187 Ga. 636 | Ga. | 1939
On August 14, 1933, Cecil Rourke suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Merchants Bakery, as a result of which his right hand was amputated three and a half inches above his wrist. Within fourteen days after the accident he entered into an agreement with the insurance carrier granting him compensation for the loss of a hand, as provided in the Code, § 114-406 (1), and also for the partial loss of his arm, in accordance with § 114-406 (r). This agreement was duly filed with and approved by the Industrial Board. More than twenty-six weeks thereafter, the claimant applied to the insurance carrier and the Industrial Board for a lump-sum settlement of the award; and after approval of the Industrial Board the insurance carrier paid to the claimant an amount “equal [to] the total sum of the probable future payments reduced to their present value upon the basis of interest calculated at five per centum per annum.” Code, § 114-417. The claimant executed a full and complete release. On March 26, 1938, the claimant, through his attorney, requested a hearing by the Industrial Board to determine the legality of the award and the settlement thus made. The hearing was granted, and the award and settlement were upheld. The judge of the superior court affirmed the rulings of the Industrial Board, and the claimant excepted.
On the merits of the amount of the award, counsel for the claimant contends that compensation should have been awarded as for the loss of an arm, that is, 50 per cent, of claimant’s weekly wage for 200 weeks, instead of for the loss of a hand and partial loss of the arm, as was done. The administration of the workmen’s compensation act is vested in an administrative board. Gravitt v. Georgia Casualty Co., 158 Ga. 613 (2) (123 S. E. 897). It is expressly empowered to hear and determine claims arising under the provisions of the act, and, as between the parties, its award has the
The ruling here made is not in conflict with Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530 (182 S. E. 906), where it was ruled: “The Department of Industrial Delations is without jurisdiction to approve an agreement for a lump-sum settlement of an award of compensation which does not conform to the terms of the workmen’s compensation act.” There the parties disregarded and attempted to set aside the provisions of the act in reference to the making of lump-sum settlements, which this court ruled could not be done, even though approved by the Industrial Board. There is certainly a wide difference between an original award of compensation, based upon an agreement between the parties, which may be merely erroneous, and an award of a lump-sum in settlement of an award already made, based upon an agreement between the parties, in a less amount than authorized by the plain terms of the act. The Tillman case does not require, nor does it authorize, a ruling that an original award of the Industrial Board, which is erroneous as to amount, may be set aside at any time by the claimant.
Under a proper construction of the workmen’s compensation act, a minor employee eighteen years of age or over, not mentally incompetent or physically incapable of earning, in whose favor an award of compensation has been made under that act, may, subject to the approval of the Industrial Board, enter into an agreement with his employer or insurance carrier for a lump-sum settlement of such award, where the weekly payments under such award have been made for not less than 26 weeks. Code, §§ 114-417, 114-420 In this respect such minors are placed upon the same basis as adults, and an agreement and settlement so made is binding and conclusive on a minor as to all of his rights under the award. In fact, it appears from the provisions of the act that all minors falling within the above description are vested with all the legal attributes of adults, in reference to any and all rights and remedies accruing to them
It is urged that these provisions of the act violate art. 1, sec. 1, par. 2, of the constitution (Code, § 2-102), which provides that “Protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government, and shall be impartial and complete,” and art. 1, sec. 1, par. 3 (§ 2-103), which provides that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.” We see no merit in this position. The right of the legislature to make reasonable classifications of persons and things for' the purpose of legislation is clearly recognized by all authorities. The mere fact that legislation is based on a classification, and is made to apply to certain persons and not to others, does not affect its validity, if it be so made that all persons subject to its terms are treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. As we have pointed out, these provisions operate uniformly upon all minors who are employed under such circumstances as to come under the workmen’s compensation act, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who are not mentally incompetent or physically incapable of earning a livelihood. The fact that they do not apply to all minors, that is, all persons below the age of twenty-one years, in no way affects the validity of the statute under the above provisions of the constitution. Georgia Southern & Fla. Ry. Co. v. Adkins, 156 Ga. 826 (120 S. E. 610); Baugh v. LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80 (2a) (130 S. E. 69).
On the appeal to the superior court the Industrial Board certified as part of the record the attending physician’s report, the employer’s report, the agreement as to the payment of compensation, the department’s approval of the agreement, and all other papers on file in the department in reference to the claimant’s case. It is contended by counsel for the claimant that this was erroneous, since none of these papers were physically in the presence of the director or introduced in evidence at the hearing. The Code, § 114-710, specifically provides that where an appeal is made from a judgment of the Industrial Board, it “shall . . cause certified copies of all documents and papers then on file in their office in the matter, and a transcript of all testimony taken therein, to be transmitted with their findings and order or decree to the clerk of the
Judgment affirmed.