18 Conn. L. Rptr. 690 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1997
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to `contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'" NovametrixMedical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc.,
It is true, as is alleged by the defendant, that General Statutes §
The defendant has pointed to no authority for the proposition CT Page 888 that the obtaining of a release to sue from CHRO is an element which must be recited in the complaint. Absent such a requirement, the first count, although admittedly a bare bones rendition of the elements of her claim, sets forth a claim of retaliatory discharge on which relief may be granted as a matter of law. The motion to strike as to this count is therefore denied.
The second count is grounded in General Statutes §
No employer shall discharge, discipline or otherwise penalize any employee because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports, verbally or in writing, a violation of any state or federal law or regulation or any municipal ordinance or regulation to a public body or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.
The defendant contends that by failing to allege any specific statutory or regulatory violation, or the fact that she had made a report of any kind to a public body or that she had been asked by such a body to participate in an investigation, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may been granted. It also claims that this count must be stricken because of the failure to allege that all administrative remedies have been exhausted, and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
These same claimed deficiencies were a subject of the defendant's earlier requests to revise. The plaintiff objected to this request, again contending that these issues were matters of special defense under Practice Book § 164. The court, Licari, J., sustained the plaintiff's objection. Like the first count, the second count is a spare, bare bones outline of a cause of action. It does, however, state a claim upon which relief may be granted as a matter of law. Should the facts elicited in later discovery establish that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to this and/or the first count, the defendant will be free to move for summary judgment or, to the extent that the deficiencies implicate subject matter jurisdiction, to move to dismiss. Given the present state of the pleadings, however, the motion to strike the second count is also denied.
The third count, however, fails to state a claim upon which CT Page 889 relief may be granted. It incorporates the first two paragraphs of the preceding two counts, namely that the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for approximately ten years and that on August 23, 1995, she was discharged. The claim that the discharge constitutes a "violation of the public policy of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the employment relationship" fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To the extent the "public policy" sought to be vindicated is embodied either in General Statutes §
In summary, the motion to strike is denied as to counts one and two, but granted as to count three.
Silbert, J.