as cave-ins;
i. violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(l) by failing to provide its employees adequate protection from hazardous loose rock or soil, such as scaling to remove loose material, installation of protective barricades as necessary to stop and contain falling material, or other means of equivalent protection;
j. violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) by failing to provide its employees protection from excavated material, failing to place or require the placement of such materials at least two feet from the edge of the excavations, and/or failing to use retaining devices sufficient to prevent materials from falling or rolling into excavations;
k. violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(k) by failing to provide a competent person to perform daily inspections of excavations, adjacent areas, and protective systems for evidence of hazardous situations, such as possible cave-ins, and failing to inspect for such dangers;
l. violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(a) by failing to select or construct sloping and benching systems in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(b); and by failing to select and construct support systems, shield systems, and/or other protective systems in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c);
m. failed to ensure cave-in protection was provided for each employee working in a trench that exceeded six feet in depth, including the plaintiff;
n. failed to adequately train its employees in good construction practices;
o. failed to properly train and supervise its employees to ensure safe excavating practices;
*529 p. failed to ensure safe working conditions for employees engaged in trenching operations in accordance with applicable federal regulations;
q. failed to ensure safe working conditions for employees engаged in trenching operations when it knew that a cave-in could result in severe injury to or death or its employees, such as the plaintiff;
r. failed to provide cave-in protection for its employees after and despite a citation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for a similar safety violation on October 6, 1998 at a job site on Route 80 in front of the Ames Department Store in East Haven, Connecticut;
s. intentionally failed to provide cave-in protection for employees engaged in trenching operations when it was both required and feasible to do so;
t. intentionally failed to provide cave-in protection for employees engaged trenching operations, despite a high risk of injury or death of its employees, including the plaintiff, in order to accelerate productivity and achieve greater profits.
(Archambault Am. Compl. ¶ 5; Sowell 2d Rev. Compl. ¶ 5)(emphasis added). Plaintiffs allege that the “aforesaid conduct оf [Soneco] exhibited reckless disregard for the life and well-being of the plaintiff and said conduct was substantially certain to result in the above-mentioned cave-in and the severe injuries sustained by the plaintiff as hereinafter described.” Id. at ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
At the time of the trench collapse giving rise to these two lawsuits, Soneco was insured under a workers’ compensation and employer’s liability insurance policy issued by Royal Indemnity, Policy No. 99 RCS 338055, and under a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Americаn, Policy No. ASP 130512. Both insurers provided Soneco with a defense in the underlying tort actions under a reservation of rights, relying on various coverage exclusions, and then filed this declaratory judgment action. Both state court actions remain pending.
DISCUSSION
Royal Indemnity’s Employer’s Liability Insurance Policy provides in relevant part: We will pay all sums you legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury to your employees, provided the bodily injury is covered by this Employers Liability Insurance.
(Form WC 00 00 00 A, Pt. II, Sec. B, at р. 3.) The policy specifically excludes the following:
4. any obligation imposed by a workers compensation ... law, or any similar law;
5. bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you; ...
Id. Sec. C, ¶¶ 4, 5. The policy further provides:
We have the right and duty to defend ... any claim, proceeding or suit against you for damages payable by this insurance ....
We have no duty to defend a claim, proceeding or suit that is not covered by this insurance....
Id. Sec. D.
The Commercial General Liability Policy issued by American provides:
We will pay those sums that the insured bеcomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the *530 insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “personal injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance does not apply....
(CG 00 01 01 96 at 1, § I, Coverage A, ¶ l.a.) The policy specifically excludes from coverage “ ‘bodily injury’ or ‘propеrty damage’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Id. ¶ 2.a.
Royal Indemnity and American argue that, in the underlying state-court actions, Archambault and Sowell have carefully framed their claims against Soneco as claims for intentional and reckless misconduct so as to circumvent the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-284(a),
3
as interpreted by the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp.,
Defendants do not deny that the factual allegations in the Archambault and Sowell complaints attempt to invoke the “substantial certainty” exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as set forth in Suarez. They argue, however, that the issue before this Court is not whether the underlying complaints *531 allege a legally sufficient cause of action under Suarez and its progeny, but rather whether the allegations of the complaint invoke the exclusions of the policies so as to defeat coverage.
As defendants point out, the critical inquiry is not whether the allegations against the employer will withstand scrutiny under
Suarez I
and
II
so as to avoid the workers’ compensation bar, but rather whether the allegations fall within the language of the policy’s exclusion. “[I]t is well settled that an insurer’s duty to defend, being much broader in scope and application than its duty to indemnify, is determined by reference to the allegations contained in the underlying complaint.... The obligation of the insurer does not depend on whether the injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action against the insured but on whether he has, in his complaint, stated facts which bring the injury within the coverage. If the latter situation prevails, the policy requires the insurer to defend, irrespective of the insured’s ultimate liability.”
Springdale Donuts, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Illinois,
Under Connecticut law, “construction of an insurance contract presents a question of law for the court.”
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Bulaong,
Royal Indemnity’s Employer’s Liability Policy
Defendants argue that the exclusion in Royal Indemnity’s Employer’s Liability Policy does not apply because the complaints do not allege that Soneco “intentionally caused or aggravated” the bodily injury, as required by the express language of the exclusion. Citing
TIG Insurance Company v. Windham Community Hospital,
No. CV 960053660S,
In a supplemental brief filed in this action, defendants cite Judge Chatigny’s recent decision in
Reliance Insurance Co. v. Vitale,
engaged in conduct with the intent of causing the injuries, as would be the ease if they were relying on the “intended tort theory” of employer liability discussed in Suarez I and Suarez II. Rather, their complaint invokes the “substantial certainty theory,” which enables an employee to recover damages against an employer for bodily injury even if the employer did not actually intend to cause the injury, provided the injury was “substantially certain” to occur.
Id. at *11, — F.Supp.2d at -. The Court concluded that, in light of the Suarez opinion and the traditional purpose of employer’s liability insurance as a “gap-filler,” the policy did not exclude coverage for the claims in the underlying action based on the “substantial certainty theory.” Id.
The specific allegations in the Archam-baualt and Sowell complaints reference intentional acts and omissions by Soneco— e.g., the refusal to provide trench boxes, the failure to provide a safe means of egress, allowing plaintiffs to work in excavations where water had accumulated, the failure to provide adequate training— which, they allege, were “substantially certain” to result in the injuries that they sustained. Nowhere do they allege that Soneco intentionally injured them or intentionally aggravated their injuries. We find that their claims, as alleged, of intentional acts and omissions by Soneco that were substantially certain to result in injuries do not fall within the language of the exclusion in Royal Indemnity’s policy for “bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated” by the insured.
In so holding, we recognize that there is a divergence of opinion on this issue in substantially similar cases involving identical poliсy exclusions.
See, e.g., Cavalier Mftg. Co. v. Employers Insur. of Wausau,
American’s Commerical General Liability Policy
As noted above, the exclusion in American’s Commercial General Liability Policy is worded differently than the exclusion in Royal Indemnity’s policy. It excludes from coverage bodily injury “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Read literally, this exclusion requires the Court to apply a subjective standard in determining whether the insured expected the bodily injury to result from its intentional acts.
See, e.g., Golec v. Metal Exchange Corp.,
No. 220166,
[t]he subjective intention and expectation of the insured determine which injuries fall within and which fall beyond the scope of coverage under this policy....
This inquiry into the subjective intention or expectation of the insured contrasts sharply with the traditional tort inquiry into an actor’s intent. The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes intended consequences as those which the actor knows or are “substantially certain” to result from an act, whether the actor consciously desires those consequences or not. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965); see also W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 8 (4th Ed.1971). While the inquiry regarding intentional torts asks whiсh consequences an objective reasonable person might expect or intend as the result of a deliberate act, we are concerned, under the language of this insurance contract, with the injury subjectively intended or expected by the insured....
Id.
at *3, — So.2d at - (citations omitted). The Court further noted that the “inquiry into whether injuries are ‘intended or expected’ by an insured under the terms of an insurance contract differs from the inquiry into whether an act is ‘intentional’ under the worker’s compensation statute’s intentional acts exception to a coemployee’s tort immunity.”
Id.
at *4, — So.2d at-. The Court held that the intentional act exception under the worker’s compensation statute encompassed a “tort-based standard” which exposed the actor to liability for injuries he did not specifically envision or desire to produce but which were “substantially certain” to occur.
Id.
at *5, — So.2d at -. “By contrast, the contract of insurance ... excludes coverаge only for those injuries, which the defendant subjectively intended to inflict.”
Id.; see also Patrons-Oxford
*534
Mutual Insur. Co. v. Dodge,
We have found no Connecticut authority interpreting the same exclusionary language, particularly as it relates to intentional tort claims brought under a “substantial certainty” theory of liability. Similar “expected or intended” language, however, is employed in liability policies in defining the term “occurrence,” and has been construed as incorporating a subjective standard, rather than an objective tort-basеd standard.
In
Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life and Casulaty Corporation,
No. CV91-0396432S,
Because we find that the exclusion in American’s commercial liability policy encompasses a subjective standard and the underlying complaints reference an objective standard, we cannot say that the allegations necessarily fall within the policy’s exclusion, particularly in light of the nature of the specific сlaims asserted. Accordingly, because the claims of Ar-chambault and Sowell could fall within the coverage provided by American’s policy, American has a duty to defend Soneco in these two underlying state court cases. Of course, whether Royal Indemnity and/or American will ultimately be liable for any damage award against Soneco will depend on the specific findings of the jury in the state court actions.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above the motion for summary judgmеnt of Royal Indemnity Company and American and Foreign Insurance Company is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Richard Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., No. CV-99-0551620-S (Sup.Ct. Jud. Dist. New London, Conn.)(Am. Compl. dated Oct. 30, 2000)(Ex. “A" to Mot. Summ. J.); Dubie Sowell v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc. and Konover Construction Corp., No. CV-00-0553393-S (Sup.Ct. Jud. Dist. New London, Conn.)(2d Rev. Compl. dated Dec. 7, 2000)(Ex. "B” to Mot. Summ. J.).
. Both complaints also assert negligence claims against Konover Construction Compa *528 ny, the general contractor on the construction project. However, the claims against Kon-over are not relevant to the instant declaratory judgment action.
. Connecticut General Statutes § 31-284(a), commonly referred to as the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, provides:
An employer shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment... but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter .... All rights and claims between аn employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees ... arising out of personal injury ... sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter.
. The Connecticut Supreme Court has interpreted the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act as a total bar to common law actions by an employee against his or her employer for job-related injuries with one narrow exception that exists when the employer has engaged in willful or serious misconduct.
Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229
Conn. 99, 106,
Three years after the initial
Suarez
decision, the Connecticut revisited this issue in what is frequently referred to as
"Suarez II,"
to escape the exclusivity of the [Workers' Compensation Act], the victim of an intentional injury must rely on the intended tort theory or the substantial certainty theory. Under the former the actor must have intended both the act itself and the injurious consequences of the act. Under the latter, the actor must have intended the act and have known that the injury was substantially certain to occur from the act.