Rowsey v. SwinsonRowsey v. Swinson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Porfilio, Kelly, Henry
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Plaintiff-Appellant Rodney Rowsey, a federal prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the district court‘s dismissal of his civil rights action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The district court dismissed Mr. Rowsey‘s complaint and action sua sponte pursuant to
Mr. Rowsey‘s factual allegations arise from an escape plot which was uncovered and investigated while Mr. Rowsey was incarcerated at a federal prison. In his complaint, Mr. Rowsey asserts he was wrongly targeted as an escape risk as a result of the investigation and was given no opportunity to clear his name or to refute the classification by any of the Defendants. Mr. Rowsey further alleges that the Defendants have improperly used the escape risk classification, which remains in his prison file, to harass him, transfer him to other correctional facilities far from his family and remove him from favorable job assignments.
Upon receipt of his complaint filed August 12, 1997, the district court granted Mr. Rowsey leave to proceed in forma pauperis and pay a partial filing fee of $25.00. Mr. Rowsey, however, paid the entire filing fee. Thereafter, the district court construed Mr. Rowsey‘s complaint as raising a due process claim and held that Mr. Rowsey‘s interest in his prison classification or placement is not a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Mr. Rowsey‘s complaint as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Mr. Rowsey first argues the district court exceeded its authority in dismissing his complaint under
Further, we do not believe the district court erred in construing Mr. Rowsey‘s complaint as alleging a due process claim and dismissing that claim. Because the district court held Mr. Rowsey‘s complaint was legally frivolous and failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we review the district court‘s decision under the more stringent de novo standard of review required to support the latter determination, see McGore, 114 F.3d at 604, and find no error. Mr. Rowsey has no legally protected liberty interest in a particular security or job classification, or in the location of his confinement. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983); Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cir.1986). Moreover, other than the “Operations Memorandum” to which Mr. Rowsey cites, which simply notifies Bureau of Prisons personnel of the impact of the Sellers decision, Mr. Rowsey cites to no regulation or statute which gives rise to a liberty interest under the circumstances he alleges. Accordingly, the district court correctly held Mr. Rowsey has not alleged a deprivation of a legally recognized liberty interest and thus has not adequately stated a due process claim.
Further, notwithstanding the liberal construction which we must give pro se complaints, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991), Mr. Rowsey‘s complaint cannot be read to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Rowsey does not attribute the defendants’ action or inaction to his membership in a suspect class; nor has he alleged that the distinction upon which the defendants relied was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir.1994).
We agree, however, that the district court should have construed Mr. Rowsey‘s complaint as alleging a claim under the Privacy Act. See
Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court‘s order of dismissal and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. In light of our disposition, we need not reach Mr. Rowsey‘s remaining arguments.