Ross v. . ChristmanRoss v. . Christman
If we are t.o understand the answer s-Wetl by the presiding Judge to the enquiry of the jury, as lаying down the proposition, that when there is any eviof fraud or imposition in procuring the execution of an instrument as a will, the contents whereof are unknown or misrepresented to the supposed testator, the tri,ers are not qt liberty to сqnsider the dispositions of property actuаlly made therein, we should feel ourselves bound tо hold that the jury hacj beep misdirected. A cоnflict between these dispositions- and the known testamentary intentions of the deceased — thе reppgnao.ee of these dispositiоns to the claims of natural aflection or qf mрral duty. — .their conferring material benefits on thosе through whose agency the supposed ■yvill has been prepared — thesp, an,d such as thesе, are circumstances fit to be considered and weighed in conducting the judgment to a proper conclusion. But it is plain, we think, that such would not bе a fair construction of the answer.
The instrument itself had been permitted to he read to the jury, and the counsel for the caveators allowed to comment freely upon its dispositions. The jury had then been instructed that as the capacity of the deceased to' make a will, and the formal execution qf the instrument as his will were nоt ■ questioned, the only enquiry for them was whether the deceased knew the contents of the instrument, and they were directed, if they should be satisfied that he did not know the contents, to find that it was not his will. This instruction wаs never afterwards with drawn, contradicted or mоdified. When they returned with the enquiry, whether they were not at liberty, upon the issue submitted to them, to take intо consideration the dispositions in the will, his honor аnswered in the negative. But this negative was proрerly qualified and fully axplained by his accompanying observations. They were told “that the will of itself prqvеd nothing, for, that however absurd and unnatural its dispositiоns might be, yet, if from the evidence they were satisfied that the deceased knew the contents of the paper, and \yith fhat knpwledge exeсuted it as his will, intending it so to be, it wqs his will;” and that it was with a view “ to that question, all the evidence given in the case *213 was submitted to them.” Thus explained, it amountеd to no more than what must be held to be clear law, that where capacity — formal execution. — and volition all appear, no tribunаl can pronounce against a will, because of its disapprobation, however strong, of the dispositions made by the testator.
Per Curiam. Judgment below affirmed.