79 A.D.2d 630 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1980
In an action to recover damages for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated May 4, 1979, which granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for punitive damages. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. In this action to recover damages for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering, plaintiff argues that punitive damages should be recoverable because of the allegedly egregious manner in which the deceased met his death. The statutes that give rise to the measure of damages in causes of action for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering (EPTL 5-4.3 and 11-3.2) either explicitly or implicitly bar the recovery of punitive damages in such actions (see Robert v Ford Motor Co., 73 AD2d 1025; Hempel v American Airlines, 102 Misc 2d 563). There is no sound basis for the adoption of a judicial initiative which would allow for the recovery of punitive damages in such actions. Plaintiff sets forth the initially appealing argument that the bar to the recovery of punitive damages in these actions constitutes a denial of equal protection under both the Federal and State Constitutions. He argues that in light of the avowed goal, where the recovery of punitive damages is permitted, of deterrence of future misconduct, there is no logic in allowing a tort-feasor whose conduct has been so severe as to result in the death of an innocent individual to escape from the remedy of punitive damages while allowing for the recovery of such damages where the injuries involved do not result in death. If punitive damages are going to prove efficacious, they must, if anything, be available to condemn and punish the conduct of the tort-feasor who causes death. In analyzing plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of EPTL 5-4.3 and 11-3.2, we must be ever conscious of the severely restricted scope of review available to us. Thus, while “The exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality * * * is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt and only as a last resort should courts strike down legislation on the ground of unconstitutionality.” (Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip, él NY2d 7, 11.) The constitutionality of the challenged legislative judgments will be upheld “if on any interpretation of the facts known or reasonably to be perceived” acceptable justification can be found (Town of Huntington v Park Shore Country Day Camp of Dix Hills, 47 NY2d 61, 66). As the classification at issue does not involve invidious, discrimination or fundamental rights, all we need find is “that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest” (New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297, 303). Actions to recover damages for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering did not exist at common law, and came into being solely as the result of legislative enactments (see Ratka v St. Francis Hosp., 44 NY2d 604; Liff v Schildkrout, 49 NY2d 622). In terminating the harsh results that existed at common law whereby a cause of action was lost when the injured party died, the Legislature, in its wisdom, chose to bar the recovery of punitive damages. Some indication of the legislative intent in this