OPINION
Aрpellant, William Wayne Rowland, was charged with driving while intoxicated. Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, pursuant to an agreement, and was assessed 180 days in confinement, suspended for one year community supervision, and a fine of $300. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence claiming the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop him or arrest him for DWI. At the motion hearing, the Statе and appellant entered into an agreed stipulation of facts, and appellant submitted these to the court as the evidence. The court denied the appellant’s motion to suppress, and appellant entered his plea of nolo contendere.
DISCUSSION
A. Challenge to the Stipulation
In points of error one, two, three, and four, appellant complains that the stipulation is too conclusory to establish probable cause to justify his stop and arrest because it does not set out the specific facts underlying the officer’s conclusions. Accordingly, we address these points of error together.
Appellant drafted an “Agreed Stipulation for Motions to Suppress,” which was signed by the attorneys for the defendant and fоr the State. The stipulation stated in relation to the traffic stop:
A Probable Cause for the Stop Facts
Houston Police Officer Benaske, in a marked car, received a report that plain clothes Houston Police Officers B. Hall and L.B. Nicks wanted a marked unit to make а warrantless traffic stop of the Defendant because they concluded he committed two traffic offenses, i.e., running а red light at the intersection of Heights and Interstate — 10 service road and swerving lane to lane. As requested, Officer Benaskе, also concluding the Defendant was weaving and speeding, made the traffic stop of the Defendant in the east bound 1500 blоck of IH-10.
The stipulation in relation to the probable cause for the arrest states:
B. Probable Cause for the Arrest
Having stopped the Defendаnt, Officer Be-naske began a driving while intoxicated investigation. Based upon the Defendant’s demeanor, his failure of the fiеld sobriety tests and the odor of an alcoholic beverage, Officer Benaske arrested William Wayne Rowland without incident and thereafter transported him to the Houston Police Department for further DWI investigation, i.e., videotaping and for an intoxilyzer test request.
Appellant did not call the trial court’s attention to the stipulation’s purported defects that now form the basis of his argument on appeal. A defendant cannot agree to submit a case on stipulated evidence, prepare the stipulation, and submit it into evidence, and then attack it for the first time on appeal on thе grounds that the stipulation is too conclu-sory. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (the record must show the complaint was made to the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the basis for the complaint). The trial court was entitled to draw reasonable inferences and deductions from the stipulation.
Yorko v. State,
We overrule points of error one, two, three, and four.
B. Adequacy of Warning on Rеfusal to Provide a Br.eath Specimen
In point of error five, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in rеfusing to suppress the evidence of his refusal to take the breath test.- Appellant asserts that his refusal to submit to the breаth test is inadmissible, under article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, because he was not provided with a written copy of the statutory warnings prior to the request to submit to the breath test. ■
Appellant was taken tó the police station where he was asked to submit a specimen of his breath for testing. Appellant received the oral DWI statutory warning required undеr section 724.015 of the Texas Transportation Code, at which time he refused to submit to the test. Officer Sanders did not give appellant the statutory warnings in writing before requesting the specimen, rather the written warning was supplied after appellant had refused to submit to the breath test. Appellant, upon receiving the written warnings, signed the form stating his refusal.
Section 724.015 provides,
“Before
requesting a person tо submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer shall inform the person orally
and
in writing” of the statutory warnings provided under sectiоn 724.015, which include the consequences of refusing to submit to the breath test. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.015 (Vernon 1998) (emphasis added). The .purрose behind section 724.015 is “to ensure that a person who refuses to give a requested specimen does so with a full understаnding of .the consequences.”
Nebes v. State,
Therе is no evidence in the record that the failure to provide appellant with the written statutory warning prior to the requеst to submit a specimen impacted the appellant in an adverse manner.
Jessup v. State,
Since appellant has shown no causal connection bеtween his refusal and the fact that he was not given the written warnings before he refused the breath test, we hold that the trial cоurt did not err in refusing to grant the appellant’s motion to suppress.
We overrule point of error five.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. Section 2(b) of former article 67011-5 of the revised civil statutеs is the predecessor to section 724.015 of the Transportation Code. See Act of June 6, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 303, § 4, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1568, 1577, amended by Act of June 19, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 886, § 9, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3523, repealed by Act of May 23, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 165, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1025, 1819-22 (current version at Tex Transp. Code Ann. § 724.015 (Vernon 1998)).
. This case is distinguishable from
Janak
v.
State,