241 Pa. 261 | Pa. | 1913
Opinion by
This is an appeal from an order approving a bond tendered by the defendant city in a proceeding to appropriate a piece of land belonging to the plaintiff. The assignments of error raise three principal questions which we shall dispose of in order.
The appellant contends that a city of the third class has no right to appropriate the property of a citizen for park purposés “by a joint resolution of councils” passed in the ordinary way, but that such action must be by an ordinance or by what is tantamount thereto — a resolution passed with all the formalities of an ordinance. Section 7 of Article 6, of the Act of May 23, 1889, P. L. 277, for the government of cities of the third class, provides that “every legislative act of councils shall be by resolution or ordinance.” Section 1 of the Act of June 26, 1895, P. L. 349, provides: “That it shall be lawful for and the right is hereby conferred upon the cities of this Commonwealth to......appropriate private properly for the purposes of making public parks...... whenever the councils thereof shall by ordinance or joint resolution, determine thereon.” This latter act was amended in (May 11) 1901 (P. L. 187), in (April 25) 1903 (P. L. 316), and in (May 6) 1909 (P. L. 459);
The appellant’s next contention is that there was no bona fide effort made by the municipality to affect a satisfactory adjustment with the owner before the bond was tendered. Section 2 of the Act of June 8, 1895, P. L. 188, provides that if the compensation “cannot be agreed upon” it shall be lawful for a city to tender its bonds, and if the claimant refuses to accept the security thus tendered the bond shall be submitted to the Court of Common Pleas for approval. The court below finds that the mayor of the city informed the claimant that he was instructed to offer him $1500 for his lot, that this offer was declined, and that the claimant admitted that he had “at all times refused to accept $1500 or any other sum”; and upon these findings the court states the conclusion of fact “that the city could not agree with the owner upon his compensation or damages.” We cannot say that the court below erred in this conclusion; and since it does not appear that the sum tendered was unreasonable or out of proportion to the value of the land appropriated, the fact that the ordinance directing the mayor to emparl with the claimant limited the amount he was authorized to offer to $1500, would not invalidate or affect the bona fides of the negotiations.
Finally, the appellant contends that the absence of a prior appropriation of money to pay for the lands taken
The assignments of error are all overruled and the order of the court below is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.