41 N.Y.S. 1069 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1896
It is not seriously contended but that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a recovery in plaintiff’s favor. The claim is made, however, that defendant has not had a fair trial,-in that what transpired thereon had a tendency to unduly create sympathy for the plaintiff and arouse the passions and prejudices of the jury, leading them, on account thereof, to render a verdict in excess of the pecuniary loss sustained. The evidence disclosed a case harrowing to the feelings in the extreme, and presented a condition where a duty was devolved upon the court to carefully guard the trial and prevent, so far as possible, the jury from being carried by their feelings away from-the questions which they were called upon to determine. The plaintiff, a little girl five years and nine months old, was run over by one of defendant’s trolley cars and her left leg was cut off by the wheel of the car. The evidence tended quite strongly to establish that defendant was grossly negligent in the management of the car which ran the child down, and every circumstance connected there
The legal questions involved were the negligence of the defendant and the freedom therefrom of the injured child or her parents, and, if these were found in her favor, the measurement of her pecuniary loss. These questions exclude sympathy in their determination, rebuke passion and prejudice, and are to be settled in the cold realm of sober judgment. And if the court can fairly see that this has not been accomplished upon the trial had, or if the things which were done render it probable that injustice has been worked, it becomes the duty of this court to interfere and correct the wrong, even though it be difficult or impossible to lay hand upon specific error, for the object of all trials is the accomplishment of justice. (Platt v. Munroe, 34 Barb. 291; Barrett v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628.) And it is the duty of the court, in the disposition of legal controversies, to secure to the parties their legal rights so far as the same may practically be accomplished. (Chamlerlain v. Lindsay, 1 Hun, 236.)
It appeared upon the trial that the foot of the child, which was amputated, had been preserved by the physician in a glass jar. The physician being upon the stand as a witness was asked by plaintiff’s counsel to produce it. Defendant’s counsel thereupon stated that it was admitted that the child’s leg had been amputated, and that no claim was made that it was not properly done, and objected to its production. Plaintiff’s counsel thereupon stated that the object of its production was “ to show the size of the child at the time.” Objection was made that the production of the foot was not for any legitimate purpose; this was overruled by the court and the foot was produced. The physician was then asked by plaintiff’s counsel if the foot showed any burn on it, and he answered: “ It shows the discoloration and blackening that I have spoken of.” Being asked if that was the result of a burn, he said : “ Part of it, I should, think so.” To defendant’s
Upon the trial of this case the child was present in the view of the jury; they could judge of her size at the time of the accident from that observation quite as well as they could determine her size from the appearance of this foot which had been preserved. That it would have undergone some change we can readily perceive, and the jury could receive little, if any, aid in that direction. What her size was at the time of the accident was comparatively of little importance in the determination of any issue which the case presented. Whatever the discoloration upon the foot was, whether from a burn or other causes, it had been fully described by the physician, and there was not a pretense that his testimony in this regard Avas to be controverted. Nor does it appear that the appearance of the discoloration upon the foot aided the jury in arriving at a determination of the question of defendant’s negligence in the slightest degree beyond Avhat they obtained from the description given of it by the physician. So far as the suggestion is concerned that the denials in the answer of the ampu
Upon the subject of damages the court charged the jury : “ Sixty thousand dollars has been claimed in the complaint. You cannot give any more than that. You will not give any more to this plaintiff because this defendant is a corporation nor will you give any less because it is a corporation. You will not give anything to this plaintiff out of pure sympathy, either by way of giving her a verdict at all or by way of increasing the amount, because of sympathy alone. By that I do not mean to say that you are to harden your hearts and to be unkind and unfeeling, because nothing of that kind is required of you, but I want to impress upon you that your duty is, under the law, to give only the pecuniary damages sustained by reason of this hurt, if you decide to give her anything. * * *
You will give her whatever you find that damage has been, if you decide to give her anything, to the full amount, without any reservation, giving her all that she is entitled to by way of compensation for the pecuniary or money loss she has sustained by reason of the hurt that has come to her.” At the close of the charge the following colloquy took place : “ .Mr. Moore.— I except to one part of your Honor’s charge ; your Honor said that if the jury give damages they are to give to the full, to the utmost, any damage she has received. I except to that. The Court.— I did not mean to say more than to give the full pecuniary damage — the full money loss sustained. I did
The tendency of juries to award a verdict for the plaintiff with large damages in this class of cases is as well established as any fact can be, and it is quite proper for courts, in view of this condition, to caution juries in restraint of the tendency. Frequent embarrassment is found in sustaining for the full amount verdicts in negligence cases upon any fair construction of the evidence. The charge in this case authorized the jury to award damages to the full amount claimed, $60,000, and nowhere is the charge in this respect qualified. The final charge of the court is, after the colloquy with counsel, that the jury should give, to the full, damages that would be adequate to compensate the plaintiff for the money loss sustained, and the only limitation which the court placed upon what would be the full and adequate money loss was the sum demanded in the complaint. By calling attention to the amount of the demand in the complaint and accompanying it by the statement that they could award no more, it left the jury at liberty to award that sum. The rule of law upon which the damages were to be measured was correctly stated by plaintiff’s counsel, i. <?., that they should he adequate compensation for the injury. Tlxe learned judge emphasized this by the statement that the jury could give full damages adequate to -the money loss. Without passing upon the question whether technical error was committed in the charge which was the subject of exception, we are of opinion that the charge as a whole conveyed to the jury a wrong impression as to the extent of what would be adequate compensation, which may have led them to award the very large verdict which they did, a verdict which seems excessive in amount, based upon any fair construction of the evidence. Upon the whole case we are satisfied that this verdict may have, and quite likely did, proceed from other
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
All concurred, except Bradley, J., who concurred in the result.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.