2005 Ohio 6269 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
{¶ 2} Appellant and defendant-appellee, Thomas M. Rotte, were married in July 1989 and had one child, Kristina, born October 1990. The parties separated in August 2003 but continued to share parenting time with Kristina on an alternating-week basis. Appellee remained in the marital home and appellant shared an apartment with a friend. Appellant filed a complaint for divorce in November 2003 and a final contested hearing was held on July 13, 2004.
{¶ 3} At the time of the final hearing, the parties had each submitted a shared parenting plan regarding their daughter; both providing for equal parenting time with their daughter on an alternating-week basis. The issue of child support remained contested. The parties had also reached a written agreement on division of much of the personal property, and stipulated that the marital real estate would be sold, that appellee would retain his 1997 Pontiac Grand Prix and that appellant would retain her 1988 Toyota Corolla.
{¶ 4} The trial court heard testimony on the remaining property and debts of the parties, as well as testimony relating to parenting, child support and spousal support. Testimony was taken from both appellant and appellee, as well as appellee's father. Appellant's testimony at the hearing revealed that the parties had accumulated multiple outstanding debts, which the trial court totaled at $42,542.70.
{¶ 5} Appellant's testimony also revealed that she had worked very little in the past few years, which appellant attributed to the need to care for an ill daughter not of the marriage at issue. At the time of the hearing, appellant was earning $13 per hour and was working approximately 10-15 hours per week. Appellee was working full time and was earning approximately $17.99 per hour.
{¶ 6} The court found that appellant was voluntarily under-employed, and therefore imputed an annual income of $27,040 based on her current pay rate at a full-time basis. Based on this imputed income, and after consideration of the statutory factors, the court found that spousal support was not warranted.
{¶ 7} The court calculated child support in accordance with the guidelines twice, once using appellant as the residential parent, and once using appellee as the residential parent. The court found that under a blended version of the parties' proposed parenting plans, the parties would be sharing an equal amount of time with their daughter and would both need to maintain suitable housing. The court therefore held that neither of the guideline calculations would be in the best interests of the child and therefore modified the guideline support. The court ordered appellee to pay appellant $81.18 per month in child support, representing the difference between the original guideline calculations.
{¶ 8} The trial court entered its judgment entry and decree of divorce on September 9, 2004 and appellant appealed, raising three assignments of error:
{¶ 9} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 10} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT AN AWARD OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO WIFE WAS NOT WARRANTED."
{¶ 11} Appellant argues that the court was in error in determining that she was "voluntarily under-employed" and in using an imputed income to determine the issue of spousal support. In support of her argument, appellant notes that she and appellee were married for 15 years, that she had worked primarily on a part-time basis during the marriage, was employed on a part-time basis at the time of the divorce, and did not work for much of the past few years due to an ill daughter. She further argues that appellee was employed throughout the marriage, earning approximately $37,000 or more at the time of the divorce.
{¶ 12} A trial court has broad discretion in determining spousal support, and on appeal, a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in its order. See Blakemorev. Blakemore (1983),
{¶ 13} R.C.
{¶ 14} Whether a party is "voluntarily unemployed or under-employed" is a factual determination to be made by the trial court based on the circumstances of each particular case. Rock v. Cabral (1993),
{¶ 15} In the case sub judice, testimony revealed that appellant was working only 10-15 hours per week at a rate of $13 per hour. The court's decision and order listed the factors to be considered under R.C.
{¶ 16} The court also found that no evidence was presented to indicate that either party contributed to the education or training of the other, and that no evidence indicated that either party needed additional education or training in order to become employed on a full-time basis. Based on these findings, the court held that spousal support was not warranted. We find that the court properly considered the factors articulated in R.C.
{¶ 17} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 18} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT TO BE PAID BY THE PARTIES AND IN DECIDING OTHER SUPPORT RELATED ISSUES."
{¶ 19} Appellant raises three issues under this assignment of error, again asserting that the court improperly imputed income, that the court improperly deviated from the child support calculation worksheet, and that the court improperly awarded the tax exemption to appellee. As stated above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to appellant or in calculating the amount imputed and therefore appellant's first issue under this assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} As to the calculation of child support, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in deviating from the guideline calculations, and in failing to make the required findings to make such a deviation. We again note that a trial court has wide discretion regarding child support obligations, and, absent an abuse of that discretion, the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed. See, Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142,144.
{¶ 21} R.C.
{¶ 22} However, the overriding concern in the calculation of child support is the best interests of the child. Id. at 141. Where the court determines that the calculated amount would be unjust, inappropriate, and not in the best interests of the child, the court may deviate from the worksheet calculation. R.C.
{¶ 23} R.C.
{¶ 24} In the case sub judice, the record includes two worksheets used by the trial court in calculating child support. The court calculated child support, pursuant to the worksheet in R.C.
{¶ 25} Upon review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's child support order deviating from the guideline calculation. Appellant points to a decision from our court in which we remanded a case for failure to include the deviation calculation on line 24 of the child support worksheet, Macke v. Macke, Clermont App. No. CA2003-08-070, 2004-Ohio-2074, and argues that the trial court's failure to include its determination and calculation on line 24 in this case warrants similar action. Macke involved a similar fact situation in which the court created multiple child support worksheets, determined that the guideline calculations would be unjust, and granted a downward deviation on the father's obligation based on the fact that the parents would be spending equal time with the child.
{¶ 26} However, upon review of the statutes regarding calculation of child support, it is apparent that a trial judge will satisfy her statutory obligations where she includes "in the journal," the amount of child support calculated according to the worksheet through the line establishing the actual annual obligation, Line 23, a determination that the amount would be unjust and not in the best interest of the child, and findings of fact in support of that determination. R.C.
{¶ 27} In the case sub judice, the trial court properly calculated child support according to the worksheet in R.C.
{¶ 28} As stated above, the abuse of discretion standard implies that a court's determination is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. SeeBlakemore,
{¶ 29} Further, we find no abuse of discretion in the award of the tax exemption to appellee. R.C.
{¶ 30} The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court considered R.C.
{¶ 31} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 32} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTING THE PARTIES' MARITAL ASSETS AND DEBTS PURSUANT TO R.C. 3105.171."
{¶ 33} Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the marital and separate debts of the parties, in ignoring the interest to be added to the debts assigned to appellant, and in dividing the debt unequally and inequitably. Again, a trial court has broad discretion in the allocation of marital assets and its findings will not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion. See Cherry,
{¶ 34} At the hearing, the parties identified multiple outstanding debts, including: a PNC Visa with a balance of approximately $6,300; a Beneficial Financial loan with a balance of approximately $1,500; a Citi Financial loan, with a balance of approximately $6,500; a personal loan from appellant's parents in the amount of $25,000, evidenced by a promissory note; a personal loan from appellee's parents in the amount of $5,660; and a personal loan from appellee's sister in the amount of $3,000.
{¶ 35} Appellant also claimed a personal loan from her parents in the amount of $10,000 to be a marital debt, though appellee denied any knowledge of the loan and appellant could not identify what the money had been used for. The trial court found that the $25,000 loan from appellant's parents was a marital debt, and assigned repayment to appellant, "as an offset against other marital debts [appellee] [was] to retain." The court further found that if there was an additional outstanding loan of $10,000, it was the separate, nonmarital debt of appellant.
{¶ 36} The court continued to divide the marital assets and debts, resulting in appellant being assigned $26,423.17 in debts, and appellee being assigned $16,119.53 in debts. Finding that the distributing of debt was unequal, the court further held that appellee would pay appellant an amount of $5,151.82 in order to more evenly balance the distribution of debt.
{¶ 37} The trial court's decision and order reveals that the court carefully considered the distribution of the multiple debts of the parties, and divided them accordingly. In finding the debts were divided unequally, the court ordered an equalization payment. We find no abuse of discretion in the fact that the trial court did not take into account the interest that appellant would be paying on the loan from her parents, as the court equally did not attribute interest to the debts of appellee. Finding no abuse of discretion in the decision of the trial court, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 38} Judgment affirmed.
Powell, P.J., and Young, J., concur.
