484 F.2d 22 | 5th Cir. | 1973
Lead Opinion
Plaintiffs are wholesalers who supply hosiery and toys to various retail outlets in the State of Georgia. They compete with defendants who sell a wide range of non-food items, including hosiery and toys, to some of the same retail outlets. Plaintiffs sought damages from defendants on a claim of violation of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a). The gist of the claim was that defendants obtained several of plaintiffs’ customers by promising these customers a special rebate on their purchases. Plaintiffs alleged that the rebate was discriminatory in that it was employed on a selective basis.
All parties moved for summary judgment. The district court gave judgment for the defendants. On the strength of depositions and affidavits, the court held that there was no geniune dispute over any material issue of fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) the contested transactions were not “consummated sales” and were not, therefore, covered by § 2(a), and (2) none of the contested transactions occurred in interstate commerce, as required by the Act. On plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, the court evaluated the claim in light of the panel opinion of this court in Little-john v. Shell Oil Company, 5 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 225, and held that although the requisite interstate involvement may have been present under the “underwriting” theory of that case, defendants were still entitled to summary judgment because the contested transactions were not “consummated sales”.
On appeal, plaintiffs assert error in the “consummated sales” holding. Meanwhile, this court has considered Littlejohn en banc and has rejected the underwriting theory as a method of meeting the jurisdictional requirement of the Act that at least one of the discriminatory sales be in interstate commerce. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Company, 5 Cir., 1973, 483 F.2d 1140 (En Banc).
With respect to the no “consummated sales” issue, it is undoubtedly true that there can be no violation of § 2(a) of the Act unless there is discrimination between purchasers and “[I]n order for there to be discrimination between purchasers, there must be actual sales at two different prices to two different actual buyers”. Jones v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 5 Cir., 1964, 334 F.2d 919 at 924. Cf. Aluminum Company of America v. Tandet, D.Conn.1964, 235 F. Supp. 111. Here there were actual sales by defendants to customers, including customers of plaintiffs, with a resultant loss of specified customers to plaintiffs. However, the rebate was never paid to the selected promisees and there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether it was ever to be paid. There is testimony that the promised rebate was conditioned on
Both in brief and on oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs conceded that the claimed discriminatory sales were made only in Georgia. They relied entirely on the underwriting theory of Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread, 1954, 348 U.S. 115, 75 S.Ct. 148, 99 L.Ed. 145, to establish subject matter jurisdiction. As stated, that theory will no longer suffice. There was thus no subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. See Littlejohn, supra, en banc decision. Summary judgment for defendants on this ground was a proper disposition. It was the basis of the first ruling of the district court which ruling was, as stated, withdrawn after the panel opinion in Littlejohn.
We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment for defendants.
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially):
I concur in Judge Bell’s opinion for the Court in this case solely because I am institutionally bound by the views of the majority of the en banc Court in Littlejohn, 5 Cir. 1973, 483 F.2d 1140. If free to do so, I would adhere to the “underwriting” theory of liability under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act,
. Based upon Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread, 1964, 348 U.S. 115, 75 S.Ct. 148, 99 L.Ed. 145.
. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 5 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 225.