ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
Docket No. 149.
Plaintiff Seth Rosenfeld filed a complaint on June 19, 2007, against Defendants United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), seeking the disclosure of certain government documents under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. See Compl. ¶ 1. After multiple years of litigation, including three rounds of cross-motions for summary judgment, this Court entered a final order and judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on March 28, 2012. See Stipulation and Order to Enter Judgment (Docket No. 146), Entry of Judgment (Docket No. 147). Now before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Docket No. 149). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion and awards Plaintiff a total of $363,217.60 in fees and costs.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Seth Rosenfeld is a professional journalist. He has written numerous publications about the FBI’s activities in connection with the University of California during the Cold War, and the impact those activities had on the “academic freedom and civil liberties” of American citizens. Eighth Decl. Of Seth Rosenfeld (Docket No. 153) ¶ 1. Much of his research and writing has drawn extensively from “FBI records released pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.” Id. ¶ 5. Over the course of his career, Plaintiff has used these records to publish articles about the FBI’s activities at the University of California during nationally prominent events in the 1950s and 1960s, including the FBI’s political surveillance of University of California students and faculty, and the FBI’s attempts to oust Clark Kerr as president of the University. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff is currently writing a book about the FBI’s activities in connection with the University that expands upon his published articles. Id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiffs present case flows from a rather protracted dispute between Rosenfeld and the FBI over whether certain documents in the FBI’s custody ought to be released under FOIA. Plaintiff has, at various times, requested FBI records concerning former President Ronald Reagan “and the individuals who were closely associated with him during the Cold War period.” Id. ¶ 18. His FOIA requests asked for FBI documents on Ronald Reagan from the date of the first record on file up to the year 1979. Id. ¶ 19. Rosenfeld maintains that the records he requested “shed light on the FBI’s deep involvement with Ronald Reagan during this period, and are thus directly relevant to the FBI’s relationship with him during his Governorship and in regards to FBI activities rela
Plaintiff claims that Reagan was an FBI informant and that the FBI played an integral role in supporting Reagan’s political career. See Seventh Decl. of Seth Rosenfeld (Docket No. 138-1) ¶¶4, 6, 9. Plaintiff seeks information about how the FBI’s operations impacted Reagan’s political career, his shaping of government policy while Governor of California, and the exercise of constitutionally protected activities by American citizens during this time period. Eighth Rosenfeld Decl. ¶¶ 24-26.
On June 19, 2007, Rosenfeld filed a complaint alleging that the FBI failed to release all of the documents he requested under FOIA. Compl. ¶ 1 (Docket No. 1); see also First Amended Compl. ¶ 13 (Docket No. 13). In the five years following the filing of that complaint, the parties have gone through four separate rounds of summary judgment motions, three of which were cross-motions for summary judgment. See Docket No. 27 (Defendants’ First Motion for Summary Judgment); No. 82 (Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment); No. 99 (Defendants’ Third Motion for Summary Judgment); No. 133 (Plaintiffs Third Motion for Summary Judgment). On each of these summary judgment rounds, Rosenfeld was largely the prevailing party. See Docket No. 47 (Memorandum and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment); No. 98 (Memorandum and Order on Second Set of Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment); No. 115 (Memorandum and Order on Defendants’ Third Motion for Summary Judgment); No. 143 (Redacted Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment). This Court entered a final order and judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on March 28, 2012. Stipulation and Order to Enter Judgment (Docket No. 146); Entry of Judgment (Docket No. 147). The Plaintiff maintains that “at a minimum” this litigation led the FBI to release in excess of 3,398 pages of materials related to President Reagan, see Eighth Rosenfeld Decl. ¶ 89, in the course of what the court described as “the FBI’s Herculean efforts at compliance with [its] FOIA obligations,” see Memorandum and Order on Second Set of Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 4.
Rosenfeld now moves for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under FOIA’s fee-shifting provision. In total, Plaintiff seeks an award of $442,917.62, which includes $85,570 in fees and costs incurred by counsel for Plaintiff in preparing the instant motion. See Pl.’s Mot. for an Award of Fees and Costs (Docket No. 149) at 25; Pl.’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Mot. for Fees and Costs at 15 (“Pl.’s Reply Mem.”) (Docket No. 156). The FBI objects to Rosenfeld’s fee motion and argues that attorneys’ fees and costs should not be awarded in any amount for three reasons: (1) that Rosenfeld is ineligible to receive attorneys’ fees because he did not substantially prevail in the litigation, (2) that Rosenfeld is not entitled to an award because the FBI made good faith efforts to respond to his FOIA requests, and (3) that his requested award amount greatly exceeds what is reasonable in a case of this type. Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Award of Fees and Costs (Docket No. 155) (“Def.’s Response Brief’).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The fee-shifting provision of FOIA states that a “court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). “Substantially prevailed” in this context
The Ninth Circuit has crafted a two-step process for determining whether a party may be awarded fees and costs under § 552(a)(4)(E). To be eligible for an award, a party must show both that “(1) the filing of the action could reasonably have been regarded as necessary to obtain the information,” and that “(2) the filing of the action had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information.” Church of Scientology of California,
Once a court deems a party eligible to recover fees and costs, it then exercises its “discretion to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to fees.” Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Locke,
If a court determines that a party is both eligible and entitled to receive fees, that party “must submit his fee bill to the court for its scrutiny of the reasonableness of (a) the number of hours expended and (b) the hourly fee claimed.” Long at 1313-14. If these two figures are reasonable in light of the difficulty of the case and the skill of the attorneys involved, there is a “strong presumption” that their product “represents a reasonable award.” Long at 1314. A court may revise upward or downward the resulting “lodestar figure”
B. Eligibility for Attorneys’Fees
The FBI contends “[t]he record here shows that Plaintiff has not demonstrated significant relief though a judicial order nor a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency with respect to a not insubstantial claim,” and is, therefore, not eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees. Def.’s Response Brief at 6. If anything, the record demonstrates quite the opposite. A party has “substantially prevailed” under FOIA, as noted above, when it obtains “relief through either ... a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree; or ... a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). Thus, if a “sufficient causal nexus exists between [plaintiffs] litigation and the release of the documents,” that is enough to “warrant a determination that [plaintiff] is eligible for attorney fees.” Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv.,
The record demonstrates both that Rosenfeld’s suit against the FBI resulted in his receiving judicial orders granting the relief sought in his complaint, and that the suit acted as the “catalyst” in prompting the FBI’s “voluntary unilateral changes in position” that resulted in the disclosure of documents he sought. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed on October 22, 2007, advanced five separate causes of action seeking the disclosure of certain records pertaining to (1) former President Reagan, (2) former Alameda County prosecutor Herbert Ellingwood, (3) former University of California Vice-Chancellor Alex Sheriffs, (4) former union official Roy M. Brewer, and (5) the former President’s older brother Neil Reagan. See FAC (Docket No. 13) at 7-
The FBI claims that “no evidence beyond timing” shows that Rosenfeld’s suit “had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of information.” Def.’s Response Brief at 7. This argument overlooks the fact that “timing” can directly inform whether a “causal nexus exists between the litigation and [defendant’s] surrender of these documents.” Church of Scientology of California v. Harris,
The initiation and prosecution of this litigation, however, was in our opinion the direct cause of their disclosure, for absent this litigation, following the unsuccessful administrative request, the General Counsel’s files would never have been searched, the 31 documents would never have been identified as falling within the scope of Scientology’s FOIA request, and the documents would never have been evaluated to determine whether they should or could be released ... The timing of the Attorney General’s letter does not eliminate the fact that if the litigation had never been brought the documents would never have been disclosed. It was the litigation that produced the 31 documents, not the letter.
Harris,
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar position for assessing the causal connection between a plaintiffs FOIA suit and the release of requested documents during litigation. “[T]he mere fact that defendants have voluntarily released documents” during the pendency of a lawsuit “does not preclude an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff’ under FOIA’s fee-shifting provision. Church of Scientology of California,
As in Harris, there is no indication in the record here that the Defendants would have searched back through their files “or released any of the contents thereof in the absence of this litigation.” Harris,
This is not a case where the FBI, “upon actual and reasonable notice, made a good faith effort to search out material and to pass on whether it should be disclosed.” Harris at 588 (citing Cox v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Viewing the litigation as a whole, the record demonstrates that “but for the institution and prosecution of this suit, the
C. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
Having determined that Rosenfeld is eligible to receive a fee award, the Court next considers whether he is also entitled to an award. The decision as to whether a party is entitled to an award of fees and costs “is left to the discretion of the district court.” Church of Scientology at 489. Courts look to the four factors described in Long as a guide to exercising their discretion, keeping in' mind “the basic policy of the FOIA to encourage the maximum feasible public access to government information.” Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson,
Turning to the first Long factor — • an examination of the public benefit resulting from FOIA disclosures in this case— the Court notes that the FBI does not dispute that this factor weighs in favor of a fee award. See Def.’s Response Brief at 11 (stating that Defendants “do not necessarily contest that the information obtained through this FOIA request is of any benefit to the public”). Coupled with the court’s prior recognition that “[t]he public maintains a significant interest in knowing the extent of the FBI’s involvement in furthering Reagan’s political aspirations,” Memorandum and Order on Second Set of Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 98) at 20, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of Rosenfeld’s entitlement to fees and costs.
The next two factors — the commercial benefit to the party resulting from the disclosures and the nature of the party’s interest in the disclosed records — are closely related and often assessed together. See Church of Scientology at 494; Tax Analysts v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
As the facts described above note, Rosenfeld is a professional journalist who made his underlying FOIA request to find supporting materials for a book he is readying for publication. Eighth Rosenfeld Decl. ¶¶ 1, 30. The FBI asks this Court to depart from the general favorable treatment afforded scholars and journalists under this prong of the entitlement
Further, the “mere intention to publish a book does not necessarily mean that the nature of the plaintiffs interest is purely commercial.” Davy v. C.I.A.,
The final factor — whether the government’s rationale for withholding the records had a reasonable basis in law — directs a court to consider whether an agency’s administrative denial of a FOIA request had “a colorable basis in law,” or whether the denial “appeared to be merely to avoid embarrassment or to frustrate the requester.” Church of Scientology of California at 492, Fn. 6 (citing S.Rep. No. 93-854, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 19 (1974)). An agency denying a FOIA request “must be careful not to read the request so strictly that the requester is denied information the agency well knows exists in its files, albeit in a different form from that anticipated by the requester. To conclude otherwise would frustrate the central purpose of the Act.” Hemenway v. Hughes,
The FBI argues that this factor weighs against an award of attorneys’ fees here because “bureaucratic difficulty, not recalcitrant behavior, delayed the FBI’s response to Plaintiffs requests.” Def.’s Response Brief at 8. It maintains that, “although the Court’s orders yielded the production of some [additional] documents or information, the FBI had a reasonable basis for its initial search and disclosures.” Id. at 9. Further, “given the sheer volume of the information requested, the age of the records sought, the length and difficulty of the many searches conducted, and Plaintiffs frequent questions regarding the records,” under the circumstances “[t]he actions taken by the FBI to process and release records [were] reasonable.” Id. The court’s orders in this matter do not support the FBI’s assertion. .
As mentioned above, the court issued four separate orders in this case on the parties’ motions for summary judgment. The content of these orders reveals quite readily the unreasonableness of the government’s rationale for withholding the records requested by Rosenfeld. On the first set of Cross-Motions for Summary
Similarly, in its Order on the second set of Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court rejected Defendant’s contention that it had conducted a reasonable search for responsive documents. It found in some instances that the FBI was “unable to demonstrate that the documents identified ... are non-existent, outside the scope of the request, or irrelevant,” and in other instances the FBI’s “failure to search for, let alone produce, specific, identified documents the existence of which are not disputed demonstrates that an adequate search was not performed.” Memorandum and Order on Second Set of Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 98) at 6, 7. Indeed, the Court specifically noted how “[t]he FBI’s current position, one favoring non-disclosure over disclosure, goes against the dictates of FOIA” in that “FOIA favors disclosure.” Id. at 8. In the same Order, the Court rejected the FBI’s argument that certain of the requested Reagan-related documents were exempt from disclosure for law enforcement purposes under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c), holding that “[information regarding acts taken to protect or promote Reagan’s political career, or acts done as political favors to Reagan serve no legitimate law enforcement purpose” and “could not have been undertaken for legitimate law enforcement investigations.” Id. at 15.
In its Memorandum and Order on Defendants’ Third Motion for Summary Judgment as Moot (Docket No. 115), the Court granted and denied in part the FBI’s summary judgment motion because, although progress had been made in carrying out its FOIA responsibilities, the FBI had not yet produced “a mutually acceptable subset of [ ] responsive documents” to Rosenfeld, and was therefore ordered to “reprocess 1,300 randomly selected documents” from the pool of 13,000 responsive records and communicate the results to Rosenfeld. Id. at 8. Finally, in this Court’s Redacted Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 143), the Court rejected the FBI’s argument that a particular three-page document discussing “traffic violations of an individual closely associated with Ronald Reagan” had to be released only in redacted form due to privacy concerns and law enforcement purposes. Id. at 5.
While it is true that “the FBI engaged in extensive efforts to respond to Plaintiffs FOIA requests,” and that the FBI prevailed on some of its claims in this case, on balance the record does not support the FBI’s argument that it “had a reasonable basis for its initial search and disclosures.” Def.’s Response Brief at 9. For the most part, the FBI had no such reasonable basis. Thus, this fourth factor — whether the government’s rationale for withholding the records had a reasonable basis in law— also weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs entitlement to a fee award. In sum, all four of the Long criteria weigh in the Plaintiffs favor, and as such the Court finds that
D. Reasonableness of Amount Requested
Having concluded that “the plaintiff is both eligible for and entitled to recover fees, the award must be given and the only room for discretion concerns the reasonableness of the amount requested.” Long at 1314. In assessing the reasonableness of the amount requested, the Court turns to the plaintiffs fee bill and scrutinizes the “reasonableness of (a) the number of hours expended and (b) the hourly fee claimed. If these two figures are reasonable, then there is a ‘strong presumption’ that their product, the lodestar figure, represents a reasonable award.” Id. at 1313-14 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to “provide a detailed account of how it arrives at appropriate figures for the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
1. Hourly Fee Claimed
In assessing a reasonable hourly rate for the lodestar figure, courts consider the prevailing market rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson,
The burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence “that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum,
Plaintiff has also submitted a Declaration of Richard Pearl in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. Pearl’s declaration (“Pearl Declaration”) (Docket No. 152) describes, inter alia, his experience with attorney’s fees awarded by California courts and his opinions regarding the bills of Rosenfeld’s counsel in this case. Pearl’s data on compensation rates in this market confirms that Wheaton, an attorney with 28 years of experience, would likely command an hourly billed rate between $640 and $875, based on hourly rates paid to litigators by California law firms. See Pearl Decl. at 12-27. Similarly, Pearl’s data confirms that Greene, who has 21 years of experience, would command between $495 and $785 per hour. Id. The hourly rates requested by Wheaton and Greene in this matter fit comfortably within those ranges.
Wheaton’s declaration further states that the ‘legal fellows’ employed in his office are billed at the fee rate of $200 per hour, and student interns are billed at $100 per hour. Wheaton Decl. ¶¶ 26-27. Maria Williams, a former staff attorney in Wheaton’s office with ten years of experience in other areas of law, was billed at $250 per hour for her work on this case. Id. at 26. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence of past fee awards supporting the hourly rates claimed for legal fellows, student interns, or Ms. Williams. However, he has submitted a declaration from Richard Pearl providing market data that generally supports the rates of compensation requested for all attorneys and student workers in this case. Pearl’s data shows that attorneys with ten years of experience, such as Williams, bill at $430 to $600 per hour in this market, placing her requested billing rate of $250 per hour for this motion well below typical market value. See Pearl Decl. at 12-27. Plaintiffs requested rate of $200 per hour for Legal Fellows, who are the equivalent of entry-level associates, falls just below Pearl’s range of $225 to $395 per hour typically billed for first-year associates. Id. Plaintiffs requested rate of $100 per hour for student interns falls within the $100 to $260 range typically billed for interns and law clerks.
In this Court’s experience, the hourly rates requested here are in line with fee awards made in other recent cases in the San Francisco area. See, e.g., Californians for Disability Rights v. California Dept. of Transp., C 06-05125 SBA MEJ,
a. Laffey Matrix
The FBI argues that the hourly rates suggested by Plaintiff are unreasonably high, and proposes that the Court adopt hourly rates set forth in the líLaffey ” matrix along with applicable locality adjustments in order to set a more reasonable
In Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, the Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant’s argument that a district court should have applied the Laffey matrix in fixing an attorney fee award; the court held that “just because the Laffey matrix has been accepted in the District of Columbia does not mean that it is a sound basis for determining rates elsewhere, let alone in a legal market 3,000 miles away. It is questionable whether the matrix is a reliable measure of rates even in Alexandria, Virginia, just across the river from the nation’s capital.” Id. at 454 (citing Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,
The Court finds that Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to show that the proposed hourly rates for inclusion in the lodestar figure accurately reflect the hourly rates these individuals would likely receive in the San Francisco area legal market. Other than arguments in support of using the Laffey matrix, the government offers no rebuttal evidence to Plaintiffs proposed hourly rates.
2. Number of Hours Expended
For the purposes of calculating the ‘lodestar’ figure, the Court has discretion in determining the number of hours reasonably expended on this case. See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles,
Plaintiff submits five declarations supporting his proposal for the number of hours reasonably expended on this case. See Docket Nos. 150-152,153 Exs. 1 and 2. The information contained in the declarations can be summarized as follows:
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Attorney/Staff Member Hours Worked Hourly Rate Total
David Greene 410.2 $460-$550 $198,461.80
Geoffrey King 33.27 $200.00 $ 6,654.00
James Leonard 6.37 $200.00 1,274.00
Maria Williams 52.75 $250.00 13,187.50
Michael Gorman 43.5 $200.00 $ 8,700.00
Beniamin Stein 119.8 $200.00 $ 23,960.00
Student Interns 383.67 $100.00 38,367.00
Subtotal 1049.56 $290,604.30
Charges Billed from, January SI, 2011 to March 5, 2012
James Wheaton 52.35 $700.00 36,645.00
David Greene 21.93 $550.00 12,061.50
Lowell Chow 64.25 $200.00 $ 12,850.00
Student Interns 15.16 $100.00 $ 1,516.00
Subtotal 153.69 $ 63,072.50
Charges Billed from March 5, 2012 to Present
James Wheaton 43.35 $700.00 $ 30,345
David Greene 92.3 $550.00 50,765
Lowell Chow 22.3 $200.00 $ 4,460
Subtotal 157.95 85,570
Grand Total (All Fees & Hours) 1361.2 $439,246.80
Given the scope and length of this case, the number of court proceedings recorded in the docket, and the detailed nature of the billing records submitted by Rosenfeld’s counsel, the number of hours proposed by Plaintiff for inclusion in the initial lodestar figure appear reasonable. The record clearly shows that the parties, through multiple years of litigation including four rounds of motions for summary judgment, expended significant attorney time on this matter. As a consequence, and in light of the contested and protracted nature of this suit, the Court finds that the total number of compensable hours incurred by Plaintiff is reasonable.
a. Defendant’s Challenges
The FBI objects to Plaintiffs billing records and proposed hourly figures on five grounds: (1) that they include unjustified hours (i.e. insufficiently documented), (2) that they include time spent reviewing FOIA documents, (3) that they include duplicative or unnecessary billed time, (4) that they include hours billed by unpaid legal interns, and (5) that they include “clerical” or “administrative” time. See Def.’s Response Brief at 12-16.
In support of the first objection, the FBI points to the declaration of James Wheaton and suggests that he inexplicably shifted from billing 0.1 hours while reviewing automated ECF e-mails from this Court to 0.2 hours during the course of this case. See Def.’s Response Brief at 14. Having reviewed the declaration at issue— the Declaration of James Wheaton in Sup
To the extent that descriptions in Plaintiffs time records are general in nature, such descriptions are sufficient to support a fee award if they describe the general subject matters upon which time was spent. See San Francisco Baykeeper v. W. Bay Sanitary Dist., C-09-5676 EMC,
On the second objection — time spent reviewing FOIA documents — the FBI has failed to provide any evidence that this time billed by Plaintiffs attorneys was not spent for the purpose of litigating this case. See Pl.’s Reply Brief at 13 (describing time at issue as spent to “ensure that the agency had actually produced the records,” to “prepare motions for summary judgment,” to prepare evidence on “adequacy of searches,” etc.). No time will be subtracted from the lodestar on account of this challenge.
b. Duplicative Time
On the third issue — the inclusion of duplicative or unnecessary billed time — the FBI makes only specific mention of the fact that two attorneys spent approximately 205 hours in preparing the Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. See Def.’s Response Brief at 15. As this Court noted in last year in Stonebrae v. Toll Bros, “[w]hile it is not uncommon to have co-counsel in litigation, and fees are commonly awarded to multiple attorneys, counsel seeking fee awards bear the risk that the lodestar will be subject to scrutiny and possible reduction due to unreasonable inefficiencies and duplicative efforts engen
“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Copeland v. Marshall,
c. Billing for Unpaid Workers and “Clerical” Time
The fourth objection raised by the FBI — the inclusion of hours billed by unpaid legal interns' — does not withstand scrutiny. “If an attorney’s fee [award] ... is to yield the same level of compensation that would be available from the market, the increasingly widespread custom of separately billing for the services of paralegals and law students who serve as clerks, must be taken into account.” Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei,
Finally, the FBI’s objection to Plaintiffs attorneys’ billing for “clerical” or “administrative” time, as with many of its other objections, does not warrant a reduction in the hourly figures used to calculate the lodestar. The government’s brief on this point is rather tentative, stating “it seems likely that these fees would fall under ‘general overhead.’ ” See Def.’s Response Brief at 16 (emphasis added). The FBI offers no evidence to show that this administrative time was, in fact, spent as general overhead time needed to run a legal office, and the Plaintiffs attorneys’ clarification that entries of this kind refer to “case management tasks such as conferring with co-counsel and the client on strategy, document management, plus routine supervision of other legal personnel,” all charges “routinely billed to clients,” support its remaining in the lodestar figure. Pl.’s Reply Brief at 14. No deductions will be taken from the lodestar on account of Plaintiffs billing for “clerical” or “administrative” time, as the time captured in these entries “could reasonably have been billed to a private client.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento,
d. Unsuccessful Claims
“If a plaintiff has prevailed on some claims but not others, fees are not awarded for time spent litigating claims unrelated to the successful claims, and the trial court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.” Chavez v. City of Los Angeles,
e. Overall Exercise of Billing Judgment
While the Court rejects most of the government’s objections to Plaintiffs claimed hours in this matter, it notes that neither Plaintiffs fee motion nor his billing records demonstrate that he employed any overt or identifiable reduction in claimed hours to account for inefficiency, waste, and duplication. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley v. Eckerhart,
E. Costs Incurred Bringing Fee Motion
In addition to work performed on the merits of this case, Plaintiff seeks a total of $85,570.00 in fees for his attorneys’ time spent on this fee motion. See PL’s Fee Mot. at 25; PL’s Reply Br. at 15 (denominated “Charges Billed from March 5, 2012 to Present” in table above). In this Circuit, plaintiffs may recover attorney’s fees for time reasonably expended on a motion for attorney fees and costs. Brown v. Sullivan,
F. Lodestar Figure
Applying these rates to the hours claimed by Plaintiff results in an initial lodestar figure of $439,246.80. From this initial figure, the Court deducts $8946.00 for duplicative time, $13,688.15 to reflect Plaintiffs mixed success on the second cross-motion for summary judgment, and $17,114 from the fees on the fee motion. This results in an adjusted lodestar figure of $399,498.65. Subtracting a further ten percent from this adjusted figure to account for inefficiencies and the exercise of billing judgment results in a final fee award of $359,548.78. The Court also awards the sum of $3,668.82 representing Plaintiffs full costs in this matter as they were reasonably incurred. See Wheaton Decl. ¶ 8. Having found that Rosenfeld substantially prevailed in this suit, and that the government lacked a reasonable basis in law for withholding the records at issue, the Court rejects the FBI’s argument that costs incurred ought to be borne by each party respectively.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Rosenfeld has demonstrated both eligibility for and entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees. The record in this case demonstrates the presence of a causal nexus between Rosenfeld’s lawsuit and the FBI’s release of the documents sought by Plaintiff, and as such Plaintiff has “substantially prevailed” in prosecuting his FOIA claims. Further, all four Long factors considered by district courts in assessing entitlement to a fee award under FOIA weigh in Rosenfeld’s favor. Together, these two findings establish Rosenfeld’s eligibility and entitlement to a fee award. After scrutinizing Plaintiffs billing records, and adjusting the number of hours claimed to account for duplicative time, unsuccessful claims, and inefficiency, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and awards Plaintiff a total of $363,217.60 in fees and costs.
This order disposes of Docket No. 149.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Referring to this method of attorney fee award calculation as the "lodestar” approach may have originated with the Third Circuit’s opinion in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
. The Long court cited with approval twelve factors that may be considered in revising a fee award. They are
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.
Long at 1314 (citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.,
. A court may reduce the amount of hours used to calculate a fee award "where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles,
. This figure represents a reduction of 16.152 hours for David Greene at $500 per hour (his 2009 billing rate), and a reduction of 4.35 hours for Michael Gorman at $200 per hour (his 2009 billing rate). The FBI has pointed to no other specific instance of duplication. The Court finds no other obvious overlap except for one instance where a student intern billed 3 hours for observing a settlement conference ($300 charge), an issue that is addressed by the general billing judgment deduction taken herein.
. The Court finds that, generally, Rosenfeld lost on the extreme scope of his arguments in this motion regarding adequacy of the FBI’s search, but won on challenges regarding the withholding of specific documents (i.e. improperly claimed exemptions). For example, Plaintiff argued that the FBI had to search all of its record systems for responsive documents. The Court rejected this, and said that only systems likely to contain responsive documents had to be searched (consistent with FOIA’s requirements). The Court applied the same rationale in denying Plaintiff’s argument that all (not just likely responsive) files with designators '80' and TOO' had to be reprocessed. He also lost on his argument that the release standards in the 1996 settlement agreement ought to apply to this case.
. This figure represents ten percent of $136,881.50, the adjusted lodestar figure attributable to this motion after having deducted $8946 to account for duplicative hours. See Declaration of James Wheaton in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for [an] Award of Fees and Costs (Docket No. 150), Ex A. (claiming an initial amount of $145,827.50 for this motion).