*1 ROSSON, Shirley Appellant, J. ROSSON, Appellee.
Thomas A.
Supreme Court of Alaska. Downes, Downes,
Robert B. Cole & Fair- banks, appellant. Parrish, Office,
Lance C. Parrish Law Fairbanks, appellee. RABINOWITZ,
Before and CON- NOR, BURKE, MATTHEWS COMP- TON, JJ.
OPINION COMPTON,Justice. appeal
In we must decide whether court abused its discretion equal nearly division of in a divorce action. We conclude did that it not. Maher,
Shirley
separated
husband,
from her
some-
prior
August,
In
Rosson,
married Thomas
good
allegedly in the
faith belief that her
separation from Thomas Maher had result-
subsequently
ed in a divorce.1
attorney
advised
for the Maher di-
vorce that she should obtain an annulment
Rosson,
which she did.
June
and Thomas Maher
[Shirley]
1. Thomas Rosson
and Thomas
testified that when he mar-
“were aware that
ried
he knew the Maher divorce was
was still married to Thomas Maher.”
not final. The
court found that both
*2
agreed Shirley should
Shirley that Thomas
Thomas Rosson
divorced.
and
were
have.
each other in Janu-
again
married to
ary 1977.
court concluded:
The
of the
. . . this was the intent
Because
Thom-
living together, Shirley and
While
parties,
parties
and because the
co-min-
money by developing and
as Rosson earned
funds,
parties
gled
and because the
their
selling
estate. Thomas was self-em-
real
attempt
to
made no
building
contractor.
ployed as a
properties, or
the different
self-employed as a real estate broker.
accounts,
impossible to
and because it is
offices,
two
shared
couple merged
their
consequences
determine the exact
tax
in each other’s busi-
expenses and worked
parties
and because the
have withdrawn
Following
from Thom-
nesses.
her divorce
money
personal
use and
Maher, Shirley
as
owned a substantial
just
factors,
the Court feels that the
of
real estate.2 Some
amount
equitable division that can be made is
and
by
developed
of this
and sold
equally
to divide the
between
parties [except for the two
during their
the
Shirley and Thomas Rosson
agrees Shirley should
that Thomas
have].
undevel-
while some remained
parcels]
two
all assets
Other than [these
Shirley’s name. For various
oped and in
parties
and liabilities
reasons,
parties
encountered economic
equally.
divided
of their
difficulties and toward the end
challenges numerous
appeal, Shirley
On
significant
lia-
marriage they accumulated
of these
findings
made
the court. Most
bilities.
Her
challenges are irrelevant or frivolous.3
1978, Shirley filed a com-
September
however,
argument,
central
plaint
Rosson.
for a divorce from Thomas
awarding
large share of
erred in
Thomas a
trial,
parties
At
the court found that
alleges
what she
to be her
they
had made
effort
the time
ty,
worthy
of consideration.
together
lived
their
claims that she never intended to contribute
parties
monies
and funds. The
treated all
estate
to the marital
expenses paid
received and all
as
mo-
in con-
and
cluding
jointly applied
it had become
expenses. They
nies and
financial resources to the
their efforts and
conflicting evidence was
court con-
operation of their business. The
trial,
presented at
there was substantial
parties
intent of the
cluded that it was the
court could con
evidence from which the
initially sepa-
treat all
to treat all
parties
clude that
intended
joint,
joint property,
rate or
as
with
joint property from the
of their
they
living together.4 Thomas
exception of two
of land owned
started
distribution
the maintenance and accumula-
2. We affirmed
court’s
forts toward
tion of
spring
since the
of
of
in the Maher divorce in Maher v.
1975.
parties
that by dividing property, there are other considerations the property nearly equally. As we have weighing in favor of the court’s division. indicated, previously the trial court has gained would have much if their making broad discretion when property di ultimately business ventures had been suc- visions and we will not disturb its decision Thomas, however, Shirley cessful. Unlike aggrieved unless an party shows that the capital invested little into their ventures. unjust. division is clearly Courtney v. As suggests, Shirley would like to 164, Courtney, (Alaska 1975); 542 P.2d 169 all of the unencumbered Hurn, 360, Hurn v. (Alaska 541 P.2d 360 herself, and leave Thomas with all of the 1975); Vanover, 644, Vanover v. 496 P.2d liabilities. To the extent (Alaska 1972); 645 McSmith, McSwith v. gained would have if their ventures had 387 P.2d 1963). 455 Shirley prospered, unjust it is not that she share in has not shown nearly equal division their losses. is clearly unjust under the facts of this case. suggest seems to the value of agree We with the court brought she into the that, even if Shirley’s property were con far exceeds Thomas’s or the contributions joint sidered to be rather present liabilities of their ventures. We property, prop the court’s division would be respond superior court did only can as the 09.55.210(6) er. provides part: AS regarding the lack of evidence judgment In a in an action for divorce properties values of the and the liabilities ... may provide court ... precluded making the court from a mathe- division between the of their matically precise division. While evidence separate, or ac- of each indicates that contributions coverture, substantial, quired only during ty in'the man- the court could not by Shirley ty acquired before 1975 characterization and 1977. The 1975 case is whether issue in this at reducing thoughts judgment in his on con- determine whether one of —and precise pertinent matters to so, greater tested if which—made the contribution. Merrill, findings. Merrill v. Thus, ...” if all the ac- even Ros- quired before her to Thomas separate property, son is considered as her inadequacy to the of the court’s Due abused its say we cannot possi- is not appellate review informed the division it did.
discretion record, objective is no ble on this and there engaged court that the trial is AFFIRMED.
reasoned, thoughtful decision-making proc- I would remand this ess. For this reason MATTHEWS, J., joined by RABINOW- court with directions to ITZ, case to the trial dissented. parcel findings as to the value of each make MATTHEWS, Justice, joined by RABI- explain its ra- involved and *4 WITZ, Justice, dissenting. NO Chief invading appellant’s tionale for mar- Appellant owned at the time of her property. riage appellee six of real keep as ty. The trial court allowed her to two of these six
cels; appellee given undivided one- an
half interest in the other four. equi-
While the trial court concluded result,
ty required this conclusion has perceptible support in the court’s find- MORGAN, Appellant, Ernest C. ings. particular, the court did not find v. the value of the or of the six Alaska, Appellee. STATE of marriage. The appellant brought into the might court also made no Supreme explain why tend to Court of Alaska. to this brief marriage required an able years younger bodied man more than ten become, should di-
vorce, appellant a tenant in common with
most of her 52(a) requires
Civil Rule the trial
judge non-jury specific trial enter of fact. must include Such subsidiary
“as much of the facts as is neces-
sary reviewing to disclose to the court the
steps by which the trial court reached its
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.” Kaatz,
State
1977) Miller, quoting Wright A.
Federal Practice at 710 & Procedure 2579 §
(1971). findings requirement exists not appellate meaningful, to make review
but to ensure a reasoned on the “gives
part of the trial court. It ascertaining
that he has exercised care in facts, employed and has both skill and