*1 Roy John E. et al. Jr.,
D. J. et al. (Knoxville, September Term, 1956.)
Opinion filed October *2 Nash- and Crownover, & Crownover Watkins Sims petitioners. for ville, opinion of Neil delivered Justice
Mr. Chiee Court. Roy complainants, September E. John
On petition presented writs this Court for and others, supersedeas to review the action of certiorari and refusing issue writs of Chancellor Joe M. Carden desegregation, integration prevent being “public same School,” the “Clinton system part Ten- school” and a grant nessee. We declined to the relief for and thereupon complainants lengthy petition filed a rehear. It now before the consideration. charged complainants resi- dent citizens County, of Anderson and that the defend- ant, D. J. Brittain, Jr., was the of the Clinton county; School in said that'he, violation segregation permitting laws of Tennessee, was the en- rollment of twelve students the school.. charged It is in the bill laws Tennessee force in full the stat- appropriating money utes schools of the State clearly contemplate segregated the maintenance of schools: *3 charge Principal made that D. J. Brittain, Jr.,
of the along school, a was made others, defendant, who were County members of the of Board Education, suit a law instituted was in the United States prior April District Court at Knoxville sometime January wherein 1952,, said on 1956, Mc Supp. Education, Swain v. Board D.C., 138 F. of pronounced desegregation final 50, 572, decree “that as high county [Anderson] school students in should be by effected a definite date and that a reasonable date beginning , be fixed should one not later than the of the year present (The fall term of of 1956”. of decree the United States District Court was not made an ex part present to the hibit and hence bill, is not of foregoing quoted record. But assume we lan guage substantially correct.) n right We have assume, as did the Chancellor, that the of and the School Board with, complying United' the aforesaid decree of the District States Conrt. Judge of
It be doubted that the said cannot following of of Conrt Avas the mandate Educa case of Brown v. Board States in United Topeka, cases, U.S. 483, tion and consolidated was held: 98 L.Ed. wherein it S.Ct. public education
“We conclude that in field of Sep- equal’ 'separate place. the doctrine but has no unequal. inherently arate educational facilities are plaintiffs others simi- we Therefore, hold brought larly situated for whom actions been complained by de- of, of the are, reason prived protection equal guaranteed the laws by disposition This the Fourteenth Amendment. any segre- unnecessary whether discussion such makes gation Process Clause violates Due ’’ Amendment. Fourteenth action” and further held that these are “class It by public supported applies ruling thus all schools funds.
Regardless we think of the soundness of what we are bound it under the Su decision premacy U.S.C.A. Clause Federal Constitution art. 6. Const. *4 argu- requested the further same case
In question Many lawyers from of relief. able ment on the argued states to be number of difficulties confronted integrating in 349 U.S. the races our schools. 1083. The L.Ed. S.Ct. cases enter to District Courts to such orders remanded and opinion necessary “consistent with this decrees proper racially to admit to non- on a schools discriminatory speed parties with basis all deliberate opinion to these cases.” In this latter incor- porated by opinion “declaring reference its former principle pub- fundamental that racial discrimination in * * lic provisions- education is All *. unconstitutional, requiring federal, permitting local state, or law yield principle.” such (Em- discrimination must to this phasis ours.) express
Now in the holding face of the Supreme Washington complainants Court at segregation continue to insist our laws are “still respectfully disagree. We full force effect”. complainants The question by seek evade insist- ing that the integration, Court did not decree a forced only but there should be discrimination; “that integration yet many ways avoid de- language termined.” The above quoted, capable meaning, but one viz. that all State yield paramount laws on must to author- ity of the Federal Constitution. complainants expressly their rec-
ognized the fact that the enrollment in the Clinton compliance School of the twelve students was in mandate of the United States District Court. Principal, Neither Mr. nor School the School Any Board could evade it. refusal to admit their en- rollment been would act an of discrimination in plain violation of Federal Court’s decree. While it argued by counsel that the Board of Education had integration not ordered and Brittain was school, acting authority, without we think the silence Board amounted ratification action of the
145 -with, (cid:127) Principal comply in Ms effort the decree to party of the Federal Court. Moreover the Board was pending defendant the suit United States Dis- directing trict Court. enrollment decree, was directed students, the Board as well to Principal. every the school re- Each and was defendant quired to take notice of it.
Now we are asked, as issue was the to Chancellor, enjoin” an to “restrain D. J. comply
Jr., of the Clinton School, from ing with the order aforesaid Dis United States trict Court.
' We know no and none has been case, cited coun- enjoin sel, in which the courts of the en- this State forcement of a Federal District Court decree based that is upon express mandate of the Court of the general “It United States. is a well-established rule authority enjoin proceed- the state courts have ings p. 28 Federal courts.” Am.Jur., Section 400; Am.Jur., Section p.
In the instant case ac Federal Court first had jurisdiction subject quired parties matter and the controversy. admittedly being This true, jurisdiction “retains court its the exclusion supra, other Am.Jur., Courts.” See C.J.S., pp. Courts, sec. 809-811.
Contention next made that “The funds Segregated appropriated Schools cannot racially-mixed expended used schools.” The fore going solely upon hypothesis contention rests racially forbidding the laws this State schools mixed- full are in force and and it error for the Chan enjoin county refuse cellor to certain officials from maintaining public disbursing schools funds for Slate County, especially School. Anderson Clinton Segre- fallacy plain . of this -The insistence is that *6 gation now referred to are not Statutes full force having been declared unconstitutional same supra. Education, in Brown v. Board of complainants’ purpose invoke of Chancery enjoin jurisdiction named of complying High of from Clinton School .officials al- of the United District or in decree States enjoin from officials dis- ternative, to State and operation bursing appropriated of said funds completely satisfy the school. Either would method prayer of bill. segrega
Complainants conceding that our insist tion nevertheless 'State unconstitutional, laws now money lawfully spent support de for the of cannot be insist segregated If we should consider this schools. issue the writ as the re valid, and for, as ence closing of until would be Clinton School sult adopt policy Tennessee either could the system contrary .operating to the Su school its preme Education, Brown decision in v. Board present system public educa supra, or abandon unwilling decree which to enter a would We are tion. closing effect of School, undoubted Clinton County. possibly schools in Anderson other .and County, Anson N.C. v. S.E. In Constantian Supreme Carolina, Court of North ex 2d 163, pressing view, held a similar : plaintiff’s adopted, all contention were author-
“If plant (unissued) facilities, bonds ized as special supple- previously authorized tax. well throughout ments within units, administrative Applicable State, legal princi- would be invalidated. ples impel opposite conclusion. interpretation
“In the Constitution Supreme United States, the Court of the United States is the final arbiter. Its in the decision Brown case the law of the land and will remain so unless reversed fully Recognizing altered constitutional means. jurisdiction, its decision is authoritative in this any provision Constitution or statutes of North Carolina in conflict therewith invalid. must be deemed
“The Florida Court, in Board Public State, Instruction Fla., 75 So.2d and the Su- *7 preme Court of in Matlock Oklahoma, v. Board of 281 Commissioners, Old., P.2d similar 169, on but somewhat factual situations, variant have reached generally conclusions in accord with the decision of this Court.” Doby Brown,
See “Race Cir., 504, F.2d Reporter”, University Law Relations Vanderbilt Press, August, page 1, Vol. No. 4,
The authorities are conclusive issue present controversy. involved in the fore- For going upon reasons, authorities referred in to opinion, this we hold that the Chancellor was in correct refusing grant the writ of ftor bill. petition The to rehear denied. Burnett,
Tomlinson Justices, concur. concurs
Prewitt, Justice, results. participate, not did since he SwepstoN, Justice, presented to original petition was time absent at'the the Court. result).
Prewitt,
(concurring
Justice
denied
September
Nashville, this
at
On
power to over-
ground
that we
on the
had
the writs
United
the decision of
ride
Education
of Brown v. Board
States in
case
Topeka
74 S.Ct.
cases,
347 U.S.
and consolidated
petition
Following
denial
this
686,
hear, and the writer petition jority opinion. rehear should I think the petition overruling disposed by simply rehear September gave 1956, when for the same on reason we we denied the writs.