Lоuis Roth, the appellant, purchased an undivided ono-fourth interest in a patent known as the “Eclipse Folding Wagon Step,” аnd agreed to pay $1,500 therefor. He paid $1,000 in cash, and executed his note to C. P. Thornton, his vendor, for $500 in payment of the balance. In due course of trade, for a valuable consideration, without notice and before maturity, the Merchants’ & Plantеrs’ Bank, of Pine Bluff, became the owner of this note. At maturity the maker, Louis Roth, refused to pay the note, and in a suit brought in the Columbia сircuit court against him and C. P. Thornton, as indorser, he filed an answer, and, .after admitting the execution of the note to O. P. Thornton and trаnsfer of same to plaintiff, Merchants’ & Planters’ Bank, pleaded “for a complete defense against the note, * * * that it was given by him to his co-defendant for an interest in a patent right, and was not on a printed form, and did not show on its face that it was exеcuted in payment of such patent right, as required by sections 493, 494, Sand. & H. Dig., and the said note is therefore void;” and the court, sitting as a jury, found that issue in favor of the defendant, and rendered judgment accordingly.
Suit was then brought in the Jefferson circuit court on accоunt for the balance of the purchase money by the bank, and, as the account’ was not assignable by statute, C. P. Thornton, the assignor, was joined as plaintiff. To this suit the appellant, Louis Roth, pleaded the judgment of the Columbia circuit court declaring thе note void, as a bar to the right of appellees to recover upon the original consideration.” The circuit court held that the plaintiffs in the latter suit were entitled to recover, and rendered judgment in their favor for the amount sued for, and thе defendant appealed.
Section 493, Sand. & H. Dig., upon which the appellant’s defense to the action against him in the Columbia circuit сourt was based, is as follows: “Any vendor of any patent machine, implement, substance, or instrument of any kind or character whаtsoever, when the said vendor of the same effects the sale of the same to any citizen of this state on a credit, аnd takes any character of negotiable instrument, in payment of the same, the said negotiable instrument shall be executеd in printed form, and show upon its face that it was executed in consideration of a patented machine, implement, substance, or instrument, as the case may be, and no person shall be considered an innocent holder of the same,-though hе may have given value for the same before maturity, and the maker thereof may make defense to the collectiоn of the same in the hands of any holder of said negotiable instrument, and all such notes not showing on their face for what they werе given shall be absolutely void.”
The object of this statute was to save a vendee of “any patent machine, implement, substance, or instrument of any kind or character whatsoever,” all the defenses he may have to an action on his note for the purchase money, and to prevent the loss thereof by a transfer of the note to an innocent holder before maturity. The failure to comply with the statute does not affect the validity of the sale, but renders only the note absolutely void. Thе penalty does not reach beyond the object to be accomplished. Though the note may be void, the vendor can recover whatever may be due him on the contract of sale from the vendee. Tillman v. Thatcher,
The defense of appellant to the action instituted in the Columbia circuit court was in the nature of a plea of abatement. It did not reach the merits of the case, but the validity of the note only. The only thing adjudicated by the judgment of that court was the validity of the nоte sued on. This judgment was no bar to an action upon the contract of sale.-
The effect of a judgment upon causes of action is unlike its effect upon defenses. The defendant in an action is required to set up all his defenses to the samе. “A valid judgment for the plaintiff sweeps away every defense that should have been raised against the action; and this, too, fоr the purpose of every subsequent suit, whether founded on the same or a different cause.” Ellis v. Clarke,
As to causes of actions, the rule is stated by the supreme court of the United States in Russell v. Place,
In Shaver v. Sharp County,
The sаme rule obtains as to cross-claims, set-offs and recoupments. The defendant in an action against him is not bound to set up such claims, if he has them, but it is generally optional with him to do so or not. McWhorter v. Andrews,
The judgment of the Jefferson circuit court is affirmed.