120 Iowa 692 | Iowa | 1903
Before the adoption of the by-laws of October, 1900, defining specifically what should constitute a broken leg, there was no definition or regulation governing this matter, as we understand the record; and it is conceded that, if the plaintiff is not bound by this enactment, he is entitled to recover. The plaintiff’s action is based upon the certificate issued to him by the defendant, and it is the contract upon which his rights against the defendant must rest, and by which the liability of the defendant must be measured. The certificate which the plaintiff accepted as his contract with the defendant provides that “the articles of incorporation, fundamental laws, by-laws, rules, and regulations * * * now in force, or which may be hereafter adopted, shall together constitute the exclusive contract” between the parties.
But if it be conceded for the purposes of this case that changes in by-laws under such an agreement, can only be reasonable, we think the change here should be held valid.
It is contended that the new by-law is not retroactive. This may be conceded, and, if we were asked to apply it to a case of injury before its enactment, we are inclined to think the contention' sound; but the by-law clearly says what shall be deemed a broken leg after its enactment, and, as the plaintiff’s injury was in fact received thereafter, and when it was in force, it is clear that it was intended to and does apply to his case. Bowie v. Grand Lodge, 99 Cal. 392 (34 Pac. Rep. 103); Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc., supra.
The judgment is ARFiRMEn.'