18 Minn. 361 | Minn. | 1872
By the Court.
The defendant upon supplementary proceedings was required to turn over to a receiver, a .certain silver watch and chain, his property and in his possession. He claims that it was exempt from execution under Gen. Stat. ch. 66, sec. 279.
We do not think that this is so.
Giving him the benefit of the statement in his brief as to what appeared upon his examination, (although it is not before us on this appeal) it is “ that defendant had a silver watch worth $40 or $50, which he wore as part of his apparel, and used to keep the time at his house and of the workmen whom he employed in his business of making cigars.” This last statement, however, must be taken in connection with the statement in his affidavit, (which is before us,) on the motion in the court below to vacate said order; “ that he is a cigar maker by trade, and has been accustomed to employ workmen, and expects to do so again, and that said watch is necessary to keep time of his workmen, and regulate his duties.” It is further stated that he is a householder and has a family dependent on him for support, and' has no clock or other watch or timekeeper.
The statute in question exempts (sub; 5.) “all wearing apparel of the debtor and his family.” It is contended that a watch worn by a debtor is wearing apparel. It would not be urged, however, that a watch which a debtor had never worn, but, which, for instance, as in one of the New York cases cited
The statute also exempts, in addition to certain specified articles, “ all other household furniture not herein enumerated, not exceeding five hundred dollars in value.” fIt is contended that as the defendant has no other timepiece, this may be considered as household furniture. A watch, worn by the debtor upon his person, can, however, be no more said to be household furniture, than one which is hung up in the house, for use therein, can be said'to be a part'of his wearing apparel.
The statute also exempts the tools or instruments of any mechanic, or other person, used and kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade. It is said that this watch and chain are instruments of the debtor for carrying on his trade. He is a cigar maker, a trade which necessarily involves the employment of no one besides himself, and the case discloses nothing, and we know of nothing connected with the successful making of cigars, which any more requires the use of a watch than in any other of the ordinary trades, e. g., making shoes. But if
It is said that exemption laws are to' be liberally construed, as just and humane provisions against rapacity and cruel exactions of creditors.
Courts are not, however, in any case, for whatever object, to strain the law beyond its fair and just meaning; still less (as defendant intimates has been done in other states) refuse, under whatever pretext, to lend their aid to a demand which the law justifies the creditor in making. This would be especially inexcusable in this state, in which the law, upon any fair construction, places debtors beyond the reach of the rapacity or cruelty of judgment creditors, not only with regard to the necessaries, but the reasonable comforts and many of the conveniences of life; and no good reason can be given, why such conveniences or luxuries (whether such a watch and
We do not see how (as is suggested by the appellant) there should be a sense of personal degradation and shame imposed upon the debtor by such an order as this, that most creditors would shrink from inflicting ; though a debtor who is provided with what is exempt by law, might well feel a sense of shame that his unwillingness to apply such exceptional articles of ■property as these in payment of his debts, should have rendered such an order necessary.
The present defendant, for aught that appears, may have all that the law allows, except a clock. Considering the trifling-cost of one which would answer every purpose for which he now uses this watch, it would seem that an honest man would rather prefer, under such circumstances, that this_ watch and chain should go in payment of a just debt.
The order appealed from is affirmed.