Plaintiffs filed complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to issue a building permit in relation to the establishment of a trailer coach park on land in section 20 of said township. Defendants answered and pleaded as an affirmative defense that the zoning designation applicable to the land involved is a reasonable exercise of the police power and is constitutional. (Such designation was the basis for the denial of the build *273 ing permit.) At the conclusion of trial and after viewing the premises, the trial judge denied the writ and plaintiffs appeal.
The township adopted a zoning ordinance, designated as Waterford Township Zoning Ordinance, 1 effective in 1963, under which the land now owned by plaintiffs was zoned R-1A (single family residence). Plaintiffs purchased this land on land contract February 3, 1965, knowing it was zoned single family residential. Until shortly before trial of the present action, Albert Rottman had owned a trailer coach park elsewhere in the township. This park existed as a nonconforming use, and when Rottman could not obtain rezoning for it in order to enlarge it, he began looking for a new location and located the land here involved.
Plaintiffs made application to rezone the land from R-1A to R-4 (trailer coach park) prior to purchasing it, hut it was some time after date of purchase when this application was denied. Thereafter and on August 4, 1965, plaintiffs filed application with defendant Lawson for a permit to construct an office and laundry building on the land for use in a trailer coach park. This application was denied the same day with a notation “wrong zone for this use”, and the present action followed.
The first question raised on appeal is:
“May a judicial determination as to the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance be based, in part, on the opinion of a planning consultant who aided the township in the preparation and adoption of such ordinance?”
It arises from the fact that one Brandon M. Rogers, who testified as to the reasonableness of the ordinance, is the planning consultant who aided the
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township in drafting the ordinance. Plaintiffs contend his testimony as to reasonableness is so patently prejudicial as to be inadmissible. We decline to pass on the merits of this contention for the reason no such objection was made to this testimony below. The only objection by plaintiffs at trial to the requested testimony of Rogers as to reasonableness was that it called for a conclusion. On such a record, the question is not before us.
Pfeiffer
v.
Haines
(1948),
Plaintiffs contend that the zoning ordinance amounts to a prohibition upon the use of land within the township for a trailer park and is therefore unlawful as an attempt to ban a legitimate business. They further contend that this vice in the ordinance is not overcome by provisions for rezoning so that land presently zoned for other purposes might be zoned in the future for trailer park use.
While it is true that there is no vacant land presently zoned for trailer park use, we are not confronted with a situation in which, by means of zoning, there has been a total prohibition on the use of land for trailer parks within the township. There is presently land in the township which is zoned for trailer park use on the zoning district map and which is actually being used as a trailer park.
The amount of land within a municipal unit, and the particular areas therein, which may be used for trailer parks, may be limited by a reasonable zoning ordinance which bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
June
v.
City of Lincoln Park
(1960),
The party attacking the zoning ordinance has the burden of establishing its invalidity.
Paka Corporation
v.
City of Jackson
(1961),
The next question raised by plaintiffs is:
“May a township zoning ordinance he based upon future growth as anticipated by township officials and consultants?”
If the facts before us supported a finding that the only basis for the R-1A classification of plaintiffs’ land was future growth of the area as anticipated by township officials,
Gust, supra,
would require a negative answer. The facts indicate plaintiffs’ property is in a rural residential area with considerable residential development and we believe the holding
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in
Bzovi
v.
City of Livonia
(1957),
Finally, plaintiffs contend the Er-1A classification is unreasonable under surrounding circumstances and is an invasion of their property rights as guaranteed by US Const, Am 14, and Const 1963, art 1, § 17. After hearing the testimony and viewing the area, the trial court found from the location and character of plaintiffs’ property and the character of surrounding property that the classification was reasonable. In addition to the weight we give such a finding
(Hudson
v.
Buena Vista Township
[1967],
We note that this is a mandamus proceeding to compel the township to issue a permit for the use of particular land belonging to plaintiffs as a trailer park. To prevail, plaintiffs must show that they have a clear legal right to establish a trailer park on the land in question. It is not enough to show that the township has been miserly in the allocation of land to trailer park use. The plaintiffs must show a clear legal duty on the part of the defendant township to issue a permit for a trailer park on the land in question.
Double I Development Company
v.
Township of Taylor
(1964),
Affirmed with costs to defendants.