44 Fla. 148 | Fla. | 1902
On the eighth day of July, 1901, an information was filed in the Criminal Court of Record for Escambia County by the County Solicitor against plaintiff in error, charging him with an assault upon one John Bell with a premeditated design to effect the latter’s death. The information alleges that- the assault was committed in Escambia county, Florida, on the fifth day of July, 1898, and it is further alleged that “the said Richard Rouse was then prosecuted for the above set forth offense by the making of aii affidavit by Geo. E. Smith, charging the said Rouse with the said offense on the sixth day of July, 1898, before Boykin Jones, who was then and there a justice of the peace in and for the second justice district of said county and State, and a warrant was then and there issued by the said justice of the peace for the arrest of the said Richard Rouse, and, said warrant was placed irn the hands of one Geo. E. Smith, sheriff of said county and State, who endeavored to and used all diligence to arrest and apprehend the said Richard Rouse, but was prevented from so doing because the said Richard Rouse concealed himself from the aforesaid time of the commission of the offense for the space of two years and ten months, and was for that space of time absent from the said State, wherefore,” &c.
A motion was made to quash the information on three grounds and denied by the court. The only ground of this motion insisted on here is the third, to the effect that the alleged assault having been committed more than two years before information was filed the prosecution was barre’ by the statute of limitations. The accused was arraigned, tried and convicted of the charge pre
Section 2357 Revised Statutes provides that “all offenses not punishable with death shall be prosecuted within two years after the same shall have been committed.” There are no exceptions to this statute on account of an accused concealing himself or absenting himself from the State after the commission of an offense, and if the information in this case can be sustained it must be on the ground alleged that the accused was prosecuted for the offense by the making of the affidavit bdfore the justice of the peace and the issuance of the warrant within the period of two years from the alleged commission of the crime. It is the rule in this State in reference to offenses to which the two years statute of limitations applies that if it appears from an indictment that the offense charged was committed more than two years before the indictment was found, it will be quashed on motion made for that purpose. Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 970; Nelson v. State, 17 Fla. 195; Anderson v. State, 20 Fla. 381. The cases in which this has been held do not show that there had been any preliminary proceedings for the offense before a committing magistrate within the period of two years from the date of the crime. In addition to the jurisdiction to try and determine certain misdemeanors justices of the peace are made committing magistrates with authority to issue warrants against persons charged on- oath with violating the criminal laws of the
It appears from the information before us that the offense was committed more than -three years before it was filed, and that after the warrant was issued by the justice no proceeding was had by information for at least three years. The information does not show that it was based upon the proceedings before the justice of the peace, or had any connection whatever with it, even if that would save it, which we do not now determine, and in our judgment the motion to quash should have been sustained instead of denied.
The judgment of the court is reversed with directions to sustain the motion to quash the information and discharge the accused thereunder. Ordered accordingly.
