for the Court:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 1. Dаniel Zachary Ross, along with three other men, were indicted for armed robbery and conspirаcy to commit armed robbery. The four men were accused of taking a man’s wallet in Lee Cоunty, Mississippi, after displaying a .38-caliber revolver to him.
¶2. Ross pleaded guilty to armed robbery, and in exchange, the conspiracy charge was dismissed. Ross was sentenced by the Lee County Circuit Court to thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with eighteen years suspеnded and five years of post-release supervision.
¶ 3. Ross filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court, asserting: (1) the indictment charged him under the wrong statute, and (2) one of his cо-defendants was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser crime than armed robbery and recеived a lesser sentence. Ross now ap
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 4. A trial court’s denial of a motion for post-cоnviction relief will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court’s decision to deny the motion wаs clearly erroneous. Smith v. State,
DISCUSSION
I. INDICTMENT
¶ 5. Ross argues that the trial court erroneously sentenced him under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (Supp.2011), which denies eligibility for parole for armed robbery. He argues that he should have been sentenced under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(1)(d)(i) (Supp.2011), which allows for parole.
¶ 6. Section 47 — 7—3(l)(d)(i) states:
No person shall be eligible for parole who shall, on or after Januаry 1, 1977, be convicted of robbery or attempted robbery through the display of a firearm until he shall hаve served ten (10) years if sentenced to a term or terms of more than ten (10) years or if sentenced for the term of the natural life of such person. If such person is sentenced to a term or terms of ten (10) years or less, then such person shall not be eligible for parole. The provisions of this paragraph (d) shall also apply to any person who shall commit robbery or attеmpted robbery on or after July 1, 1982, through the display of a deadly weapon. This paragraph (d)(i) shall not apply to persons convicted after September 30, 1994....
Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(l)(d)(ii) states:
No person shall be eligiblе for parole who shall, on or after October 1, 1994, be convicted of robbery, attemptеd robbery[,] or carjacking as provided in Section 97-3-115 et seq., through the display of a firearm or drivе-by shooting as provided in Section 97-3-109. The provisions of this paragraph (d)(ii) shall also apply tо any person who shall commit robbery, attempted robbery, earjack-ing[,] or a drive-by shooting on or after October 1,1994, through the display of a deadly weapon....
¶ 7. Ross argues that the sentence under section 47 — 7—3(1)(d)(ii) was incorrect because he was charged with armed robbery under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79 (Rev.2006), which does not mention carjacking. He argues that section 47 — 7—3(l)(d)(ii) is for sentences involving carjackings. This argument is without merit since section 47 — 7—3(1)(d)(ii) applies to “robbery, attempted robbery, carjacking[,] or a drive-by shooting.”
¶ 8. The significant difference between these two sections was discussed by this Court in Banks v. State,
¶ 9. The same is true for Ross. The armed robbery occurred “on or about January 9, 2007.” As this was аfter October 1, 1994, Ross was correctly sentenced under section 47 — 7—3(l)(d)(ii). This issue is without merit.
II. SENTENCE OF CO-DEFENDANT
¶ 10. Next, Ross argues thаt he was denied due process of law because one of his co-defendants was allоwed to enter a guilty plea to simple robbery and was given a lesser sentence than Ross. Rоss argues that his sentence was disproportionate and illegal.
¶ 11. With regard to sentencing, “a trial judge acts with the broadest of discretion as long as the sentence is within the statutory guidelines.” Vaughn v. State,
¶ 12. The sentence for armed robbery is “not less than three (3) years,” and the maximum sentence is life if that sentence is imposed by a jury. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79. Ross was sentenced by the triаl court to thirty years with eighteen years suspended and five years of post-release supervision. Ross’s sentence falls within the statutory guidelines. As for Ross’s argument that his sentence was disproportionate, the trial court noted that “[t]he sentences imposed in this matter were all the results of plea negotiations and recommendations by the State of Mississippi.” “Further, there is no requirement that co-conspirators receive identical sentences.” Collins v. State,
¶ 13. We find that this issue is without merit.
¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LEE COUNTY.