3 La. Ann. 533 | La. | 1848
Lead Opinion
The judgment of the court was pronounced by
The plaintiff, being the testamentary executor of his father, William Ross, represents that the testator left at his death five children, George, John, Robert, Ann, and himself, each of wbom inherited one-fifth of his succession; that Ann subsequently died intestate and without issue, leaving her brothers her heirs, each for one undivided fourth. He further alleges that he purchased the share of John Ross, on the 20th of June, 1835, and that the share of Robert Ross, now deceased, was purchased by him and George, he, the plaintiff, having paid $1,400, and George $600, of the purchase money. He avers that, in consequence of his purchase, John’s share in the succession is limited to the fourth of the share of Ann, and claims that the remainder be divided in the proportion of five-eighths to himself and three-eighths to George. To this petition praying fora partition'of the succession, John Ross answered, that the pretended sale under which the plaintiff claims his share in the succession was a complete and absolute nullity; that the plaintiff was legally incapable of acquiring by purchase the defendants’ interest in the succession ; that the sale was made in fraud of his rights, and that the price was inadequate and dis-proportioned to the value of the thing sold. ‘He further averred that, by reason of his incapacity to purchase, be has no title to the share of Robert. George Ross, the other defendant, filed a general denial, admitted the heirship; and joined in the prayer for a partition. The court below rendered judgment according to the prayer of the petition, and the defendants appealed.
In the case of Michoud et al. v. Girod et al., on which the defendants mainly rely, the Supreme Court of the United States remarked: « We scarcely neecf add that a purchase by a trustee of his cestui que trust, sui juris, provided it is deliberately agreed or understood between them that the relation shall be considered as dissolved, and there is a clear contract, ascertained to be such after a jealous and scrupulous examination of all the eireumstances; and it is clear that the cestui que trust intended that the trustee should buy,and there is no fraud, no concealment, and no advantage taken by the trustee of information acquired by him as trustee, will besustained in a court of equity." 4 Howard, 556. This rule of equity jurisprudence harmonizes with the dispositions of our Code. The incapacity created by arts. 1139, 1784, endures as long as the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, and no longer. If the contract by which the trustee acquires the property previously committed to his charge, necessarily terminates
The sale by two of the heirs, in this case, of their hereditary rights, necessarily implies the deliberate intention on the part of the vendors that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust should cease, so far as their shares went. There is a clear contract made by persons capable of contracting, and who intended that the trustee should buy.
Fraud and concealment are alleged, but no evidence whatever has been adduced in support of the allegation. It is contended that, in the sale of John Ross, concealment and fraud are proved by the inadequacy of the price. The evidence of this fact is very loose and unsatisfactory. But if it was the reverse, the plaintiff has pleaded the prescriptions of four and ten years ; and we are of opinion that one of the two pleas must avail him. Civil Code, arts. 1870, 2218.
Inadequacy of price is either lesion or evidence of fraud. If it is lesion, the action is barred by four years. If taken as evidence of fraud, the action is limited to ten j ears from the discovery of the fraud, which, in a case like this, must, for want of better evidence, be taken to be the date of the sale. The prohibition found in art. 1784 of the Civil Code, on which the defendants rely, is analogous to that found in art. 1596 of the Code Napoléon. The nullity which this last article establishes is held by french commentators and courts of justice to be merely relative, and introduced exclusively in the interest of the owners of the property of which that article forbids the sale. Rogron, Code Civil, on art. 1596. 3 Delvincourt, p. 66, 126, notes.
It is a rule that admits of no exception that, every man who has the right to attack an onerous contract which the law declares null for his private benefit, makes it valid and obligatory upon him by his ratification, express or implied, or, in default of ratification, by his voluntary execution of it subsequently to the period at which the obligation could have been validly confirmed or ratified. The sale made, without the formalities of law, by the tutor, of the immovables belonging to his ward, is considered in law as an absolute nullity; and yet the minor may ratify it, expressly or tacitly. L. 10, ff. Re Rebus Eorum. Toullier, vol. 7, nos. 594, 595, 596 ; vol. 8, nos. 517, 518. Every nullity which may thus be ratified, is held by the french courts to be prescribed by ten year's, under art. 1304 of the Napoléon Code, which is word for word the same as art. 2218 of our Code. This has been the jurisprudence of France ever since the ordinance of Louis XII, passed in 1510, for the purpose, as is therein stated, que les domaines etpropriüés des chases ne soient incertaines et sans súreié, es mains des possesseurs d’iceües, si longuement qu’ils Vont etc ci-devant. Francis I, in an ordinance passed in 1535, re-enacted this disposition, and gave the same reasons for its necessity. The Code Napoléon, says Toullier, has sanctioned the disposition of this ancient legislation; it does not distinguish whether the nullity is absolute or relative, or the causes in which it originates, but fixes in all cases the duration of the actions of nullity and rescission to ten yoars, in order to insure the stability of transactions and the peace of families. 7 Toullier, no. 599.
The only class of nullities to which this prescription is considered in France as inapplicable, are those resting on motives of public order or utility, or taking their source in the respect due to morals; and, even in those cases, if the con. tract ceases to be illicit, it is from that time susceptible of ratification, and the prescription of ten years is applicable to it. We must presume that our
Rehearing
Same Case — On an Application por a Re-hearincj.
The opinion of the court was pronounced by
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case remandedfor anew trial; the appellees paying the costs of this appeal.