18 S.E.2d 57 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1941
Lead Opinion
1. The test as to whether a claimant is so "mentally incompetent" under the workmen's compensation act (Code, § 114-306) as to toll the running of the statute of limitations is this: Is his mind so unsound, or is he so weak in his mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that he can not manage the ordinary affairs of life?
2. The evidence authorized the board to find that the claimant was mentally incompetent under the rule just stated, and that the statute of limitations had been tolled a sufficient period of time to prevent a bar of his claim. *378
3. The award in favor of the claimant was authorized by the evidence. The judge of the superior court properly overruled the appeal.
In the absence of anything in the workmen's compensation act to indicate that anything different was intended, the term "mentally incompetent," as used in the statute exempting such person from the application of the limitation provision (§ 114-305, supra), must be given the same scope and meaning as that which is accorded to it, or words of similar import, in other statutes which deal with the status of persons generally. 71 C.J. 1023, § 798. With reference to the tolling of the statute of limitations generally, our Code, § 3-801, provides: "Infants, idiots, or insane persons, or persons imprisoned, who are such when the cause of action shall have accrued, shall be entitled to have the same time, after the disability shall have been removed, to bring an action, as is prescribed for other persons." The section immediately following provides: *379 "If either of the foregoing disabilities shall happen after the right of action shall have accrued, and shall not be voluntarily caused or undertaken by the person claiming the benefit thereof, the limitation shall cease to operate during its continuance." Code, § 3-802. Thus, the statute is tolled whether the disability existed at the time of the accrual of the cause of action or subsequently thereto.
There is nothing in the act indicating that a different meaning was to be given it, and in the light of the context of § 114-306 and the section immediately following it, we think the lawmakers, in framing the act, had distinctly in mind the provisions of our Code dealing with persons for whom a guardian or trustee (who is but a guardian of property) may be appointed. Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
From a consideration of the Code sections cited above it is clear that the Code defines insane persons, or persons non compos mentis, or as applied to the facts of this case, persons "mentally incompetent," as meaning persons with unsoundness of mind in many degrees. In Gray v. Obear, supra, page 680, the court treated such condition of mind as being of three degrees as follows: 1. One who is so unsound as to be sent to an asylum. 2. Another so unsound as to have a guardian of his property and of his person. 3. Another so unsound as to have a guardian only of his property, to see that it is not wasted; that is, a trustee. It must be borne in mind that under such definition of "mentally incompetent" no account is taken of physical infirmities, yet it is certain that when a person becomes mentally disabled (incompetent) from whatever cause the disability may arise, whether from sickness, vice, casualty, or old age, he is equally a fit and necessary object of guardianship and protection. Matter of James Barker, 2 Johnson's Chan. R. 232, 233 (N. Y.). In other words, the test as to whether the claimant is so "mentally incompetent" as to toll the running of the statute of limitations, in this: is his mind so unsound, or is he so weak in his mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that he can not manage the ordinary affairs of life?
The question in the instant case is not whether Agnew, the claimant, is such an idiot or lunatic or so insane that he ought to be sent to the asylum, or even have a guardian for his person, but, was he, during the year 1939 (a period of time sufficiently long to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations), so "mentally incompetent" (non compos mentis or insane), so unsound in mind, or so imbecile in intellect, that he could not manage his ordinary affairs of life? If there be such a degree of unsoundness of mind or imbecility as to incapacitate one from managing the ordinary business of life, it will authorize the board to find that the claimant was "mentally incompetent," and thus to find that the statute was tolled during the period of time the claimant is "mentally incompetent" and until the disability shall have been removed. Code, § 3-801; Gray v.Obear, supra, 679 (2).
The director found in favor of the claimant. The Industrial *381 Board affirmed the award and the judge of the superior court overruled the appeal. The defendants excepted.
The Industrial Board was authorized to find from the evidence that the claimant was injured in the scope of his employment on December 28 or December 30, 1938, and that he reported the injury within five minutes thereafter to the foreman. He obtained permission from the foreman to go to the company's clinic, and did so three times on the date of the accident, but received no treatment because of the absence of the doctor. He did not return to work. He was totally disabled from the injury and the natural consequences therefrom. He did not file his claim until June, 1940, and the defendants contend that his claim is barred by the one-year limitation as provided in Code § 114-305 supra. The all important and controlling issue is whether, under the evidence, the claimant was "mentally incompetent" as defined above, so as to toll the statute of limitations, and such tolling was for a sufficient length of time to prevent a bar. There was sufficient evidence from which the board could determine that the claimant was so incompetent.
Dr. F. C. Mims, who was admitted to qualify as a practicing physician, was asked the following hypothetical question based on the facts of this case and gave the answer stated: Q. "If a man to all outward appearances was healthy and steadily engaged in work every day, hard physical work, and he became injured so as to necessitate bed, house, and hospital confinement for a period of six months, and during a considerable part of that time was in such a physical condition that he couldn't even turn over in the bed or have bathroom privileges, that condition persisted for about six months and he exhausted all his money and had no income of importance, had a wife and several children, partly nourished, and some sickness among the members of the family, was unable to do any kind of work himself, or get about, got dependent upon his neighbors for food and other necessities, and was unable to pay for medicine or physicians, and suffered almost continuously with fever and pains throughout the body and had headaches, lapses of memory over a whole year, and had occasional crying spells and was depressed, would you say he was a man mentally normal during such period and capable of knowing and appreciating and physically and mentally able to look after his business and to preserve *382
and look after his legal rights?" A. "No, he would not have been." See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Saul,
There was evidence from which the board could have found, as contended by the defendants, that the claimant was not "mentally incompentent," and that therefore the claim was barred by the statute which requires it to be filed within one year from the date of the accident. However, it being a question of fact whether the claimant was "mentally incompetent," under the evidence pointed out above the board was authorized to find as they did *383
that he was "mentally incompetent;" that is, incapable of managing his business affairs for the entire year 1939, and that therefore the claim was not barred, the statute having been tolled for one year out of the one year, five months, and eighteen days, the period of time which elapsed between the date of the accident and the date of the filing of the claim. Thus, under the general statute with reference to the tolling of the statute of limitations, Code §§ 3-801, 3-802, the claim was not barred. See Elliott v. Gary,
As to medical, surgical, hospital, and other treatment, the board did not abuse its discretion in awarding $500 therefor as provided for in the Code, § 114-501. There was sufficient evidence to authorize such a finding. The judge of the superior court did not err in overruling the appeal.
Judgment affirmed. Broyles, C. J., and Gardner, J., concur.
Addendum
The defendants contend that the court overlooked their contention that the phrase "mentally incompetent" must be defined to be such incompetency as is denoted by the word "lunatic," and that this is a vital part of the case. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "lunatic" as a person of "unsound mind." Furthermore, the Code, § 102-103, quoted in the opinion, declares that a lunatic includes all persons of unsound mind, and a reading of the opinion discloses that the court dealt thoroughly with the definition of a person of unsound mind which includes the word "lunatic." This contention was not overlooked; nor do we think the award is inconsistent.
Rehearing denied. Broyles, C. J., and Gardner, J., concur.
