ELIZABETH L. ROUSE, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION UAW NON-CONTRIBUTORY PLAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 01-1152
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Argued: June 19, 2002
Decided and Filed: August 13, 2002
2002 FED App. 0271P (6th Cir.) | 300 F.3d 711
Before: COLE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; MILLS, District Judge.
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 02a0271p.06
ARGUED: Francis R. Ortiz, DICKINSON, WRIGHT, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Camille Horne, PLUNKETT & COONEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Francis R. Ortiz, DICKINSON, WRIGHT, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Robert G. Kamenec, PLUNKETT & COONEY, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.
OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, District Judge. In 1995, Elizabeth Rouse successfully petitioned Michigan‘s Macomb County Circuit Court to retroactively modify her 1984 divorce settlement via a domestic relations оrder. The order gave Rouse survivorship-benefits in her deceased ex-husband‘s pension. It also impacted the DaimlerChrysler Corporation UAW Non-Contributory Plan‘s (“the Plan“) obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA“).
Thе Plan removed Rouse‘s case to federal court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. It contested the domestic relations order‘s validity, claiming that the state court issued it pursuant to a sham hearing. The district court, through Judge Denise Page Hood, held that this was an issue that should be decided by the state court. Thus, the district court dismissed the case so that the parties could refile it in state court.
Two years later, Rouse filed a Motion for Rule to Show Cause in an effort to require the Plan to pay her survivorship-benefits claim. The Plan again removed the case to federal court. This time the Plan argued that the domestic relations order was invalid under
Judge Borman also held that “comity and collegiality between coordinate courts,” as well as
For the following reasons, we REVERSE the district court‘s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Elizabeth Rouse was married to Chrysler Corporation employee Kenneth C. Rouse for approximately 27 years. The Rouses divorced on April 11, 1984, and entered into a property settlement before the Macomb County Circuit Court. The settlement agreement stated that:
the Defendant [Elizabeth Rouse] is awarded one-half оf any pension payment paid to the Plaintiff [Kenneth Rouse] by Chrysler Corporation prior to the Plaintiff attaining the age of sixty two (62) years. After Plaintiff has attained the age of sixty two (62) years, Defendant is awarded the sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE AND 62 ($233.62) DOLLARS per month of any pеnsion payments paid to the Plaintiff by Chrysler Corporation. In the event of Plaintiff‘s death, Defendant is awarded any survivors pension payments payable by Chrysler Corporation; however, Plaintiff shall not be obligated to provide for any such survivоrs payments.
When Kenneth Rouse died of cancer in April 1994, Mrs. Rouse sent a letter to the Chrysler-UAW Pension Board of Administration (“the Board“) asking it to provide her with
Since Mr. Rouse did not assign survivor benefits to Mrs. Rouse in the settlement agreеment, and the Plan did not automatically provide them, Chrysler informed Mrs. Rouse that she would need to get a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO“) to receive surviving-spouse benefits. Mrs. Rouse notified Chrysler that she intended to seek a QDRO and she sent the Bоard a proposed QDRO. Board member Ronald Gurdak approved the proposed QDRO as to its form, but would not approve its content. Mrs. Rouse then filed suit in county court in an effort to get a domestic relations order (“DRO“) that qualified undеr
Armed with the Macomb County Circuit Court‘s July 5, 1995, Order, Mrs. Rouse again requested the Board to approve her request for pension benefits. On September 22, 1995, the Board denied her request. It stated several reasons for the decision. Among them, the Board asserted that the state court‘s DRO did nоt qualify under
- The pension agreement between Chrysler and Mr. Rouse was not obligated to provide benefits to Plaintiff at his death;
- There was no indication of Mr. Rouse‘s intent to change division of property status at time of divorce;
The new decree was entered 11 years after divorce and 10 years after enactment of [the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, P.L. 98-397 ];- The Domestic Relations Order was submitted to the court after Mr. Rouse‘s death.
In 1996, Mrs. Rouse moved the district court for summary judgment, arguing that the Board did not have authority to disregard the state court‘s DRO. The Plan also moved for summary judgment, asserting that the 1984 divorce decree did not obligate Mr. Rouse to pay Mrs. Rouse survivor benefits and that the DRO was the invalid result of a sham state court рroceeding. Judge Hood denied both parties’ motions, holding that the propriety of the Plan‘s denial could not be assessed until the state court interpreted the divorce decree and the DRO. Judge Hood dismissed the case and it remained idle for two years until Mrs. Rouse filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause in state court to obtain survivor benefits.
Since Mrs. Rouse‘s benefit claim implicated
DISCUSSION
Three issues comprise this appeal: the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine; the application of Burford abstention (see Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)); and whether the Plan‘s Motion
A. Law-of-the-case Doctrine
We use an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a lower court‘s application of the law-of-the-case doctrine. See Pac. Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Sav-a-Lot of Winchester, 291 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 132 F.3d 1147, 1150 (6th Cir. 1998)). Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, findings made at one point in the litigation become the law of the case for subsequent stages of that same litigation. See United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421 (6th Cir. 1994). The doctrine also bars challenges to a decision made at a previous stage of the litigation which could have been challenged in a prior appeal, but were not. See United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846, 849-50 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Plan asserts that the district court improperly аpplied the law-of-the-case doctrine to prevent consideration of the DRO‘s validity under
B. Abstention
This Court reviews abstention decisions de novo. See Heitmanis v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Litteral v. Bach, 869 F.2d 297, 298 (6th Cir. 1989)). Since abstention is an “extraordinary and narrow еxception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it,” “[o]nly the clearest of justifications” will warrant abstention. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-19, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 1244-47, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976).
The district court apparently dismissed this case pursuant to the Burford abstention doctrine.2 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Burford abstention is used to avoid conflict with a state‘s administration of its own affairs. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989). It applies only if a federal court‘s decision on a state law issue is likely to “interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies.” Id. The Burford abstentiоn should not be applied unless: (1) a case presents “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at
The Burford abstention doctrine is inapplicable here for several reasons. First, there is no state administrative agency involved in the dispute. Second, there is no difficult question of state law whose importance transcends the result of this case, or any basis for concluding that federal review of this matter would be disruptive of Michigan‘s domestic relations policies. The question before the district court was whether the DRO satisfied
Moreover, the Supreme Court hаs stated that when the status of a domestic relationship has been determined as a matter of state law—upon the entry of a divorce, settlement agreement, etc.—and has no bearing on the underlying claim, “we have no difficulty concluding that Burford abstention is inappropriate.” See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705-06, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2215-16, 119 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1992). The status of Mrs. Rouse‘s domestic relationship with her ex-husband had already been determined when she obtained the DRO in state court. Because the Plan‘s claim in its Motion for Entry of Judgment contests only the validity of the DRO under
Finally, Mrs. Rouse contends that the Plan‘s Motion for Entry of Judgment is an impermissible collateral attack on Judge Hood‘s 1998 Order and Opinion. The record does not support this contention.
When Judge Hood dismissed Mrs. Rouse‘s and the Plan‘s cross-motions for summary judgment in 1998, she did so to allow the state court the oppоrtunity to determine whether or not the DRO was issued pursuant to a sham hearing. Her Order and Opinion did not address whether the DRO was valid under
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED. The case is REMANDED for further consideration consistent with this opinion.