49 Tenn. 321 | Tenn. | 1871
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This' is an application to a court of equity for relief
The rule as laid down in Kearney v. Smith, 3 Yer., 139, may be regarded as fully established, by numerous subsequent recognitions of it in this State. The rule so established is, that “a party will not be aided by a Court of Chancery, after a trial at law, unless he can impeach the justice of the verdict, on grounds of which he could not have availed himself at law, or was prevented from doing it by fraud, or accident, or the act of the opposite party, unmixed with negligence or fraud on his part.”
It is manifest that the jurisdiction of a Chancery Court can never be successfully invoked until it is made clearly to appear that injustice has been done by the judgment in the court of law. Before a Court of Chancery will entertain an appeal to its remedial powers, in a case which has already been tried in a court of law, it must see that injustice has been done.
In the case before us, the complainant has shown clearly and distinctly, that the judgment which he seeks to enjoin was rendered on a note, on which he was never legally bound; that his name was affixed to it without his knowledge or authority, and that the act has never
But as clearly as the injustice of the judgment is made to appear, it is better that complainant should suffer the consequences, than that the fixed rules, which define the jurisdiction of courts of law and of equity, should be broken down. Hence it is incumbent on complainant, not only to show the injustice of the judgment at law, but also, that he was prevented from making his defense by fraud or accident, or act of the plaintiffs; and that he was chargeable with no negligence or fault on his part. In the case before us, it appears that complainant made no defense whatever. The summons was served on him some time in the fall of 1860, yet, down to the January Term, 1861, of the Court, he had taken no preparatory steps for his defense, though he avowed his determination to resist the suit, even at the hazard of sending his son to the penitentiary. It is obvious that, if he had engaged counsel in advance of the meeting of the Court, he could have avoided a judgment at the appearance term, though he might have been prevented by sickness from being in attendance. To determine whether his failure to employ counsel in advance was negligence or not, depends upon the facts and circumstances in proof.
It is shown that he dei’ived his first information as to the existence of the note, from the Sheriff, at the time the summons was served. He promptly repudiated the note, denied his liability, and declared he never would pay it. The Sheriff informed him that Ben. Layne said it was not complainant’s debt, and that he must not pester him about it; but that they (meaning the other makers of the
It is in proof, by witness, Reynolds, that Ben. Layne and Jones, one of the plaintiffs in the suit at law, were present, and saw young Rowland sign his father’s name to the note; and when he did so, saying his father had authorized him, witness looked him in the face, whereupon he turned off, when witness remarked to Ben. Layne that that signature was a forgery. Notwithstanding this significant remark by one who was well acquainted with complainant’s habit of never giving his note, or going security, no further inquiry was made, but the note was received by Jones. As Ben. Layne was a partner in the purchase of the mules, for which the note 'was given, it was to his interest that Jones should receive the note; and for that reason, we may presume, he made no objection to the fraud thus attempted to be perpetrated on complainant for his benefit. It further appears that Jones took the note, without requiring young Rowland to show his authority for using his father’s name.
These facts explain the motive which Ben. Layne had in sending the messages by the 'Sheriff to complainant.
"Without now inquiring whether this effort on the part of Ben. Layne to induce complainant to hold still, and take no" steps in the case, proceeded from a desire to relieve his mind from anxiety, or whether it was designed to throw him off his guard for a sinister purpose, we have no difficulty in seeing that an old and illiterate man, naturally oppressed by the necessity of subjecting his son to infamy, by fixing upon him the guilt of forgery, in making out his defense, would readily listen to the suggestions of Layne and the advice of the Sheriff, and postpone any preparation for his defense until it became absolutely essential. We are, therefore, satisfied that complainant was chargeable with no such negligence or fault, in failing to employ counsel before the appearance term of the court, as ought to repel him from a court of chan,-cery.
The question still remains, was he prevented by fraud or accident, or by the act of the opposite party, without negligence or fault on his part, from attending and making his defense at the appearance term of the court? The proof is entirely satisfactory, that when the court came on, and during its continuance, complainant was entirely unable, from severe bodily affliction, to attend the court
But was he guilty of negligence, in failing to employ some one to attend court and secure the services of counsel, in preventing a judgment by default? It was the appearance term, and nothing could be done beyond making up the pleadings. He had been assured by the Sheriff that there was no necessity for his being present; and he had every reason to believe that Ben. Layne would attend, and take the necessary steps to prevent a judgment by default. Layne had sent him word that the debt would be paid, and had instructed the Sheriff not to trouble complainant. Layne did employ counsel to plead for all the defendants. This was sufficient to secure to complainant an opportunity to make his defense at the next term. But, notwithstanding his knowledge that complainant’s name was forged to’ the note, and that he intended to rely upon that fact, he took advantage of complainant’s unavoidable absence, and consented to withdraw, not only his own plea, but that of complainant, and allowed the plaintiffs to take judgment. The plain
These facts not only relieve complainant of all charge of negligence, but they develop a fraudulent contrivance to defeat complainant’s defense, which fully justifies the interposition of a court of chancery. They show that the plaintiffs in the judgment are now seeking to avail themselves of an unconscientious advantage at law, which equity will either put out of the way or restrain them from using. White v. Cahal, 2 Swan, 550.
The judgment will be perpetually enjoined as to complainant. The defendants will pay the costs of this court, and of the court below.