Onslоw Ross appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and his sentence imposed under OCGA § 17-10-7.
While appellant was an inmate at Bibb County Law Enfоrcement *456 Center (LEC) on trusty status, he was twice taken to the dentist for teeth extractions. The first time, the dentist gave appellant a prescription for twelve 100 mg. Demerol tablets; on thе second visit, he was given a prescription for twelve 50 mg. Demerol, to be taken every four hours. According to the LEC nurse, each pill was dispensed to appellant at the time it wаs to be taken. The nurse testified she did not give appellant any pills to be taken later and did not know whether appellant “palmed” the pills. An officer testified that on July 30, 1991, another inmate who was a confidential informant told him appellant was selling 50 mg. Demerol pills to inmates. A “buy” was set up in which the informant would buy Demerol. Appellant and the informant met and when the informаnt gave the “take-down” signal, the officers stopped appellant. The arrest was planned to take place before an actual exchange to prevent destruction of evidence. Appellant was carrying in his hand a pouch containing a writing pad. Two Demerol tablets in tissue paper had been pushed up into the spine of the pаd so they would not fall out. The officer testified the arrest occurred at 5:30 p.m. Officers then searched appellant’s locker but found no more controlled substance.
Appellant denied trying to sell any pills and testified the nurse had given him two pills to take at 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.; that when he dropped the pills in the pouch he did not take time to see where they fell; and thаt the arrest occurred at 3:50, so he had not had a chance to take the first pill at 4:00.
Another inmate testified that prior to this event appellant had sold him some 100 mg. Demerol pills. Held:
1. Aрpellant urges error on the admission of the officer’s testimony that a confidential informant, who never testified, had told him appellant was selling drugs in the jail, and that the informant set up a “buy.” This wаs not error in the facts of this case.
Such evidence is inadmissible hearsay when used to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein (see
Momon v. State,
2. In his second enumeration, appellant contends the trial court erred in “permitting] testimony asserting prior acts with which appellant was never charged.” Appellant is referring to the testimony of another inmate that appellant had sold him 100 mg. Demerol pills. Trial counsel objected to this evidence on grounds that appellant had not been charged with that offense. The trial court expressed concern that appellant was not charged with this offense, but admitted the evidence to show his intent to sell Demerol.
This evidence was not objectionable on grounds that appellаnt was not charged with a crime for that act. See
Randolph v. State,
At trial appellant objected only that he had not been charged with a crime for selling 100 mg. Demerol tablets. He did not оbject at trial that the State did not give him notice of intent to introduce the evidence, or that a hearing under USCR 31.3 (B) was not held, or that the trial court did not make the required findings before admitting thе evidence. See Williams, supra. Neither did appellant raise these points in this appeal.
We recently have held that an appellant’s “failure to object to the admissiоn of similar transaction evidence on the basis that a Rule 31.3 (B) hearing was not conducted does not constitute a waiver of the procedure dictated by Rule 31.3 (B) and does not preclude our consideration of this issue on appeal.”
Riddle v. State,
208 Ga. App.
*458
8, 11 (
In
Riddle
and
Cavender,
these issues were raised on appeal by enumeration and argument. In this case, appellant’s complete failure to object at trial and his complete failure to raise these issues on appeal preclude us from addressing the issues on appeal.
Moore v. State,
3. The evidence in the case is sufficient to enable a rationаl trier of fact to find appellant guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.
Jackson v. Virginia,
4. Appellant contends he was improperly sentenced. We agree, but not for the reasons he advances. Appellant contends he had previously pled guilty to four single-count indictments оn the same day and received concurrent sentences on the four indictments, and that these convictions constituted one conviction for purposes of sentencing under thе felony recidivist statute, OCGA § 17-10-7. However, he contends the trial court counted each sentence separately. OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) provides that for purposes of recidivist sentencing under that statute, conviction of two or more crimes charged in two or more indictments or accusations “consolidated for trial” shall be deemed to be only one conviction. As these pleas were entered on the same day, we shall assume they were entered at the same time, for it does not appear otherwise.
The sentence is defectivе because the State did not give notice of intent to use these prior offenses in aggravation of punishment for this offense, as required by OCGA § 17-10-2 (a). Although it is not essential that the indictment set forth the prior offenses, if the indictment does not set forth prior offenses it is necessary that the record contain an
“affirmative
notice to defendant that his prior felony offenses would be used against him for
recidivist purposes
during sen
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tencing.”
State v. Freeman,
Judgment affirmed and sentence vacated; case remanded.