78 Miss. 401 | Miss. | 1900
delivered the opinion of the court.
Henry Rose, being admitted to beneficial membership in the order of the Knights of Honor, had issued to him, on ¿he nineteenth day of June, 1895, by the supreme lodge, a benefit certificate in the sum of 82,000, payable at his death to his wife, ' Mary J. Rose. On the fourth day of November, 1898, he and his wife jointly sold and-transferred by writing a three-fourths interest in said certificate to David D. Wilkins. Henry Rose died on the twenty-eighth day of March, 1900, a member of the order in good standing, and soon thereafter Wilkins filed his bill against the association and Mrs. Rose to recover a three-fourths
The charter of the supreme lodge of the Knights of Honor only authorized it to pay a benefit to a member of the order, or to some of his family, or to a dependent upon a member. Mr. Wilkins is not such person, nor has he been named to the order as beneficiary. If he had been so named, he could not recover the benefit, for such contract would have clearly been ultra vires. 1 Bac. Ben. Soc. (2d ed.), §§ 295, 304, 311; Assurance Fund v. Allen, 106 Ind., 593, s.c. 7 N. E., 317.
It is to be noted that the order of Knights of Honor is created by public law, of which strangers, as well as members of the order, are bound to take notice, and Wilkins is to be charged with the knowledge that the benefit under this contract -can only be paid to a particular class of persons, to which he did not belong. 1 Bac. Ben. Soc., sec. 304; Mor. Priv. Cor. (2d ed.), sec. 591 et seq.
The assignment to Wilkins of a three-fourths interest in the •certificate by Rose and wife was inoperative and void, because it was in violation of the laws of the order, of which he was bound to take notice. 2 Beach, Priv. Corp., sec. 421.
The association only agrees to pay a benefit to a certain class •of persons as the objects of its charity, and it is bound only to the terms of its contract; and the restriction of payment to such persons inhered in the contract, by whomsoever held, whether holding by assignment or otherwise. If the bill of complaint ■of Mr. Wilkins had been adapted to the recovery of the sums •of money paid by him in behalf of Rose to keep the policy in -force, it is reasonable to’ suppose that he might recover the amount so paid, with six per centum per annum interest thereon. Harley v. Heist, 86 Ind., 196, s.c. 44 Am. Rep., 285.
The decree of the court is reversed and the case is remanded, with leave to complainant to amend his bill if he shall be so .advised. Reversed.