| U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | Nov 15, 1890

Wallace, J.

The question in this case is whether the libelants or Prince, who is administrator of the estate of the former owner of the vessel, is entitled to the sum of $888.20, deposited in the registry of the district court, arising from a condemnation and sale of the vessel, under a decree in rem at the suit of one Taggert for seamen’s wages. In 1859, the libelants filed a libel against the vessel to recover the amount of a bottomry bond, which set forth the bond, and th&t it was duly executed by the master of the brig at Pernambuco. A monition was duly issued and published, and the vessel was attached; and, upon the return-day of the process, the owner of the vessel did not appear, and his default was duly entered in the minute-book by the clerk of the district court. Within a few days subsequently, the vessel was sold under the decree in the suit by Taggert, and December 31, 1859, the proceeds of the sale were deposited in the registry. The balance, after payment of Taggert’s claim, remained in the registry, and is the money now in controversy. The owner of the vessel died 13 years ago, and in January, 1889, Prince, *96who had been appointed administrator of his estate, filed a petition in the district court for an order that the proceeds be paid to him. Whether the proceeds belonged to the libelants or not, it is very clear that Prince is not entitled to them. The default of the owner of the vessel to appear at the return-day of the monition was equivalent to a formal admission on his part of the truth of the matters alleged in the libel, and consequently of a lien by the libelants at that time upon the vessel, which lien of course attached to the proceeds of her sale. See Miller v. U. 8., 11 Wall. 268" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1871-04-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/miller-v-united-states-88325?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="88325">11 Wall. 268, 301. That default has never been vacated, and the amount of the lien of the libelants, which is the amount of the bottomry bond, is far in excess of the proceeds in dispute.

After the administrator petitioned that these proceeds be paid over to him, the proctors for the libelants applied for a decree condemning them. This was, in effect, an application by them to have the proceeds paid over to them. The court made an order allowing the administrator to contest the libelants’ rights to the proceeds. For the libelants the execution of the bottomry bond by the master of the ship at Pernambuco, in the presence of the United States consul, and at the same time an assignment of the bond to Pickeragili & Co., of New York, for collection, were proved, and also that within about a month thereafter the owner of the vessel wrote to Pickeragili & Co. denying that the master had any authority to execute a bottomry bond “for so large an amount.” This letter is an admission that the master was justified in executing a bot-tomry bond. When the execution of the bottomry bond was proved, the onus was cast upon the administrator to show that it was for a larger sum than was required by the necessities of the vessel. No evidence was offered by the administrator for this purpose. As between the two rival claimants for the proceeds it is entirety plain that the title to them is in the libelants.

The evidence taken upon the hearing shows that all but one of the libelants are dead, and the only survivor is one Patchett; and that he has not been heard of in two or three years, and when last heard from was a very old man, and “a floater, very much of a floater,” somewhere in Brazil. The proctors who filed the libel are assuming to act upon their original authority, conferred 30 years ago, in applying for the proceeds. Under these circumstances, the proceeds should not be paid over without a further application, by which it may be made to appear that there is some person in existence who is legally entitled to them. A decree will be entered dismissing the petition of the administrator, and refusing the application of the libelants for a final decree, with leave to renew it upon further proof.

© 2024 Midpage AI does not provide legal advice. By using midpage, you consent to our Terms and Conditions.